Schemes for encrypted key exchange are designed to provide two entities communicating over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session key to be used to achieve data integrity and/or message confidentiality. An example of a very efficient and ``elegant'' scheme for encrypted key exchange considered for standardization by the IEEE P1363 Standard working group is AuthA. This scheme was conjectured secure when the symmetric-encryption primitive is instantiated via either a cipher that closely behaves like an ``ideal cipher'', or a mask generation function that is the product of the message with a hash of the password. While the security of this scheme in the former case has been recently proven, the latter case was still an open problem. For the first time we prove in this paper that this scheme is secure under the assumptions that the hash function closely behaves like a random oracle and that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is difficult. Furthermore, since Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks have become a common threat we enhance AuthA with a mechanism to protect against them.

Authenticated Key Exchange, Diffie-Hellman, Password-Based Authentication, Dictionary Attacks

Proceedings of the 2004 International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography (PKC 2004)
(march 1-4, 2004, Singapore)
F. Bao Ed., Pages 145-158, LNCS 2947, Springer-Verlag, 2004.
© IACR 2004.

Full Paper:

Emmanuel Bresson	(DCSSI, France)
Olivier Chevassut	(Lawrence Berkeley National Lab)
David Pointcheval	(LIENS-CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure)