

# About the Security of Ciphers

(Semantic Security and Pseudo-Random Permutations)

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**Abstract.** Probabilistic symmetric encryption have already been widely studied, from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, many applications require length-preserving encryption, to be patched at a minimal cost to include privacy without modifying the format (e.g. encrypted filesystems). In this paper, we thus consider the security notions for length-preserving, deterministic and symmetric encryption schemes, also termed *ciphers*: semantic security under lunchtime and challenge-adaptive adversaries. We furthermore provide some relations for this notion between different models of adversaries, and the more classical security notions for ciphers: pseudo-random permutations (PRP) and super pseudo-random permutations (SPRP).

## 1 Introduction

The main goal for any encryption scheme is secrecy: ideally, such a notion means that a ciphertext should not reveal any information about the plaintext, however powerful is the adversary. This had been defined under “perfect secrecy” [10], but also showed to be impossible, unless one uses one-time pad, which is a symmetric encryption that uses a secret key as long as the messages to be encrypted. That is, if one wants to use a small symmetric key in order to protect many plaintexts or a long message, or asymmetric encryption, such perfect secrecy is impossible.

To overcome this theoretical impossibility, but which has no real practical impact since adversaries are computationally limited, several security notions have thereafter been defined, and namely the polynomial security [4], *a.k.a.* indistinguishability of ciphertexts or semantic security. This intuitively means that no *polynomially* bounded adversary can extract any information about the plaintext, given the ciphertext.

However, in practice, an adversary is not only given the challenge ciphertext about which plaintext it wants to learn some information. It may also have access to extra information, such as plaintext-ciphertext pairs. According to the way these pairs are obtained, several kinds of attacks may be mounted: known pairs, chosen-plaintext or chosen-ciphertext attacks, in an adaptive way or not. Furthermore, when considering semantic security, the choice of the plaintexts or the ciphertexts may be allowed before the adversary has been given the challenge ciphertext (lunchtime attacks [8]), or unlimited (*challenge*-adaptive attacks [9]).

### 1.1 Some Wordings

In order to make things clear, let us note that all the adversaries considered in this paper are implicitly *adaptive*, in the sense that their queries to any oracle may depend on previous answers, but not necessarily on the challenge ciphertext they want to break (when such a specific challenge exists, as in the semantic security game, or the indistinguishability one). To make the distinction between whether the challenge ciphertext may impact the queries or not, we will use the terms “adaptive attacks” and “lunchtime attacks” respectively: in lunchtime attacks the adversary has a full and adaptive access to oracles but before the challenge ciphertext is known only, while in adaptive attacks this access is unlimited in time.

## 1.2 Motivation

Relations between various security notions for symmetric encryption, under different kinds of attacks, have been deeply studied by Bellare *et al.* [1] and Katz and Yung [6]. But they were mainly restricted to the probabilistic case. Nevertheless, many applications of encryption require length-preserving schemes. For compatibility, one may indeed want the message format to be similar, whatever it is in clear (no privacy) or encrypted (enhanced with privacy). Another famous application of encryption is for encrypted filesystems [5], which need encryption schemes able to encipher the sectors of a disk in-place, while sectors have a fixed length. Length-preserving symmetric encryption thus means *deterministic* encryption schemes. In the following we thus focus on length-preserving, deterministic and symmetric encryption schemes, also termed *ciphers*. However, from our knowledge, no analysis of *ciphers* has ever been done so far. The main reason may be that, while the security goal is privacy, no semantic security definition fits the deterministic case: it is clear that the straightforward extension of the usual notion fails when considering deterministic encryption (probabilistic encryption is a basic requirement for semantic security, when an oracle —encryption and decryption— is available at least once). As a consequence, other notions are used: pseudo-random permutation or super pseudo-random permutation properties [3, 7].

The security notion one usually requires from a block cipher is indeed to look like perfectly random permutations for random keys (family of pseudo-random permutations if one just considers chosen-plaintext attacks, or family of super pseudo-random permutations if decryption queries are also possible). This is a very strong security notion useful when the block cipher is seen as a all-purpose primitive (for providing stream ciphers with encryption modes, message authentication codes, etc.). But for confidentiality, the useful notion is secrecy only: the view of the ciphertext does not leak any useful information about the plaintext to a (polynomial) adversary. While the former notion of super pseudo-random permutations is clearly stronger than the latter, the actual relations have never been studied.

## 1.3 Previous Work

Security notions for encryption have been defined a long time ago, namely with the definition of polynomial security [4] (*a.k.a.* semantic security or indistinguishability). Bellare *et al.* [1] studied several variants of the latter, for symmetric encryption, under the names of *find-then-guess*, *left-or-right* and *real-or-random*, and relations in the concrete setting. Katz and Yung [6] studied the actual difference between these various kinds of attacks, against probabilistic symmetric encryption. Indeed, whereas in the public-key setting chosen-plaintext attack is the basic scenario for an adversary, since it can encrypt any plaintext of its choice granted the public key, in the symmetric setting, simply some known plaintext-ciphertext pairs may give extra information. However, they showed that an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (where queries are allowed even after the challenge ciphertext is known) does not help more than a lunchtime attack (where oracle accesses are limited up to the reception of the challenge ciphertext.)

As already noted, the security notion usually required from a block cipher is the (super) pseudo-randomness, which means to look like *perfectly random permutations*, for randomly chosen keys. Depending on whether a decryption oracle is available or not, one indeed considers either the super pseudo-randomness or the pseudo-randomness only, respectively. The latter notion (the weakest) has been recently studied by Desai and Miner [2]. They claimed the equivalence between this notion and the

semantic security under lunchtime chosen-plaintext attacks. Halevy and Rogaway [5] showed the equivalence between the super pseudo-randomness and the *left-and-right* indistinguishability, with (almost) unlimited oracle accesses, for tweakable ciphers.

## 1.4 Contributions

In this paper, we study the security notions of secrecy for ciphers, namely semantic security (indistinguishability of ciphertext) and (super) pseudo-randomness, with the existing relations between them.

We first show that the usual indistinguishability, modeled by the *find-then-guess* game, (with some natural restrictions) is still equivalent to the natural definition of semantic security (adapted for symmetric and deterministic encryption).

We then show that some results relative to the probabilistic case remain true for ciphers. Namely, adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks do not provide significant advantage against lunchtime attacks. More interestingly, we also consider the relation between adaptive and lunchtime chosen-ciphertext attacks, and prove that an adaptive access does not help either in the case where the cipher and its inverse are already both secure against lunchtime attacks.

Finally, for completeness, we provide relations between the above notions and the notion of (super) pseudo-random permutations. We namely prove that indistinguishability against lunchtime adversaries is equivalent to the notion of super pseudo-random permutations, when the cipher and its inverse have the same security level against lunchtime attacks: challenge-adaptive security level is not necessary. All the proofs and some additional relations, under various assumptions, are provided in the Appendix.

We believe that these results have concrete applications for practical ciphers, since the encryption and the decryption algorithms are often very similar, and thus with a similar security level. For example, when considering DES possibly using some mode of operation, under the conjecture that a slight modification of the key schedule (replacement of the left rotation by a right rotation) does not affect the security against at least lunchtime adversaries, we can show that the above results hold without any additional assumption (see Appendix C for the application.)

## 2 Security Notions for Encryption

### 2.1 Symmetric Encryption Schemes

Let us first review the formal definition of a symmetric encryption scheme  $\pi = (k, \ell, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ . It is defined by two algorithms, parameterized by a key  $k$  that is assumed to be uniformly distributed in  $\{0, 1\}^k$ . Note that the two main data in practice are  $k$ , the bit-length of the keys, and  $\ell$  the bit-length of the block to be encrypted:

- the encryption algorithm  $\mathcal{E}_k$ , which on a message  $m$  from the set  $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ , and random coins  $r$  from  $\{0, 1\}^\mu$ , outputs a ciphertext  $c$  in  $\{0, 1\}^\nu$ ;
- the decryption algorithm  $\mathcal{D}_k$ , which on a ciphertext  $c$  outputs the corresponding plaintext  $m$ , or  $\perp$  if there is no corresponding plaintext.

### 2.2 Ciphers: Length-Preserving, Deterministic and Symmetric Encryption Schemes

In the particular case of deterministic encryption, the encryption scheme does not use any random coin, since it is furthermore length-preserving, any ciphertext is valid:

it is a permutation for each key (and thus  $\mu = 0$  and  $\nu = \ell$ .) For a given cipher  $\pi = (k, \ell, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ , we can denote the inverse cipher by:

$$\pi^{-1} = (k, \ell, \mathcal{E}^{-1} = \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}^{-1} = \mathcal{E}).$$

### 2.3 Semantic Security

The natural security notion for encryption is the computational variant of perfect secrecy: the view of the ciphertext does not help to learn any information about the plaintext. This has been formalized by the notion of *semantic security* [4], for which a SEM-adversary  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  plays the following game, in two steps:

- a key  $k$  is first uniformly drawn from  $\{0, 1\}^k$ ;
- Stage 1:  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs a samplable distribution  $D$  on the set  $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ , together with a state information  $s$  to be forwarded to the second step of the attack;
- a message  $m$  is drawn from  $\{0, 1\}^\ell$  according to the distribution  $D$  (denoted  $m \stackrel{D}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\ell$ ), and a random tape  $r$  is uniformly drawn from  $\{0, 1\}^\mu$  (denoted  $r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\mu$ ) then one computes  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m; r)$ ;
- Stage 2:  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is given the state information  $s$  and the ciphertext  $c$ . It outputs a computable predicate  $f$ .

The adversary is said to be successful if  $f(m)$  is true. It means that it has been able to learn at least one bit of information about  $m$ , from the ciphertext  $c$ . However it is easy for an adversary to win all the time, by outputting a constant predicate  $f$ . Then we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks the semantic security if the predicate  $f$  holds on  $m$  with probability significantly greater than for another random plaintext  $m'$  (following the same “a priori” distribution  $D$ ).

Therefore, we define the advantage  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A})$  of an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , against the semantic security of an encryption scheme  $\pi$ , by the following distance:

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^k; (D, s) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(); \\ m, m' \stackrel{D}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\ell; r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\mu; \\ c = \mathcal{E}_k(m; r); f \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(s, c) : \\ f(m) = 1 \end{array} \right] - \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^k; (D, s) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(); \\ m, m' \stackrel{D}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\ell; r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\mu; \\ c = \mathcal{E}_k(m; r); f \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(s, c) : \\ f(m') = 1 \end{array} \right].$$

**Definition 1.** An encryption scheme  $\pi$  is said to be  $(\varepsilon, t)$ -semantically secure if for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , that runs within time  $t$ ,  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ .

**Adversaries.** Adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  may be given extra information than just the challenge ciphertext, such as plaintext-ciphertext pairs. According to the way these pairs are defined, several kinds of attacks may be mounted: known pairs, chosen-plaintext and/or chosen-ciphertext attacks. Furthermore, the choice of the plaintexts or the ciphertexts may be allowed before the adversary has been given the challenge ciphertext only, or unlimited.

Such additional information is modeled by (un)limited access to oracles that compute encryptions or decryptions. A  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -adversary  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  is a 2-stage adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  where  $\mathcal{A}_1$  (resp.  $\mathcal{A}_2$ ) can ask up to  $e_1$  and  $d_1$  (resp.  $e_2$  and  $d_2$ ) queries to the encryption and decryption oracles  $\mathcal{E}_k$  and  $\mathcal{D}_k$ , with a running time bounded by  $t$ . We cover this way the passive adversary, where  $e_1 = e_2 = d_1 = d_2 = 0$  that is denoted P0-C0, or any active adversary that is denoted PX-CY, according to the oracles access:

- $X = '1' - e_1 > 0$  but  $e_2 = 0$ ,      lunchtime chosen-plaintext (P1-CY);
- $Y = '1' - d_1 > 0$  but  $d_2 = 0$ ,      lunchtime chosen-ciphertext (PX-C1);
- $X = '2' - e_2 > 0$  whatever  $e_1$  is, adaptive chosen-plaintext (P2-CY);
- $Y = '2' - d_2 > 0$  whatever  $d_1$  is, adaptive chosen-ciphertext (PX-C2).

We remind that all the adversaries are adaptive w.r.t. the previous oracle answers, and thus by “adaptive” we mean “challenge-adaptive”, while “lunchtime” stands for “challenge-non-adaptive”.

Such a PX-CY adversary can play the attack game against semantic security, but there are natural restrictions in case of oracle access. Let us denote by  $\Lambda_{\mathcal{E}}$  ( $\Lambda_{\mathcal{D}}$  resp.) the lists of plaintext-ciphertext  $(m, c)$  pairs obtained from the encryption oracle (and the decryption oracle resp.). The superscript  $m$  (resp.  $c$ ) will be used to restrict these lists to the first coordinates (resp. the second coordinates), which thus leads to two lists of plaintexts  $\Lambda_{\mathcal{E}}^m$  and  $\Lambda_{\mathcal{D}}^m$ , and two lists of ciphertexts  $\Lambda_{\mathcal{E}}^c$  and  $\Lambda_{\mathcal{D}}^c$ . The restrictions are thus:

- if the adversary has access to the decryption oracle (that is C1 or C2), it is restricted not to ask the challenge ciphertext  $c$  in the second stage;
- in the deterministic case, if the adversary has access to the encryption oracle (that is P1 or P2), the support  $S_D$  of  $D$  (the set of plaintexts that have a non-zero probability in  $D$ ) must be disjoint with the list of the plaintexts asked to the encryption oracle at any time, or obtained from the decryption oracle during the first stage.

The former restriction is the classical one, and the latter one is quite natural for deterministic encryption. We show later (by proving equivalence with the *find-then-guess* notion) that it is a minimal restriction.

**Definition 2.** An encryption scheme  $\pi$  is said to be  $(\varepsilon, t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -semantically secure if for any  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -SEM adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , that asks at most  $e_1$  and  $d_1$  (resp.  $e_2$  and  $d_2$ ) encryption and decryption queries in the first stage (resp. in the second stage) within time  $t$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ .

## 2.4 Indistinguishability: Find-then-Guess

The *indistinguishability* security notion (also known as *find-then-guess* [1]) involves a  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -IND adversary  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  that plays the following game:

- a key  $k$  is first uniformly drawn from  $\{0, 1\}^k$ ;
- Stage 1 (find):  $\mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}$  outputs two plaintexts  $(m_0, m_1)$  together with a state information  $s$ ;
- a bit  $b$  is randomly drawn, and a random tape  $r$  is uniformly drawn from  $\{0, 1\}^{\mu}$  then one computes  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b; r)$ ;
- Stage 2 (guess):  $\mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}$  is given the state information  $s$  and the ciphertext  $c$ . It outputs its guess  $b'$  for  $b$ .

The adversary is said to be successful if  $b' = b$ . It means that it has been able to distinguish the encryption of  $m_0$  from the encryption of  $m_1$ . However it is easy for an adversary to win half the time, by simply flipping a random coin. Then we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks the *find-then-guess* security if  $b' = b$  with probability significantly greater than  $1/2$ . Therefore, we define the advantage of an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , against the *find-then-guess* security, or *indistinguishability*, of an encryption scheme  $\pi$ , by the following formula:

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) = 2 \times \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} k \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^k; (m_0, m_1, s) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}(); b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}; \\ r \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^{\mu}; c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b; r); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}(s, c) : b' = b \end{array} \right] - 1.$$

As above, there are also natural restrictions in case of oracle access:

- if the adversary has access to the decryption oracle (that is C1 or C2), it is restricted not to ask the challenge ciphertext  $c$  in the second stage;
- in the deterministic case, if the adversary has access to the encryption oracle (that is P1 or P2) it is restricted not to ask  $m_0$  or  $m_1$  to the encryption oracle at any time, or to have obtained  $m_0$  or  $m_1$  from the decryption oracle during the first stage.

Since we focus this paper on the deterministic case, one can note that the above restrictions sum up to

$$m_0, m_1 \notin \Lambda_{\mathcal{E}}^m \quad c \notin \Lambda_{\mathcal{D}}^c.$$

**Definition 3.** An encryption scheme  $\pi$  is said to be  $(\varepsilon, t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -indistinguishable if for any  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -IND adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , that asks at most  $e_1$  and  $d_1$  (resp.  $e_2$  and  $d_2$ ) encryption and decryption queries in the first stage, *a.k.a.* the find stage (resp. in the second stage, *a.k.a.* the guess stage) within time  $t$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ .

## 2.5 Pseudo-Random and Super Pseudo-Random Permutations

**Pseudo-Random Permutation.** The usual security notion one requires from a block cipher is to look like perfectly random permutations, for the keys uniformly drawn. This notion can be formalized as follows: any adversary accessing an oracle  $\mathcal{O}_b$  ( $\mathcal{O}_0$  corresponds to the perfectly random permutation  $\mathcal{P}$  —a permutation randomly chosen in the set  $\mathcal{SP}_{\ell}$  of the permutations onto  $\{0, 1\}^{\ell}$ — and  $\mathcal{O}_1$  corresponds to an encryption permutation  $\mathcal{E}_k$ , for a random key  $k$ ) cannot guess  $b$  (i.e, it cannot distinguish if it accesses the perfectly random permutation  $\mathcal{P}$  or the actual encryption algorithm  $\mathcal{E}_k$ , with a random key):

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) = 2 \times \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} k \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^k; \mathcal{P} \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{SP}_{\ell}; \mathcal{O}_0 = \mathcal{P}; \mathcal{O}_1 = \mathcal{E}_k; \\ b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_b}() : b' = b \end{array} \right] - 1.$$

**Definition 4.** An encryption scheme  $\pi$  is said to be a  $(\varepsilon, t, n)$ -pseudo-random permutation, denoted  $(\varepsilon, t, n)$ -PRP if for any  $(t, n)$ -PRP adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , that asks at most  $n$  encryption queries within time  $t$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ .

**Super Pseudo-Random Permutation.** The above notion does not take into account the decryption oracle access. Hence the stronger notion: as above, one requires that no adversary can distinguish if it accesses the perfectly random permutation  $\mathcal{P}$  or the actual cipher. But in this case, the adversary not only accesses the permutation  $\mathcal{O}_b$  itself, which is either  $\mathcal{P}$  or  $\mathcal{E}_k$ , but also its inverse  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ , which is thus either  $\mathcal{P}^{-1}$  or  $\mathcal{D}_k$ :

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{SPRP}}(\mathcal{A}) = 2 \times \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} k \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^k; \mathcal{P} \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{SP}_{\ell}; \\ (\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O}_0^{-1}) = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1}); (\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_1^{-1}) = (\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k); \\ b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_b, \mathcal{O}_b^{-1}}() : b' = b \end{array} \right] - 1.$$

**Definition 5.** An encryption scheme  $\pi$  is said to be a  $(\varepsilon, t, n, m)$ -super pseudo-random permutation, denoted  $(\varepsilon, t, n, m)$ -SPRP if for any  $(t, n, m)$ -SPRP adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , that asks at most  $n$  encryption queries and  $m$  decryption queries within time  $t$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{SPRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ .

## 2.6 Equivalences

For completeness, let us briefly recall a well-known result: indistinguishability and semantic security are equivalent security notions, if  $D$  is required to be efficiently samplable, and the predicate  $f$  to be efficiently computable. From a more concrete point of view, we can state the following theorem, which proof can be found in the Appendix A.1.

**Theorem 6.** *For any encryption scheme  $\pi = (k, \ell, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ :*

$$\frac{1}{2} \times \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{sem}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t', e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2),$$

where  $t' \leq t + 2T_D + T_f$ , if the sampling time for  $D$  is bounded by  $T_D$  and the time to evaluate predicate  $f$  is bounded by  $T_f$ .

## 3 About the Indistinguishability of Ciphers

First, as already remarked, contrary to the probabilistic case, restrictions do not exist for the challenge only, which should not have been asked to the decryption oracle, but also for  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ : they should not have been asked to the encryption oracle either, hence  $m_0, m_1 \notin \Lambda_{\mathcal{E}}^m$  and  $c \notin \Lambda_{\mathcal{D}}^c$ .

### 3.1 Normal Adversary

Moreover, in the following, we restrict any adversary to behave like a *normal* adversary, which means that

- each query is asked at most once;
- if  $m$  has been asked as an encryption query (or to  $\mathcal{O}_b$ ), with answer  $c$ , the query  $c$  will never be asked to the decryption oracle (or to  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ ) later;
- if  $c$  has been asked as a decryption query (or to  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ ), with answer  $m$ , the query  $m$  will never be asked to the encryption oracle (or to  $\mathcal{O}_b$ ) later;
- for a  $(t, n)$ -PRP adversary (or  $(t, n, m)$ -SPRP adversary, respectively), the adversary makes exactly  $n$  queries to  $\mathcal{O}_b$  ( $n$  queries to  $\mathcal{O}_b$  and  $m$  queries to  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ , respectively) .

**Proposition 7.** *Any adversary can be made normal (with just additional look up in tables.)*

The proof can be found in the Appendix A.2.

### 3.2 Adaptive Adversaries

Since we consider general adversaries, with possible oracle access, according to the values  $e_1, d_1, e_2$  and  $d_2$ , for simpler notations we omit the oracle notation  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  but simply use  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ . Oracle access is now implicit.

**Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attacks.** First, we review the property showed by Katz and Yung [6] about probabilistic symmetric encryption schemes. By the Corollary 10 below, we prove that it still holds for ciphers: an adaptive access to the encryption oracle after the challenge ciphertext is known does not significantly increase the power of an adversary which already had adaptive access to this oracle in the first stage.

**Theorem 8.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2) \leq (2e_2 + 1) \times \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, d_2).$$

*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a  $(t, e_1, e_2, d_1, d_2)$ -normal adversary against indistinguishability. We denote by  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]$  the new adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  we build using  $\mathcal{A}$ , by restricting the interactions  $\mathcal{A}$  actually has with the world. We indeed filter the queries it asks: all the queries asked by  $\mathcal{A}_1$  are forwarded (as well as the answers); however, only the first  $\epsilon_2$  encryption queries are forwarded in the second stage, extra encryption queries are answered at random, but different from any previously involved ciphertext (the decryption queries, the ciphertext answers to encryption queries, and the challenge ciphertext.) We easily see that  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]$  is normal. Note that  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2] = \mathcal{A}$  since in this case all the queries are forwarded, as well as the answers, whereas  $\mathcal{A}[0]$  is in fact an adversary who makes no encryption query in the second stage, since the queries asked by  $\mathcal{A}_2$  are answered at random, without querying  $\mathcal{E}_k$ .

**Lemma 9.** *For any  $1 \leq \epsilon_2 \leq e_2$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]) - \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1]) \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, d_2).$$

The proof of this lemma is quite similar but simpler than the proof of the Lemma 12 below. The complete proof of the present lemma can be found in the Appendix A.3. The full proof of the Lemma 12 is included below. By applying  $e_2$  times this lemma, using a classical hybrid argument, one gets

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, 0, d_2) + 2e_2 \times \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, d_2),$$

which implies the claimed result.  $\square$

In the particular case where  $d_2 = 0$ , one gets the following corollary which means that adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks do not give any additional power to an adversary.

**Corollary 10.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, 0) \leq (2e_2 + 1) \times \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1, 0, 0).$$

**Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext and Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks.** This result was already known. But the particular case of deterministic encryption admits improvements: under specific assumptions, an adaptive access to both the encryption oracle and the decryption oracle after the challenge ciphertext is known does not significantly increase the power of an adversary which already had access to these oracles in the first stage. Interestingly, the cost of the reduction is only linear in the (total) number of queries.

**Theorem 11.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :  $\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$  is upper-bounded by*

$$\left(2(e_2 + d_2) + 1\right) \left( \begin{array}{c} \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\pi-1}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1 + d_2 - 1, e_1 + e_2 + 2, 0, 0) \end{array} \right).$$



*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a  $(t, e_1, e_2, d_1, d_2)$ -normal adversary against indistinguishability. As above, we denote by  $\mathcal{A}[n]$  the new adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  we build using  $\mathcal{A}$ , by restricting the interactions  $\mathcal{A}$  actually has with the world: all the queries in the first stage are forwarded, and the answers too, but only the first  $n$  queries are answered correctly in the second stage, while extra queries are answered at random but different from any message which previously appeared in the same category: if it is an encryption query, the answer must be different from any previously involved ciphertext (the decryption queries, the ciphertext answers to encryption queries, and the challenge); if it is a decryption query, the answer must be different from any previously involved plaintext (the encryption queries, the plaintext answers to decryption queries, and the two plaintexts output of  $\mathcal{A}_1$ ). We easily see that  $\mathcal{A}[n]$  is normal. Note that  $\mathcal{A}[e_2 + d_2] = \mathcal{A}$ , since there are at most  $e_2 + d_2$  oracle queries in the second stage. However,  $\mathcal{A}[0]$  is a lunchtime adversary, since all the queries in the second stage are answered at random, without querying any oracle.

**Lemma 12.** *For any  $n \leq e_2 + d_2$ : the difference  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[n]) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[n-1])$  is upper-bounded by*

$$2 \times \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0) + \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1 + d_2 - 1, e_1 + e_2 + 2, 0, 0) \right),$$

where  $t$  is the running time of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Proof.* We construct two adversaries  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , such that for each successful execution of  $\mathcal{A}$ , one of  $\mathcal{B}$  or  $\mathcal{C}$  is successful. The former is a  $(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary against  $\pi$ , while the latter is a  $(t, d_1 + d_2 - 1, e_1 + e_2 + 2, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary against  $\pi^{-1}$ .

*Description of  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ .* Our adversaries  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  actually restrict the interactions  $\mathcal{A}$  has, the same way as  $\mathcal{A}[n-1]$  or  $\mathcal{A}[n]$  would do:  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  run  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , forwarding any query/answer to their corresponding encryption/decryption oracles<sup>1</sup>. When  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $(m_0, m_1)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  choose a random bit  $b$  and get  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$ . This value requires one more encryption query to  $\pi$  for  $\mathcal{B}_1$ , while it requires one more decryption query to  $\pi^{-1}$  for  $\mathcal{C}_1$ . Then  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  run  $\mathcal{A}_2(c)$  up to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query  $q$ , still forwarding any query/answer to their corresponding oracles, except that last  $q$  one (the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query of  $\mathcal{A}_2$ ). In the case that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  makes less than  $n$  queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  complete randomly their games by choosing immediately two random plaintexts different from any previous plaintext and outputting randomly the guesses. The advantages are thus exactly zero in this case. We thus now turn to the case where such a query  $q$  exists:

- If  $q$  is an encryption query,  $\mathcal{C}$  completes randomly its game in the above sense with a random answer since we do not care about it but only about  $\mathcal{B}$ , which attacks  $\pi$  as follows.  $\mathcal{B}_1$  chooses a random plaintext  $q_0$  for  $\pi$ , different from any previous plaintext (encryption queries and decryption answers), and then outputs  $(q_0, q_1 = q)$ . Thereafter, the challenge ciphertext  $a = \mathcal{E}_k(q_d)$  is produced, for a random bit  $d$ . On input  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  resumes  $\mathcal{A}_2$  using  $a$  for answering the query  $q$  (note that  $\mathcal{B}_2$  does not query on  $q$ ). When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs its guess  $b'$  for the bit  $b$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  outputs its guess  $d'$ , for the bit  $d$ , that is defined by the boolean value of the test  $b' = b$  (in other words, if  $b' = b$ , then  $d' = 1$ , else  $d' = 0$ ).

<sup>1</sup> Note that a query to  $\mathcal{E}_k$  corresponds to an encryption query to  $\pi$  (for  $\mathcal{B}_1$ ), while it corresponds to a decryption query to  $\pi^{-1}$  (for  $\mathcal{C}_1$ ), and similarly for a query to  $\mathcal{D}_k$ .

- If  $q$  is a decryption query,  $\mathcal{B}$  completes randomly its game in the above sense with a random answer since we do not care about it but only about  $\mathcal{C}$ , which attacks  $\pi^{-1}$  as follows.  $\mathcal{C}_1$  chooses a random plaintext  $q_0$  for  $\pi^{-1}$  (and thus a ciphertext for  $\pi$ ), different from any previous plaintext for  $\pi^{-1}$  ( $\mathcal{D}_k$  queries and  $\mathcal{E}_k$  answers) but also from  $\mathcal{E}_k(m_{\bar{b}})$  ( $\mathcal{C}_1$  must ask this further query —a decryption query for  $\pi^{-1}$ — to learn this value and avoid the collision), and then outputs  $(q_0, q_1 = q)$ . Thereafter, the challenge  $a = \mathcal{D}_k(q_d)$ , a ciphertext for  $\pi^{-1}$ , is produced for a random bit  $d$ . On input  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_2$  resumes  $\mathcal{A}_2$  using  $a$  for answering the query  $q$ . When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs its guess  $b'$  for the bit  $b$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_2$  outputs its guess  $d'$ , for the bit  $d$ , that is defined by the boolean value of the test  $b' = b$  (in other words, if  $b' = b$ , then  $d' = 1$ , else  $d' = 0$ ).

*Advantages of  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ .* We first check that  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  satisfy the access restriction to the oracles, which is easy. Indeed, in the case  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  choose a random plaintext  $q_0$  (when  $\mathcal{A}$  makes the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query), they choose it different from any previous plaintext. Then, we know that  $\mathcal{B}_2$  and  $\mathcal{C}_2$  do not ask any other query, the access restriction to the decryption oracle is then satisfied. Let us now evaluate the number of queries:

- Algorithm  $\mathcal{B}_1$  makes at most  $e_1 + e_2$  encryption queries (all the encryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query  $q$  excepted  $q$  itself and it must make one more encryption query to get  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$ ), and  $d_1 + d_2$  decryption queries (all the decryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query);
- Algorithm  $\mathcal{C}_1$  makes at most  $d_1 + d_2 - 1$  encryption queries (all the decryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query  $q$  excepted the query  $q$  itself) and  $e_1 + e_2 + 2$  decryption queries (all the encryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  query, one more query to get  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$ , and one more query to learn the value  $\mathcal{E}_k(m_{\bar{b}})$ ).

About the running time, no extra computation has to be performed by either  $\mathcal{B}$  or  $\mathcal{C}$ . We thus get the following upper-bounds, where  $t$  is the running time of  $\mathcal{A}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0), \\ \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C}) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1 + d_2 - 1, e_1 + e_2 + 2, 0, 0). \end{aligned}$$

Let us now analyze the relation between the advantages of  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , and those of  $\mathcal{A}[n]$  and  $\mathcal{A}[n - 1]$ . We denote by  $\text{Enc}^q$  the event in which  $q$  is an encryption query and we also denote by  $\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A} \mid \text{Enc}^q)$  the conditional advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  providing the event  $\text{Enc}^q$  holds, that is

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A} \mid \text{Enc}^q) = \Pr[\mathcal{A}() = 1 \mid b = 1 \wedge \text{Enc}^q] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}() = 1 \mid b = 0 \wedge \text{Enc}^q].$$

- if  $q$  is an encryption query, we have a non trivial adversary  $\mathcal{B}$ :

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) = 2 \Pr[d' = d] - 1 = \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0].$$

When  $d = 1$ , the distribution of  $b$  and  $b'$  used by  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as the usual attack game for  $\mathcal{A}[n]$ , since  $a$  is the correct answer of  $q_1 = q$ . When  $d = 0$ , the answer of the encryption query  $q$  (w.r.t.  $\pi$ ) is  $a$ , the encryption of  $q_0$  (a random distinct message), and thus a random ciphertext different from any previously involved ciphertext because of the permutation propriety of the cipher. The last

remark shows that  $\mathcal{B}$  is identical to  $\mathcal{A}[n-1]$ . Since  $d' = 1$  means  $b' = b$ , we have<sup>2</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B} \mid \text{Enc}^q) &= \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1 \wedge \text{Enc}^q] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0 \wedge \text{Enc}^q] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[n] \mid \text{Enc}^q) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[n-1] \mid \text{Enc}^q) \right). \end{aligned}$$

- if  $q$  is a decryption query, a similar argument can be provided for the adversary  $\mathcal{C}$ : when  $d = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  is identical to  $\mathcal{A}[n]$  and when  $d = 0$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  is identical to  $\mathcal{A}[n-1]$  because the encryption of  $q_0$  (a random distinct message) for  $\mathcal{C}$  is a random plaintext different from any previous plaintext (included  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ .) Therefore, we have<sup>2</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C} \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) &= \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1 \wedge \overline{\text{Enc}^q}] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0 \wedge \overline{\text{Enc}^q}] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[n] \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[n-1] \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) \right). \end{aligned}$$

In the above formula,  $\overline{\text{Enc}^q}$  denotes the negation of event  $\text{Enc}^q$ . With the remark that  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B} \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) = 0$  and  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C} \mid \text{Enc}^q) = 0$ , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Enc}^q] \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B} \mid \text{Enc}^q) &= \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0), \\ \Pr[\overline{\text{Enc}^q}] \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C} \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) &= \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(d_1 + d_2 - 1, e_1 + e_2 + 2, 0, 0). \end{aligned}$$

Combined with the two above equations, this leads to the expected result.  $\square$

Starting from  $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A}[e_2 + d_2]$ , and applying  $e_2 + d_2$  times the above relation, one gets:

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[0]) + 2(e_2 + d_2) \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1 + d_2 - 1, e_1 + e_2 + 2, 0, 0) \end{array} \right).$$

Since  $\mathcal{A}[0]$  is a  $(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary, and thus its advantage is bounded by  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, 0)$ , one gets the result.  $\square$

In many ciphers, the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm are similar. Therefore, if the cipher is secure against any lunchtime adversary (IND-P1-C1), its inverse achieves a similar security level. The above theorem implies that the cipher is actually secure against any adaptive adversary (IND-P2-C2): thus, adaptive attacks do not help against symmetric and deterministic encryption schemes.

## 4 Indistinguishability and Pseudo-Randomness

In this section, we give a relation between the notion of indistinguishability defined above and the classical security notions for ciphers, namely to provide a pseudo-random permutation family or a super pseudo-random permutation family.

### 4.1 IND-P1-C0 is Equivalent to Pseudo-Randomness

In [2], Desai and Miner claimed that:

**Proposition 13.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :*

$$\frac{1}{2} \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, 0, 0, 0) \leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{prp}}(t, e_1 + 1) \leq (e_1 + 1) \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + 1, 0, 0, 0).$$

We prove this proposition (which has not been published anywhere) in the following two theorems whose results are more general. In fact, the left relation is a particular case of Theorem 14 where  $d_1 = e_2 = d_2 = 0$ , while the right relation is a particular case of Theorem 15 where  $n = e_1 + 1$  and  $m = 0$ .

<sup>2</sup> We remind that  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A} \mid \text{E})$  denotes the conditional advantage of any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  providing the event  $\text{E}$  holds.

## 4.2 IND-P2-C2 is “almost” Equivalent to Super Pseudo-Randomness

The first theorem is the intuitive and easy direction:

**Theorem 14.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2) \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sprp}}(t, e_1 + e_2 + 1, d_1 + d_2).$$

*Proof.* We are assuming that  $\pi$  is SPRP-secure. We then show that  $\pi$  is also secure in the sense of IND-P2-C2. Let  $\mathcal{A}$  to be a  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -IND adversary attacking  $\pi$ . We want to show that  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A})$  is negligible. To this end, we describe a SPRP adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  which attacks  $\pi$  by using  $\mathcal{A}$  as a sub-program.

*Description of  $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{O}_b, \mathcal{O}_b^{-1}}$ .* Our adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_1$  by answering its encryption/decryption queries, which are simply forwarded to the oracles  $\mathcal{O}_b$  and  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ , respectively. When  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $(m_0, m_1)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses a random bit  $d$  and gets  $y_d = \mathcal{O}_b(m_d)$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  then runs  $\mathcal{A}_2(y_d)$ , still forwarding all the encryption/decryption queries of  $\mathcal{A}$  to the oracles  $\mathcal{O}_b$  and  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ , respectively. When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs its guess  $d'$  for the bit  $d$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  outputs its guess  $b'$ , for the bit  $b$ , that is defined by the boolean value of the test  $d' = d$  (i.e, if  $d' = d$ , then  $b' = 1$ , else  $b' = 0$ ).

*Advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$ .* We now consider the relation between the advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  and the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

- in the case  $b = 1$ , this game is exactly the game in which  $\mathcal{A}$  plays against  $\pi$ . The probability that  $\mathcal{B}$  outputs  $b' = 1$  is therefore the probability that  $d' = d$ :  $(\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) + 1)/2$ .
- in the case  $b = 0$ , because  $\mathcal{A}$  queries a random permutation, and  $y_d = \mathcal{P}(m_d)$  is perfectly independent with  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_2$  therefore gives an answer  $d' = d$  with probability  $1/2$ . Consequently,  $\mathcal{B}$  gives  $b' = 1$  with probability  $1/2$ .

Combining these two cases, in which  $\mathcal{A}$  is a  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -IND adversary and  $\mathcal{B}$  is a  $(t, e_1 + e_2 + 1, d_1 + d_2)$ -SPRP adversary, we get the expected result.  $\mathcal{B}$  indeed asks  $e_1 + e_2 + 1$  queries to  $\mathcal{O}_b$ , because of the extra query to get  $y_d$ .  $\square$

The other direction is less natural, and much more surprising:

**Theorem 15.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sprp}}(t, n, m) \leq (n + m) \times \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, n, m, 0, 0) + \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, m, n, 0, 0) \right).$$

*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a  $(t, n, m)$ -SPRP normal adversary against  $\pi$ . We denote by  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$  the hybrid adversary  $\mathcal{B}$ , built using  $\mathcal{A}$  by restricting its interactions: the first  $\eta$  queries to the oracles are answered by  $\mathcal{E}_k$  (for an encryption query – oracle  $\mathcal{O}$ ) and by  $\mathcal{D}_k$  (for a decryption query – oracle  $\mathcal{O}^{-1}$ ), the following queries are answered by  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{P}^{-1}$  respectively. The goal of the adversary is always to output a bit  $b'$ . We define  $\text{PI}(\mathcal{B})$  to be the probability that any adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  gives the answer  $b' = 1$ . We thus have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sprp}}(\mathcal{A}) &= \Pr[\mathcal{A}() = 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}() = 1 \mid b = 0] \\ &= \text{PI}[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}()] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1}}() = 1] = \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[n + m]) - \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[0]). \end{aligned}$$

**Lemma 16.** *For any  $\eta \leq n + m$ :*

$$\text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta]) - \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta - 1]) \leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(n, m, 0, 0) + \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(m, n, 0, 0).$$

This proof is similar to the one of the Lemma 12. The idea is that we construct two adversaries, a  $(t, n, m, 0, 0)$ -adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  against  $\pi$  and a  $(t, m, n, 0, 0)$ -adversary  $\mathcal{C}$  against  $\pi^{-1}$  such that one of their advantages is exactly equal to the left-hand side. These two adversaries run  $\mathcal{A}$  up to the  $\eta^{\text{th}}$  query of  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$  using  $\mathcal{E}_k$  for answering a query to  $\mathcal{O}_b$  and using  $\mathcal{D}_k$  for answering a query to  $\mathcal{O}_b$ . According to the type of the  $\eta^{\text{th}}$  query of  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$  (an encryption query or a decryption query),  $\mathcal{B}_1$  or  $\mathcal{C}_1$  outputs this query as one of its two chosen messages (the other is chosen randomly) and then  $\mathcal{B}_1$  or  $\mathcal{C}_1$  gives its received challenge as the answer to the  $\eta^{\text{th}}$  query of  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{B}_2$  or  $\mathcal{C}_2$  then outputs its guess according to the guess of  $\mathcal{A}$  without making any query.

The full proof can be found in Appendix A.4.

Applying  $n + m$  times this lemma, we obtain the expected result.  $\square$

From these two theorems, we see that a cipher is a super pseudo-random permutation if and only if itself and its inverse achieve semantic security against any lunchtime adversary (IND-P1-C1). In other words, under the conjecture that a cipher and its inverse achieve a similar security level secure against any lunchtime adversary, SPRP and IND-P1-C1 are equivalent with a linear-cost reduction.

The more intuitive equivalence, between IND-P2-C2 and SPRP, can be obtained under a weaker condition: if  $\pi^{-1}$  is just IND-P1-C0. This result is given in details in the Appendix B.

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## 5 Conclusion

Many block ciphers are built in such a way that the encryption and the decryption algorithms are similar, for efficiency reasons (smaller code). Then intuitively, they may have similar security levels, at least against lunchtime attacks. This is for example the case with the most famous block cipher, that is DES, under a very weak conjecture (see Appendix C).

Based on such an assumption, we have proven that adaptive attacks do not help for breaking semantic security. We also proved that the most classical security notion for ciphers (to be a super pseudo-random permutation family) is equivalent to semantic security against adaptive attacks, but thus also against lunchtime attacks only.

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## A Proofs

### A.1 Proof of Theorem 6

First, let  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  be a  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -adversary against indistinguishability. We define the following  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -adversary  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{B}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  against semantic security:

- $k \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^k$ ;
- $\mathcal{B}_1$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , and forwards all the query-answers to/from the oracles (the same number of queries are thus asked). When  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs two plaintexts  $(m_0, m_1)$  and  $s$ , one defines and outputs the distribution  $D = \{m_0, m_1\}$  (the uniform distribution among the two messages) together with the state information  $s$ ;
- $m \xleftarrow{D} \{0, 1\}^\ell$ ,  $r \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^\mu$  and  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m; r)$  (note this is equivalent to  $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}$ ,  $r \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^\mu$  and  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b; r)$ );
- $\mathcal{B}_2$  is given the state information  $s$  and the ciphertext  $c$ , which it forwards to  $\mathcal{A}_2$ . it also forwards all the query-answers to/from the oracles (the same number of queries are thus asked). When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs its guess  $b'$  for  $b$ , one defines  $f(x)$  to be the predicate  $x = m_{b'}$ .

By definition, if we consider the distribution  $D$  for  $m'$ , that is equivalent to the random choice of a bit  $d$  independent to  $b$  and  $b'$ , and  $m' = m_d$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) &= 2 \times \Pr[b' = b] - 1 \\
 \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{B}) &= \Pr[f(m)] - \Pr[f(m')] = \Pr[m_b = m_{b'}] - \Pr[m_d = m_{b'}] \\
 &= \Pr[b = b'] + \Pr[b \neq b' \wedge m_0 = m_1] - \Pr[d = b'] - \Pr[d \neq b' \wedge m_0 = m_1] \\
 &= \left( \Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \Pr[b \neq b' \mid m_0 = m_1] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \times \Pr[m_0 = m_1].
 \end{aligned}$$

Note that if  $m_0 = m_1$  then, from an information theoretical point of view, the adversary has no information about  $b$ , thus  $b'$  is perfectly independent of  $b$ , then  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) = 2 \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{B})$ . Furthermore, the running time of  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as the running time of  $\mathcal{A}$  since no computation is done. Therefore, if the running time of  $\mathcal{A}$  is bounded by  $t$ ,  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ .

From the restrictions point of view, if  $\mathcal{A}$  has access to the decryption oracle, it is not allowed to use it on the challenge  $c$ , thus  $\mathcal{B}$  does not make such a wrong query either. If the scheme is deterministic,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not allowed to ask either  $m_0$  or  $m_1$  to the

encryption oracle. Thus  $\mathcal{B}$  will not do it either: they are exactly the two messages whose probability is not zero in  $D$ .

Let us turn to the second part of the relation. Let  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  be a  $(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -adversary against the semantic security. We define the following  $(t', e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2)$ -adversary  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k}, \mathcal{B}_2^{\mathcal{E}_k, \mathcal{D}_k})$  against indistinguishability:

- $k \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^k$ ;
- $\mathcal{B}_1$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , and forwards all the query-answers to/from the oracles (the same number of queries are thus asked). When  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs a distribution  $D$  and  $s$ , one draws independently two plaintexts  $(m_0, m_1)$  using  $D$ , and outputs them together with the state information  $s$ ;
- $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}$ ,  $r \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^\mu$  and  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b; r)$
- $\mathcal{B}_2$  is given the state information  $s$  and the ciphertext  $c$ , which it forwards to  $\mathcal{A}_2$ . it also forwards all the query-answers to/from the oracles (the same number of queries are thus asked). When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs  $f$ , one checks whether  $f(m_0)$  holds. If it is true, one outputs  $b' = 0$ , otherwise  $b' = 1$ .

By definition, if we consider the distribution  $D$  for  $m'$ , that is equivalent to  $m' = m_{\bar{b}}$  (where  $\bar{b} = 1 - b$ ), and the event  $\mathbf{E}$ , which means  $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) &= \Pr[f(m_b)] - \Pr[f(m')] = \Pr[f(m_b)] - \Pr[f(m_{\bar{b}})] \\ &= \Pr[f(m_b) \wedge \neg \mathbf{E}] - \Pr[f(m_{\bar{b}}) \wedge \neg \mathbf{E}] \\ &= \Pr[\neg \mathbf{E}] \times (\Pr[f(m_b) | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \Pr[\neg f(m_b) | \neg \mathbf{E}]) \\ \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) &= 2 \times \Pr[b' = b] - 1 = \Pr[f(m_0) | b = 0] - \Pr[f(m_0) | b = 1] \\ &= \Pr[f(m_b) \wedge \mathbf{E} | b = 0] + \Pr[f(m_b) \wedge \neg \mathbf{E} | b = 0] \\ &\quad - \Pr[f(m_b) \wedge \mathbf{E} | b = 1] - \Pr[\neg f(m_b) \wedge \neg \mathbf{E} | b = 1]. \end{aligned}$$

The output of  $\mathcal{A}$  does not depend on the actual value of  $b$ , but on  $c$  only, thus

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) &= \Pr[f(m_b) \wedge \neg \mathbf{E}] - \Pr[\neg f(m_b) \wedge \neg \mathbf{E}] \\ &= \Pr[\neg \mathbf{E}] \times (\Pr[f(m_b) | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \Pr[\neg f(m_b) | \neg \mathbf{E}]) = \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}). \end{aligned}$$

Note that the running time of  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as of  $\mathcal{A}$  plus two samplings using  $D$  and one evaluation of  $f$ . Then if the running time of  $\mathcal{A}$  is bounded by  $t$ , sampling one element using  $D$  is bounded by  $T_D$  and evaluating  $f$  is bounded by  $T_f$ :

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t + 2T_D + T_f, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2).$$

From the restrictions point of view, if  $\mathcal{A}$  has access to the decryption oracle, it is not allowed to use it on the challenge  $c$ , thus  $\mathcal{B}$  does not make such a wrong query either. If the scheme is deterministic,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not allowed to ask a message whose probability is not zero in  $D$ . Thus  $\mathcal{B}$  will not ask either  $m_0$  or  $m_1$  to the encryption oracle.  $\square$

## A.2 Proof of Proposition 7

We show that we can transform any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  into a normal adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  without decreasing its power. This can be simply done by bookkeeping all the query-answers. We indeed store all the query-answers  $(m, c)$  in a list  $\mathcal{A}$ , which is initially set to empty. Whenever the adversary asks an encryption query  $m$ , one first looks into the list  $\mathcal{A}$  whether there is a pair  $(m, c)$ . In such a case, the adversary is given back  $c$ , otherwise

$m$  is queried to the encryption oracle to get the answer  $c$ , then one stores the pair  $(m, c)$  into the list. Any decryption query is proceeded in the same way. Since the encryption algorithm is deterministic (and the decryption algorithm too), there is a unique answer to each query.

So the above simulation of oracles is perfect. The cost is just some look up in a list (which admits very efficient techniques).  $\square$

### A.3 Proof of Lemma 9

We construct  $\mathcal{B}$ , a  $(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, d_2)$ -IND adversary attacking  $\pi$  whose advantage is exactly the left-hand side of the relation.

*Description of  $\mathcal{B}$ .* Our adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  restricts interactions of  $\mathcal{A}$  with the world, as  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1]$  or  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]$  would do:  $\mathcal{B}_1$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , forwarding any query/answer to the encryption/decryption oracle; when  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $(m_0, m_1)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_1$  chooses a random bit  $b$  and gets  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$  (we see here that  $\mathcal{B}_1$  makes one more encryption query to get  $c$ ); then  $\mathcal{B}_1$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_2(c)$  up to the  $\epsilon_2^{\text{th}}$  encryption query  $q$ , still forwarding any query/answer to the encryption/decryption oracle, except that last  $q$  one.

In the case that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  makes less than  $\epsilon_2$  encryption queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses immediately two random plaintexts, but different from any previously involved plaintext and outputs randomly its guess  $d'$ . We consider now the case where such a query  $q$  exists.  $\mathcal{B}_1$  also chooses a random plaintext  $q_0$ , but different from any previously involved plaintext (included  $m_b$ ), and then outputs  $(q_0, q_1 = q)$ . Thereafter, a challenge ciphertext  $a$  of  $q_d$  is produced, for a random bit  $d$ .

On input  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  resumes  $\mathcal{A}_2$  using  $a$  for answering the query  $q$  (remark that  $\mathcal{B}$  does not query on  $q$ , which thus makes one less query).  $\mathcal{B}_2$  follows up, still forwarding any decryption query/answer from  $\mathcal{A}_2$  to its decryption oracle, while encryption queries are answered at random, but different from any previously involved plaintext. When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs its guess  $b'$  for the bit  $b$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  outputs its guess  $d'$ , for the bit  $d$ , that is defined by the boolean value of the test  $b' = b$  (i.e, if  $b' = b$ , then  $d' = 1$ , else  $d' = 0$ ).

We can note that  $\mathcal{B}_1$  makes at most  $(e_1 + e_2)$  encryption queries (all the encryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the  $\epsilon_2^{\text{th}}$  query  $q$  in the second stage, but not  $q$  itself; it must make one more encryption query to get  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$ ), and at most  $(d_1 + d_2)$  decryption queries. From its side,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  makes no encryption query and at most  $d_2$  decryption queries.

*Advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$ .* We first check that  $\mathcal{B}$  satisfies the access restriction to the oracles. Indeed, in the case  $\mathcal{A}_2$  makes less than  $\epsilon_2$  encryption queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  does not make any more query, so  $\mathcal{B}$  satisfies the access restriction. In the other case, when  $\mathcal{B}_1$  chooses a random plaintext  $q_0$ , it chooses it different from any previous plaintext. Then, we know that  $\mathcal{B}_2$  does not ask any other encryption query since  $q$  is the last real encryption query of  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]$ . About the access restriction to the decryption oracle,  $a$  is assumed to be the ciphertext of  $q$ , it means that for  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $a$  is assumed to be the ciphertext of the plaintext  $q$ , and thus  $a$  is never asked since  $\mathcal{A}$  is a normal adversary. Algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  is thus a  $(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, d_2)$ -adversary:

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2, 0, d_2).$$

Let us now analyze the relation between the advantages of  $\mathcal{B}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]$  and  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1]$ . In the case that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  makes less than  $\epsilon_2$  encryption queries, the advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  is zero



which is trivially equal to  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1])$  since  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2] = \mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1]$ . In the case that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  makes more than  $\epsilon_2$  encryption queries, we have<sup>3</sup>:

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi_\beta}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) = \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0].$$

When  $d = 1$ , the distribution of  $b$  and  $b'$  used by  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as the usual attack game for  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]$ , since  $a$  is the correct answer of  $q_1 = q$ . When  $d = 0$ , the answer of the encryption query  $q$  (w.r.t.  $\pi$ ) is  $a$ , the encryption of  $q_0$  (a random distinct message), and thus a random ciphertext different from any previous ciphertext (included the challenge of  $\mathcal{A}$ ), because of the permutation propriety of the cipher. The last remark shows that the distribution of  $b$  and  $b'$  used by  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as the attack game for  $\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1]$ .

Since  $d' = 1$  means  $b' = b$ , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) &= \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \times \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2]) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\epsilon_2 - 1]) \right). \end{aligned}$$

□

#### A.4 Proof of Lemma 16

We construct two adversaries, a  $(t, n, m, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  against the cipher  $\pi$  and a  $(t, m, n, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary  $\mathcal{C}$  against the inverse  $\pi^{-1}$  such that one of their advantages is exactly equal to the left-hand side.

*Description of  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ .* Our adversaries  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  restrict the interactions  $\mathcal{A}$  has with the world, the same way as it would be for  $\mathcal{A}[\eta - 1]$  or  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$ .  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  run  $\mathcal{A}$ , forwarding all the first  $\eta - 1$  query/answer of  $\mathcal{A}$  to their corresponding oracles (for a query  $x$  to  $\mathcal{O}_b$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  answer  $\mathcal{E}_k(x)$  which is a  $\pi$ -encryption query for the former and a  $\pi^{-1}$ -decryption query for the latter, and for a query  $y$  to  $\mathcal{O}_b^{-1}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  answer  $\mathcal{D}(x)$ , which is a  $\pi$ -decryption query for the former and a  $\pi^{-1}$ -encryption query for the latter). We now consider the  $\eta^{\text{th}}$  query  $q$  of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

- If  $q$  is an encryption query,  $\mathcal{C}$  completes randomly its game by choosing immediately its two random plaintexts, but different from any previous plaintext and outputting randomly the guess  $d'$ , whereas  $\mathcal{B}$  attacks  $\pi$  as follows.  $\mathcal{B}_1$  chooses a random plaintext  $q_1$ , but different from any previous plaintext, and then outputs  $q_0 = q, q_1$ . Thereafter, a challenge ciphertext  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(q_d)$  is produced, for a random bit  $d$ .  $\mathcal{B}_2$ , on input  $c$ , resumes  $\mathcal{A}$ , outputting  $c$  as the answer for the query  $q$ . For the other queries of  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  answers randomly but consistently. Finally, when  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs its guess  $b'$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  outputs (without making any query) its guess  $d'$ , for the bit  $d$ , that is defined equal to  $b'$ .
- If  $q$  is a decryption query,  $\mathcal{B}$  completes randomly its game by choosing immediately its two random plaintexts, but different from any previous plaintext and outputting randomly the guess  $d'$ , whereas  $\mathcal{C}$  attacks  $\pi^{-1}$  as follows.  $\mathcal{C}_1$  chooses a random ciphertext  $q_1$ , but different from any previous ciphertext, and then outputs  $q_0 = q, q_1$ . Thereafter, a plaintext (the challenge  $\pi^{-1}$ -ciphertext  $c = \mathcal{D}_k(q_d)$ ) is produced, for a random bit  $d$ .  $\mathcal{C}_1$  give  $c$  as an answer for the query  $q$  of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

<sup>3</sup>  $d$  and  $d'$  follow the distribution obtained in the above game:  $d$  is the challenge random bit, while  $d'$  is the output of  $\mathcal{B}$ .

For the other queries of  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_1$  answer randomly but consistently. Finally, when  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs its guess  $b'$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_2$  outputs (without making any query) its guess  $d'$ , for the bit  $d$ , that is defined equal to  $b'$ .

We note that  $\mathcal{B}_1$  makes at most  $n$  encryption queries and  $m$  decryption queries to  $\pi$ , while  $\mathcal{C}_1$  makes at most  $m$  encryption queries and  $n$  decryption queries to  $\pi^{-1}$ . From their sides,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  and  $\mathcal{C}_2$  make no encryption query and no decryption query.

*Advantages of  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ .* We first check that  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  satisfy the access restriction to the oracles. Indeed, when  $\mathcal{B}_1$  and  $\mathcal{C}_1$  choose a random plaintext  $q_0$ , they choose it different from any previous plaintext. Algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  is thus a  $(n, m, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary against  $\pi$ , and algorithm  $\mathcal{C}$  is a  $(m, n, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary against  $\pi^{-1}$ , within the same running time  $t$  as  $\mathcal{A}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) &\leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, n, m, 0, 0), \\ \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C}) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, m, n, 0, 0).\end{aligned}$$

Let us now analyze the relation between the advantages of  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , and  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$  and  $\mathcal{A}[\eta - 1]$ . We denote by  $\text{Enc}^q$  the event that  $q$  is an encryption query and we also denote by  $\text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta] \mid \text{Enc}^q)$  the conditional probability that  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$  outputs 1, providing the event  $\text{Enc}^q$ , and by  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A} \mid \text{Enc}^q)$  the conditional advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  providing the event  $\text{Enc}^q$ .

–  $q$  is a encryption query. We indeed have:

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) = \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0].$$

When  $d = 1$ , the distribution of  $b'$  used by  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as in the game that  $\mathcal{A}[\eta]$  would play, since  $a$  is the correct answer of  $q_1 = q$ . When  $d = 0$ , the answer of the encryption query  $q$  is  $a$ , the encryption of  $q_0$  (a random distinct message), and thus a random ciphertext different from previous ciphertext, because of the permutation propriety of the cipher. The last remark shows the game that  $\mathcal{B}$  plays is identical to the one that  $\mathcal{A}[\eta - 1]$  would play. Since  $d' = 1$  means that  $b' = 1$ , we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B} \mid \text{Enc}^q) &= \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1 \wedge \text{Enc}^q] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0 \wedge \text{Enc}^q] \\ &= \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta] \wedge \text{Enc}^q) - \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta - 1] \wedge \text{Enc}^q).\end{aligned}$$

–  $q$  is a decryption query. The same way as above, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C} \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) &= \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1 \wedge \overline{\text{Enc}^q}] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0 \wedge \overline{\text{Enc}^q}] \\ &= \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta] \wedge \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) - \text{PI}(\mathcal{A}[\eta - 1] \wedge \overline{\text{Enc}^q}).\end{aligned}$$

Using the remark that  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B} \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) = 0$  and  $\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C} \mid \text{Enc}^q) = 0$ , one gets,

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[\text{Enc}^q] \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B} \mid \text{Enc}^q) &\leq \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(n, m, 0, 0), \\ \Pr[\overline{\text{Enc}^q}] \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{C} \mid \overline{\text{Enc}^q}) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(m, n, 0, 0).\end{aligned}$$

One then easily concludes.  $\square$

## B A Weaker Assumption for the Equivalence between IND-P2-C2 and SPRP

**Theorem 17.** *For any cipher  $\pi$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, 0, 0, 0) \leq 2d_1 \times \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1, e_1 + 1, 0, e_1).$$

*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a  $(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0)$ -IND adversary against  $\pi$ . We denote by  $\mathcal{A}[\delta_1]$  the adversary  $\mathcal{B}$ , built by using  $\mathcal{A}$ , restricting its interactions with the world: at most  $\delta_1$  decryption queries are answered correctly in the first stage, extra decryption queries are answered at random, but different from any previously involved plaintext. Note that  $\mathcal{A}[d_1] = \mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{A}[0]$  is in fact an adversary who makes no decryption query.

**Lemma 18.** *For any  $1 \leq \delta_1 \leq d_1$ :*

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\delta_1]) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\delta_1 - 1]) \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1 - 1, e_1 + 1, 0, e_1).$$

*Proof.* We construct a  $(t, d_1 - 1, e_1 + 1, 0, e_1)$ -IND adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  against  $\pi^{-1}$  whose advantage is equal to the left-hand side of the above relation.

*Description of  $\mathcal{B}$ .* Our adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$ , by intercepting the query-answer, so that it behaves like  $\mathcal{A}[\delta_1]$ :  $\mathcal{B}_1$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , forwarding any query/answer to the encryption/decryption oracle until the  $\delta_1^{\text{th}}$  decryption query of  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that an encryption query from  $\mathcal{A}$  will be a decryption query for  $\mathcal{B}$ . In the case that  $\mathcal{A}_1$  makes less than  $\delta_1$  encryption queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses immediately two random plaintexts (to  $\pi^{-1}$ ), but different from any previous plaintext and output randomly its guess  $d'$ . We consider now the case where such a query  $q$  exists,  $\mathcal{B}_1$  chooses randomly  $q_0$ , but different from any previous plaintext, and then outputs  $(q_0, q_1 = q)$ . Thereafter, a challenge ciphertext  $a$  of  $q_d$  is produced, for a random bit  $d$  (and for the cipher  $\pi^{-1}$ ). On input  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  resumes  $\mathcal{A}_1$  using  $a$  for answering the query  $q$ .  $\mathcal{B}_2$  follows up by forwarding any encryption query/answer of  $\mathcal{A}$  to its decryption oracle. decryption queries from  $\mathcal{B}$  are answered at random, but consistently. When  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $(m_0, m_1)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  chooses a random bit  $b$  and gets  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$  ( $\mathcal{B}_2$  then makes one more decryption query —to  $\pi^{-1}$ — to get  $c$ ); then  $\mathcal{B}_2$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_2(c)$ . When  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs its guess  $b'$  for the bit  $b$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  outputs its guess  $d'$ , for the bit  $d$ , that is defined by the boolean value of the test  $b' = b$  (i.e, if  $b' = b$ , then  $d' = 1$ , else  $d' = 0$ ). We can note that  $\mathcal{B}_1$  makes at most  $(d_1 - 1)$  encryption queries (all the decryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the decryption query  $q$  but not this query), and at most  $e_1 + 1$  decryption queries (all the encryption queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes up to the decryption query  $q$  and one more query to get  $c = \mathcal{E}_k(m_b)$ ). From its side,  $\mathcal{B}_2$  makes no encryption query and at most  $e_1$  decryption queries.

*Advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$ .* We first check that  $\mathcal{B}$  satisfies the access restriction to the oracles. Indeed, when  $\mathcal{B}_1$  chooses a random plaintext  $q_0$ , it chooses it different from any previous plaintext. Then, we know that  $\mathcal{B}_2$  does not ask any other encryption query. About the access restriction to the decryption oracle,  $a$  is assumed to be the plaintext of the ciphertext  $q$  of  $\mathcal{A}$ , and thus  $a$  is never asked since  $\mathcal{A}$  is a normal adversary. Algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  is thus a  $(d_1 - 1, e_1 + 1, 0, e_1)$ -IND adversary against  $\pi^{-1}$  within the same running time  $t$  as  $\mathcal{A}$ :

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, d_1 - 1, e_1 + 1, 0, e_1).$$

Let us now analyze the relation between the advantages of  $\mathcal{B}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}[\delta_1]$  and  $\mathcal{A}[\delta_1 - 1]$ . We indeed have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) = \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0].$$

When  $d = 1$ , the distribution of  $b$  and  $b'$  used by  $\mathcal{B}$  is exactly the same as in  $\mathcal{A}[\delta_1]$ , since  $a$  is the correct answer of  $q_1 = q$ . When  $d = 0$ , the answer of the decryption query  $q$  (w.r.t.  $\pi$ ) is  $a$ , the decryption of  $q_0$  (a random distinct message), and thus a random plaintext different from any previous plaintext, because of the permutation propriety of the cipher. The last remark shows the  $\mathcal{B}$  is identical to  $\mathcal{A}[\delta_1 - 1]$ . Since  $d' = 1$  means  $b' = b$ , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{B}) &= \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 1] - \Pr[d' = 1 \mid d = 0] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \times (\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\delta_1]) - \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(\mathcal{A}[\delta_1 - 1])). \end{aligned}$$

□

By applying  $d_1$  times the above lemma, one easily concludes the proof of the Theorem 17. □

**Theorem 19.**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sprp}}(t, n, m) &\leq n \times (m + n) \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, n, m + 1, 0, m) \\ &\quad + (m + n) \times \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, n, m, 0, 0) + \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, m, 0, 0, 0) \right). \end{aligned}$$

*Proof.* By the Theorem 15:

$$\text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{sprp}}(t, n, m) \leq (n + m) \times \left( \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, n, m, 0, 0) + \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, m, n, 0, 0) \right).$$

By the above Theorem 17, applied to  $\pi^{-1}$ , one gets:

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, m, n, 0, 0) \leq \text{Adv}_{\pi^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, m, 0, 0, 0) + 2n \times \text{Adv}_\pi^{\text{ind}}(t, n, m + 1, 0, m).$$

Which concludes the proof. □

From the Theorems 14 and 19, we immediately deduce the following corollary:

**Corollary 20.** *For any cipher  $\pi$  such that its inverse  $\pi^{-1}$  is IND-P1-C0 secure, the notions of indistinguishability against adaptive adversaries and super pseudo-random permutations are equivalent.*

## C An Application to DES

We first remark that, in all Feistel-like ciphers, the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm are almost similar. The only difference is just that encryption uses the sub-key  $K_i$  for round  $i$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, n$  where  $n$  is the number of round), while decryption uses the sub-key  $K_{n+1-i}$  for round  $i$ . Therefore, if we make a conjecture that the use of the key expansion or its inverse does not affect the security of the ciphers, we can prove that adaptive attacks do not help against any symmetric and deterministic encryption of Feistel construction. This remark extends to any construction beyond the basic primitive, using any mode of operation.

For the case of DES, we show that this conjecture is true when a slight modification of the key schedule, changing the left rotation by a right rotation, does not make a difference, from a security point of view. In this case, adaptive attacks do not help against any construction beyond DES, in order to break semantic security.

*The Key Schedule of DES.* We briefly review the key schedule of DES that we call here *the left key schedule*, and we denote by  $\text{DES}_L$  the cipher DES.

**Input** : The master key  $K$ , a sequence of 56 bits (we omit the parity check bits).

**Output** : The sub-keys  $K_1, \dots, K_{16}$ .

**Process** :

- Step 0: Transformation of the master key  $K$  in  $L_0 = (C_0, D_0)$  by the permutation table PC-1.  $L_0$  is a sequence of 56 bits (two halves of 28 bits).

For any  $i = 1, \dots, 16$ ,

- Step  $i$ : Transformation of  $L_{i-1} = (C_{i-1}, D_{i-1})$  into  $L_i = (C_i, D_i)$ , where  $C_i = \text{LR}_i(C_{i-1})$  and  $D_i = \text{LR}_i(D_{i-1})$ . In the above transformation,  $\text{LR}_i$  denotes the left rotation of either 2 positions or only one position (when  $i = 1, 2, 9, 16$ ). We denote by  $\text{LO}$  the *left* rotations that operate on the whole state:  $L_i = \text{LO}_i(L_{i-1})$ .

Transformation of  $L_i$  into  $K_i$  by the permutation table PC-2.

We now change a little bit the key schedule by simply changing the left rotation (LR) by a right rotation (RR). We then obtain a new key schedule we call *the right key schedule*. We denote by  $\text{DES}_R$  the variant of DES, where the *left key schedule* is replaced by the *right key schedule*:

**Input** : The master key  $K$ , a sequence of 56 bits.

**Output** : The sub-keys  $K_1, \dots, K_{16}$ .

**Process** :

- Step 0: Transformation of the master key  $K$  in  $R_0 = (C_0, D_0)$  by the permutation table PC-1.  $R_0$  is a sequence of 56 bits.

For any  $i = 1, \dots, 16$ ,

- Step  $i$ : Transformation of  $R_{i-1} = (C_{i-1}, D_{i-1})$  into  $R_i = (C_i, D_i)$ , where  $C_i = \text{RR}_i(C_{i-1})$  and  $D_i = \text{RR}_i(D_{i-1})$ . In the above transformation,  $\text{RR}_i$  denotes the right rotation of either 2 positions or only one position (when  $i = 1, 2, 9, 16$ ). We denote by  $\text{RO}$  the *right* rotations that operate on the whole state:  $R_i = \text{RO}_i(R_{i-1})$ .

Transformation of  $R_i$  into  $K_i$  by the permutation table PC-2.

Note that  $\text{LO}_i = \text{RO}_{18-i}^{-1}$  for  $i = 2, \dots, 16$ , and  $\text{LO}_1 = \text{RO}_1^{-1}$ .

The slight modification of the key schedule, changing the left rotation by a right rotation, does not seem to make a big difference, from a security point of view. We thus make the *left-right DES conjecture*:

*Conjecture 21 (Left-Right DES Conjecture).* The two ciphers  $\text{DES}_L$  and  $\text{DES}_R$  have the same security level.

Actually, for the following result, we just need to make a weaker assumption:

*Conjecture 22 (Non-Adaptive Left-Right DES Conjecture).* The two ciphers  $\text{DES}_L$  and  $\text{DES}_R$  have the same security level against non-adaptive attacks:

$$\left| \text{Adv}_{\text{DES}_L}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0) - \text{Adv}_{\text{DES}_R}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0) \right| \leq \delta(t, e_1, d_1),$$

where  $\delta$  is a small function.

**Theorem 23.** *Under the non-adaptive left-right DES conjecture, adaptive attacks do not help against DES, in order to break semantic security:*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DES}}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, e_2, d_2) \leq (2(e_2 + d_2) + 1) \left( \text{Adv}_{\text{DES}}^{\text{ind}}(t, q, q, 0, 0) + \delta \right),$$

where  $q = \max\{e_1 + e_2, d_1 + d_2\}$ .

*Proof.* We just need to show that under the *non-adaptive left-right DES conjecture*,

$$\left| \text{Adv}_{\text{DES}}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0) - \text{Adv}_{\text{DES}^{-1}}^{\text{ind}}(t, e_1, d_1, 0, 0) \right| \leq \delta.$$

Let us consider the *left key schedule* process, which starts with  $L_0 = \text{PC-1}(K)$ . Then  $L_i = \text{LO}_i(L_{i-1})$  and  $K_i = \text{PC-2}(L_i)$ . Note that  $L_{16} = L_0$  (since we have 16 rotations, whose 12 are of two positions, and 4 of one positions, which operate independently on each half, of 28 bits).

Let us now consider the *right key schedule* process, which starts with  $R_0 = L_1$  (which is thus  $\text{PC-1}(K')$  for a key  $K'$ , since  $\text{PC-1}$  is a permutation). Then  $R_i = \text{RO}_i(R_{i-1})$  and  $K'_i = \text{PC-2}(R_i)$ . The same way as above,  $R_{16} = R_0 = L_1$ :

$$L_1 = R_{16} = \text{RO}_{16}(R_{15}), \text{ which implies } R_{15} = \text{RO}_{16}^{-1}(L_1) = \text{LO}_2(L_1) = L_2.$$

By induction, if  $R_{17-i} = L_i$  (which is true for  $i = 1, 2$ ),

$$L_i = R_{17-i} = \text{RO}_{17-i}(R_{17-(i+1)}), \text{ and, } R_{17-(i+1)} = \text{RO}_{17-i}^{-1}(L_i) = \text{LO}_{i+1}(L_i) = L_{i+1}.$$

Therefore, for  $i = 1, \dots, 16$ ,  $L_i = R_{17-i}$  and  $K_i = K'_{17-i}$ , where  $K' = \text{PC-1}^{-1}(R_0)$ :

$$\text{DES}_L^{-1}(K) = \text{DES}_R(K'), \text{ for } K' = \text{PC-1}^{-1}(\text{PC-2}(\text{PC-1}(K))).$$

Since  $\text{PC-1}$  and  $\text{PC-2}$  are two permutations, when  $K$  is uniformly distributed,  $K'$  is also uniformly distributed:  $\text{DES}_R$  and  $\text{DES}_L^{-1} = \text{DES}^{-1}$  are thus perfectly equivalent, from the security point of view. Therefore, under the *non-adaptive left-right DES conjecture*,  $\text{DES}$  and  $\text{DES}^{-1}$  have the same security level against non-adaptive adversaries. The Theorem 11 gives the result.  $\square$