

SNARKs: An Introduction

Anca Nitulescu



Outline

SNARKs


Background

Framework
from QAP

Challenges

Conclusion





Succinct Non-interactive ARgument of Knowledge

SNARK: Definitions and Properties

SNARK
Background

Framework
from QAP

Challenges
New tools


Conclusion



SNARKs: Proof system



Verifier




Prover

Properties


Succinct Proofs




Non-Interactive



Knowledge Soundness



Knowledge Soundness




Knowledge Soundness

\mathcal{A}
crs



Adversary



π



\mathcal{E}
crs



extractor



Zero-Knowledge: Verifier learns nothing about witness




Zero-Knowledge

(crs, vk)
trapdoor




Simulator

π'



\approx

π



(crs, vk)



Prover

Zero-Knowledge SNARK

Zero-Knowledge
does not leak anything
about the witness

Knowledge Soundness

a witness can be efficiently
extracted from the prover



11



Succinctness
proof size independent
of NP witness size



Non-Interactivity
no exchange between
prover and verifier

Argument
soundness holds only
against computationally
bounded provers

Usecase: Outsourcing Computation



Verifier



Prover

Prover claims a statement



Verifier

Claim
 $y = f(x)$



Prover

Verifier is able to check



Verifier




$$y' \neq f(x)$$

A large grey arrow points from the seal towards the verifier character.




Corrupted
Prover

Publicly vs. Designated-Verifier



Verifiers



Prover



SNARKs




R. Gennaro,
C. Gentry, B. Parno, M.
Raykova



[GGPR13]
QSP and succinct NIZKs
without PCPs


B. Parno,
J. Howell, C. Gentry,
M. Raykova



[PHGR13]
Pinocchio: Nearly practical
verifiable computation



[BCI+13] SNARGs via
linear interactive proofs




N. Bitansky,
A. Chiesa, Y. Ishai, R.
Ostrovsky, O Paneth



J. Groth



SNARK: Methodology



Target Statement
 $R(y,w)=1$

Computational Model
(Representation)

Encodings Secure
under
Knowledge Assumptions

Arithmetic Circuit SAT


QAP / SAP
over **Field** = Z_p

PKE Power Knowledge of Exponent
GGM Generic Group Model

SNARK: Methodology



Target Statement
 $R(y,w)=1$



Computational Model
(Representation)



Encodings Secure
under
Knowledge Assumptions


Arithmetic Circuit SAT

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PKE Power Knowledge of Exponent
GGM Generic Group Model

Boolean Circuit SAT

SNARK: Methodology



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Boolean Circuit SAT


QSP / SSP
over **Field** = Z_p

PKE: Power Knowledge of Exponent

SNARK: Methodology



Target Statement
 $R(y,w)=1$



Computational Model
(Representation)



Encodings Secure
under
Knowledge Assumptions

Arithmetic Circuit SAT

QAP / SAP
over **Field** = Z_p

PKE Power Knowledge of Exponent
GGM Generic Group Model

Boolean Circuit SAT

QSP / SSP
over **Field** = Z_p

PKE: Power Knowledge of Exponent

General Circuits over Rings

QRP over **Ring** = R

Augmented PKE: Power Knowledge of Encoding



Key Steps to Build SNARKs

SNARK
Background

Framework
from QAP

Challenges


Conclusion



Proving NP statements




Verifier




Prover

Verifier solves equivalent problem instead



Verifier





Prover

Evaluate solution at point s



Verifier


$$\pi = P(s)$$





Evaluate solution at point s



Verifier




$$\pi = P(s)$$




$P(x)$

General SNARK framework




General SNARK framework



Verifier


Encoding:

- *linearly* homomorphic
- quadratic root detection
- image verification



Prover


Main Ingredients for SNARKs



Encoding
scheme



Quadratic Arithmetic Program



QAP

Given



$$\{v_i(x)\}_i, \{w_i(x)\}_i,$$
$$\{y_i(x)\}_i, t(x)$$

Find $V(x), W(x), Y(x), h(x)$ s.t.



$$V(x) = \sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(x) \dots$$

$$\text{and } t(x)h(x) = V(x)W(x) - Y(x)$$

Example: Solution for equation $\mathbf{A}x^2 + \mathbf{C} = 0$





Indexes for wires: A=(0), C=(1), x=(2), z₁=(3), z₂=(4), out = (5)



v _i (r ₁) = 1 for i=2	w _i (r ₁) = 1 for i=2	y _i (r ₁) = 1 for i=3,
v _i (r ₂) = 1 for i=2	w _i (r ₂) = 1 for i=3	y _i (r ₂) = 1 for i=4
v _i (r ₃) = 1 for i=1,4	w _i (r ₃) = 0 for all i	w _i (r ₃) = 1 for i=5
v _i (r _j) = 0 for the rest	w _i (r _j) = 0 for the rest	y _i (r _j) = 0 for the rest

Indexes for wires: A=(0), C=(1), x=(2), z₁=(3), z₂=(4), out = (5)



$$v_i(r_1) = 1 \text{ for } i=2$$

$$v_i(r_2) = 1 \text{ for } i=2$$

$$v_i(r_3) = 1 \text{ for } i=1,4$$

$$w_i(r_1) = 1 \text{ for } i=2$$

$$w_i(r_2) = 1 \text{ for } i=3$$

$$w_i(r_3) = 0 \text{ for all } i$$

$$y_i(r_1) = 1 \text{ for } i=3,$$

$$y_i(r_2) = 1 \text{ for } i=4$$

$$w_i(r_3) = 1 \text{ for } i=5$$

$$\prod_{j=1}^d (x - r_j) \left| \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(x) \right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(x) \right) - \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i y_i(x) \right) \right.$$

R1CS for vector $\mathbf{a}=(1, A, C, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})$

System:
$$\begin{cases} z_1 = A \cdot x \\ z_2 = z_1 \cdot x \\ \text{out} = (C + z_2) \cdot 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbf{a}=(1, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})^T$$

$$\mathbf{a}=(1, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})^T$$

$$(A, 0, 0, 0, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a} \circ (0, 1, 0, 0, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a} = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a}$$

$$(0, 0, 1, 0, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a} \circ (0, 1, 0, 0, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a} = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a}$$

$$(C, 0, 0, 1, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a} \circ (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) \cdot \mathbf{a} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) \cdot \mathbf{a}$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{c|c} V & a \end{array} \right) \circ \left(\begin{array}{c|c} W & a \end{array} \right) = \left(\begin{array}{c|c} Y & a \end{array} \right)$$

R1CS for vector $\mathbf{a}=(1, A, C, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})$

System: $\begin{cases} z_1 = A \cdot x \\ z_2 = z_1 \cdot x \\ \text{out} = (C + z_2) \cdot 1 \end{cases}$

$$\mathbf{a} = (1, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})^\top$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{V} & \mathbf{a} \\ \hline \mathbf{d} & \end{array} \right] \circ \left[\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{W} & \mathbf{a} \\ \hline \mathbf{d} & \end{array} \right] = \left[\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{Y} & \mathbf{a} \\ \hline \mathbf{d} & \end{array} \right]$$

$v_i(r_j) = V_{ji}$ $\forall \{r_j\} \in \mathbb{F}^d$

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(x) \right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(x) \right) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i y_i(x) \right)$$

R1CS for vector $\mathbf{a}=(1, A, C, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})$

System: $\begin{cases} z_1 = A \cdot x \\ z_2 = z_1 \cdot x \\ \text{out} = (C + z_2) \cdot 1 \end{cases}$

$$\mathbf{a} = (1, x, z_1, z_2, \text{out})^\top$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} & \overset{m}{\underset{d}{\text{V}}} & \overset{m}{\underset{d}{\mathbf{a}}} \end{bmatrix} \circ \begin{bmatrix} & \overset{m}{\underset{d}{\mathbf{W}}} & \overset{m}{\underset{d}{\mathbf{a}}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} & \overset{m}{\underset{d}{\mathbf{Y}}} & \overset{m}{\underset{d}{\mathbf{a}}} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$v_i(r_j) = V_{ji} \quad \forall \{r_j\} \in \mathbb{F}^d$$

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(x) \right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(x) \right) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i y_i(x) \right)$$

$$\prod_{j=1}^d (x - r_j) \left| \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(x) \right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(x) \right) - \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i y_i(x) \right) \right.$$

Schwartz-Zippel Lemma over Fields

$$t(x) = \prod_{j=1}^d (x - r_j) \mid \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(x) \right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(x) \right) - \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i y_i(x) \right) = p(x)$$

Lemma: Let $f \in \mathbb{F}[X]$ be a **non-zero** poly.

$$\Pr_{s \leftarrow \mathbb{F}}[f(s) = 0] \leq \frac{\deg(f)}{|\mathbb{F}|}$$

Encodings over Fields

DLog Group \mathbb{G}

$$\langle g \rangle = \mathbb{G}, \ Enc(s) = g^s$$



$$Enc(p(s)) = g^{p(s)}$$

$$g^{\sum_i p_i s^i} = \prod (g^{s^i})^{p_i}$$

DLog

vs General Encoding

DLog Group \mathbb{G}

$$\langle g \rangle = \mathbb{G}, \ Enc(s) = g^s$$



$$Enc(p(s)) = g^{p(s)}$$

$$g^{\sum_i p_i s^i} = \prod (g^{s^i})^{p_i}$$

Encode: $E_{pk}(m) = c$
Decode: $D_{sk}(c) = m$



$$Enc(p(s)) = E_{pk}(p(s))$$

$$E_{pk}(\sum p_i s^i) = \sum p_i E_{pk}(s^i)$$

Quadratic Root Detection – Pairings

$$\begin{aligned}\langle g \rangle &= \mathbb{G}, \langle \tilde{g} \rangle = \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \\ Enc(s) &= g^s \quad e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \\ e(g^a, g^b) &= \tilde{g}^{ab}\end{aligned}$$

Quadratic root detection **public**

$$t(s)h(s) \stackrel{?}{=} p(s)$$

$$e(g^{t(s)}, g^{h(s)}) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g^{p(s)}, g)$$

Publicly Verifiable

vs

Designated Verifiable

$$\begin{aligned}\langle g \rangle &= \mathbb{G}, \langle \tilde{g} \rangle = \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \\ Enc(s) &= g^s \quad e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \\ e(g^a, g^b) &= \tilde{g}^{ab}\end{aligned}$$

Quadratic root detection public



$$t(s)h(s) \stackrel{?}{=} p(s)$$

$$e(g^{t(s)}, g^{h(s)}) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g^{p(s)}, g)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Encode:} \quad E_{pk}(m) &= c \\ \text{Decode:} \quad D_{sk}(c) &= m\end{aligned}$$

Quadratic root detection needs **sk**


$$t(s)h(s) \stackrel{?}{=} p(s)$$




Assumptions on Discrete Log Encoding for Fields



d-PKE



d-PDH



Technical Details


SNARK
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Conclusion







Assumptions on Discrete Log Encoding for Fields



d-PKE




d-PDH




Review of the Protocol (Algorithms)


Gen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{R}$)



P(crs, y, w)



V(vk, y, π)



H_2O



Security Analysis



Reduction to PDH: Power Diffie-Hellman




d-PDH



Security Reduction: Cheating Strategy

Solve
d-PDH




Cheating Proof



Security Reduction: Cheating Strategy


Solve
d-PDH



Cheating Proof



Polynomial Division does not Hold



$$t(s)h(s) = V(s)^2 - 1$$


- $t(x)h(x) \neq V^2(x) - 1$, but



Cheating Proof




Not in the Proper Span



$$V(s) = v_0(s) + \sum_{i=1}^m a_i v_i(s)$$

Cheating Proof





- $t(x)h(x) \neq V^2(x) - 1$, but $\text{Enc}(t(s))H = W^2 - 1$
- $V(x) \notin \text{Span}(v_1, \dots, v_m)$, but







d-PDH





d-PDH





d-PDH

Enc(s)

Enc(s²)

...

Enc(s^d)

Enc(s^{d+2})



...

Enc(s^{2d})

$\{v_i(x)\}_{i=0,m}$
 $t(x)$




SSP






d-PDH







d-PDH







d-PDH







d-PDH





d-PDH





$V(x)$
 $h(x)$

$t(x)h(x) \neq V(x)^2 - 1$, but $t(s)h(s) = V(s)^2 - 1$





d-PDH




$t(x)h(x) \neq V(x)^2 - 1$, but $t(s)h(s) = V(s)^2 - 1$
 $p(x) = t(x)h(x) - V(x)^2 + 1 \neq 0$, but $p(s) = 0$




d-PDH



...



...



$$p(x) = t(x)h(x) - V(x)^2 + 1 \neq 0, \text{ but } p(s) = 0$$

$$p_{d+1} \text{Enc}(s^{d+1}) = - \sum_{i=1, \dots, d}^{d+2, \dots, 2d} p_i \text{Enc}(s^i)$$


Conclusions

SNARK
Background


Framework
from QAP

Challenges

Conclusion



Conclusions



Pre-Processing:

(**crs**: common reference string)

- ✗ Secret coins
- ✗ Expensive
- ✗ Subversion

Subversion-Resistant Protocols

- ✗ Updatable **crs**
- ✗ Verifiable **crs**

THANK YOU



Credits

Special thanks to all those who made and released these resources for free:

- ✗ Presentation template by [SlidesCarnival](#)
- ✗ Illustrations by [Disneyclips](#), [Iconfinder](#) and [Flaticon](#)