Section: Contracts and Grants with Industry
Contracts with Industrials
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SAPHIR-II (Sécurité et Analyse des Primitives de Hachage Innovantes et Récentes)
Security and analysis of innovating and recent hashing primitives.
Participants : Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Gaëtan Leurent, Jiqiang Lu.
From April 2009 to March 2013.
Partners: France Telecom R&D, Gemalto, EADS, SAGEM, DCSSI, Cryptolog, INRIA/Secret, UVSQ, XLIM, CryptoExperts.
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SAVE (Sécurité et Audit du Vote Electronique)
Security and audit for electronic voting.
Participants : Dario Fiore, David Pointcheval.
From December 2006 to June 2010.
Partners: France Telecom R&D, GET/ENST, GET/INT, Supélec, Cryptolog.
This project extends an earlier Crypto++ project, but for electronic voting only, and at a larger scale: not only the security at the cryptographic level will be considered (validity of the computations, correctness of the ballot, anonymity, etc) but also at the network level (infrastructure, etc).
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PACE: Pairings and Advances in Cryptology for E-cash.
Participants : Olivier Blazy, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Georg Fuchsbauer, David Pointcheval, Mehdi Tibouchi, Damien Vergnaud.
From December 2007 to November 2011.
Partners: France Telecom R&D, NXP, Gemalto, CNRS/LIX (INRIA/TANC), Univ. Caen, Cryptolog.
This project aims at studying new properties of groups (similar to pairings, or variants), and then to exploit them in order to achieve more practical e-cash systems.
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PAMPA: Password Authentication and Methods for Privacy and Anonymity.
Participants : Michel Ferreira Abdalla, Dario Fiore, David Pointcheval.
From December 2007 to November 2011.
Partners: EADS, Cryptolog.
One of the goals of this project is to improve existing password-based techniques, not only by using a stronger security model but also by integrating one-time passwords (OTP). This could avoid for example having to trust the client machine, which seems hard to guarantee in practice due the existence of numerous viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. Another extension of existing techniques is related to group applications, where we want to allow the establishment of secure multicast networks via password authentication. Several problems are specific to this scenario, such as dynamicity, robustness, and the random property of the session key, even in the presence of dishonest participants.
Finally, the need for authentication is often a concern of service providers and not of users, who are usually more interested in anonymity, in order to protect their privacy. Thus, the second goal of this project is to combine authentication methods with techniques for anonymity in order to address the different concerns of each party. However, anonymity is frequently associated with fraud, without any possible pursuit. Fortunately, cryptography makes it possible to provide conditional anonymity, which can be revoked by a judge whenever necessary. This is the type of anonymity that we will privilege.
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BEST: Broadcast Encryption for Secure Telecommunications.
Participants : Duong Hieu Phan, David Pointcheval, Mario Strefler.
From December 2009 to November 2013.
Partners: Thales, Nagra, CryptoExperts, Univ Paris 8.
This project aims at studying broadcast encryption and traitor tracing, with applications to the Pay-TV and geolocalisation services.
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ProSe: Security protocols : formal model, computational model, and implementations.
Participants : Bruno Blanchet, David Cadé, Miriam Paiola, David Pointcheval.
From December 2010 to November 2014.
Partners: ENS Cachan-INRIA/Secsi, LORIA-INRIA/Cassis, Verimag.
The goal of the project is to increase the confidence in security protocols, and in order to reach this goal, provide security proofs at three levels: the symbolic level, in which messages are terms; the computational level, in which messages are bitstrings; the implementation level: the program itself.
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PRINCE: Proven Resilience against Information leakage in Cryptographic Engineering.
Participants : Michel Ferreira Abdalla, Bruno Blanchet, David Pointcheval.
From December 2010 to November 2014.
Partners: UVSQ, Oberthur Technologies, Ingenico, Gemalto, Tranef.
We aim to undertake research in the field of leakage-resilient cryptography with a practical point of view. Our goal is to design efficient leakage-resilient cryptographic algorithms and invent new countermeasures for non-leakage-resilient cryptographic standards. These outcomes shall realize a provable level of security against side-channel attacks and come with a formally verified implementation. For this every practical aspect of the secure implementation of cryptographic schemes must be taken into account, ranging from the high-level security protocols to the cryptographic algorithms and from these algorithms to their implementation on specific devices which hardware design may feature different leakage models.
