SpaceMint

Overcoming Bitcoin's waste of energy

Georg Fuchsbauer Innia





joint work with

S. Park, A. Kwon, K. Pietrzak, J. Alwen and P. Gaži

|||;;



Journées nationales pré-GDR SI 31/05/17

Overview



- Transactions
- Blockchain
- Proof of work
- Problems with PoW



- Proofs of space
- Issues with PoSp
- New blockchain format


Bitcoin

- Digital currency
- Decentralized (no bank issuing coins)
- Pseudonymous
- Controled Inflation

Public ledger (maintained by authority)


Alice	1	
Bob	0	
Charlie	0	

Public ledger




Alice: transfer $1 \rightarrow \mathsf{Bob}$

Public ledger (records all transactions)



Alice: transfer $1 \rightarrow Bob$

Public ledger (records all transactions)



Digital signatures

- Alice can create a key pair
 - private key used to sign messages
 - public key lets anyone verify signatures

Digital signatures

- Alice can create a key pair
 - private key used to sign messages
 - public key lets anyone verify signatures
- **Unforgeability**: no one can forge signature w/o knowing secret key

Digital signatures


- Alice can create a key pair
 - private key used to sign messages
 - public key lets anyone verify signatures
- **Unforgeability**: no one can forge signature w/o knowing secret key

- Public key \leftrightarrow coin
- Private key: enables spending of coin


Transactions

- Alice owns pk_A i.e. it's in the ledger
- Bob creates pk_B
- Alice signs $pk_A \rightarrow pk_B$ and adds to ledger

Double-spending




Double-spending



Ledger only accepts if

- exists transaction
- no transaction



Decentralization

How to eliminate authority that


- checks validity of tx's
- publishes new tx's in ledger


Decentralization


How to eliminate authority that


- checks validity of tx's
- publishes new tx's in ledger

The Blockchain











- outputs look random
 - \Rightarrow small modifs result in huge changes
 - \Rightarrow hard to find preimage




- outputs look random
 - \Rightarrow small modifs result in huge changes
 - \Rightarrow hard to find preimage

 \Rightarrow best way to find input with hash from some subset is randomly trying




blocks linked by including hash of previous block
 ⇒ cannot mofify block w/o changing everything after




• blocks linked by including hash of previous block \Rightarrow cannot mofify block w/o changing everything after

acts as fingerprint for whole chain



- transactions collected into block
- new block added & published every 10min

 \Rightarrow who adds block?




- transactions collected into block
- new block added & published every 10min
 ⇒ who adds block?
- assume mechanism chooses random user
 - \Rightarrow user could be malicious
 - \Rightarrow Sybil attacks? \Rightarrow Proof of work

Proof of work

- prove that you've performed work
- e.g. prevent spam: Hashcash


Proof of work

- prove that you've performed work
- e.g. prevent spam: Hashcash





Proof of work

- prove that you've performed work
- e.g. prevent spam: Hashcash




- try out $\approx 2^{20}$ values (~1s)
- easy to verify (${\sim}1\mu$ s)







- collect transactions
- find value \$ yielding small hash



- collect transactions
- find value \$ yielding small hash
- broadcast block





 \Rightarrow add block to local copy of blockchain




Incentive?
 ⇒ reward bitcoins!

(all bitcoins created this way)







• Double-spending!



"Always mine on the longest chain"




"Always mine on the longest chain"



"Always mine on the longest chain"

Secure if majority of miners is honest ⇒ wait for 6 blocks before accepting payment

Forks



The "51%-attack"

- Miners incentivized by rewards
- Probability of mining block \sim computing power \Rightarrow no Sybil attacks!
- Rational to mine on longest chain
 - \Rightarrow quick consensus

- Miners incentivized by rewards
- Probability of mining block \sim computing power \Rightarrow no Sybil attacks!
- Rational to mine on longest chain
 ⇒ quick consensus

Problems	 specialized hardware + cheap electricity ⇒ mining oligarchy
	 Bitcoin consumes electricity like town of 100k population ⇒ polluting

- Miners incentivized by rewards
- Probability of mining block \sim computing power \Rightarrow no Sybil attacks!
- Rational to mine on longest chain
 ⇒ quick consensus

Problems •	<pre>specialized hardware + cheap electricity ⇒ mining oligarchy</pre>
⇒ Can proof of work be replaced by something else?	Bitcoin consumes electricity like town of 100k population $\Rightarrow polluting$

Proof of stake

- $\bullet\,$ prob. of mining $\sim\,$ number of coins owned
- Problems:
 - Nothing-at-stake problems
 - Participation: miners = holders

prove that you've allocated disk space

Trivial solution


Verifier

Prover

prove that you've allocated disk space


Trivial solution

Initialization:




prove that you've allocated disk space
 Trivial solution


Initialization:




prove that you've allocated disk space
 Trivial solution


Initialization:








A better solution



prove that you've allocated disk space

A better solution



prove that you've allocated disk space
 [DFKP'15]


Initialization:

id

Verifier

Prover

prove that you've allocated disk space
 [DFKP'15]




prove that you've allocated disk space
 [DFKP'15]

Initialization:

idVerifier Prover • fill nodes of graph G γ dep. on *id* hash content (use hard-to-pebble graph) (hash using Merkle tree)


prove that you've allocated disk space
 [DFKP'15]




- replace proof of **work** by proof of **space**
- Advantages:
 - green: low electricity; reusable hardware
 - decentralized


- replace proof of **work** by proof of **space**
- Advantages:
 - green: low electricity; reusable hardware
 - decentralized
- Challenges:
 - PoS is *interactive*
 - Nothing-at-stake problems

- replace proof of **work** by proof of **space**
- Advantages:
 - green: low electricity; reusable hardware
 - decentralized
- Challenges:
 - PoS is *interactive*
 - Nothing-at-stake problems
 - * Mining multiple chains
 - * Grinding blocks




- Miner initializes space with id = pk
- \bullet broadcasts γ
- γ gets added to chain






Who gets to add the block?



• Quality of proof?

 \Rightarrow define fct. of proof $\pi\colon$ quality \sim space allocated


 \Rightarrow block with *best* proof gets added to chain




• Quality of proof?

 \Rightarrow define fct. of proof $\pi\colon$ quality \sim space allocated


- \Rightarrow block with *best* proof gets added to chain
- Blocks define quality of chain
 ⇒ always mine on *best* chain



Does this work?




- *easy* to generate proofs!
 - \Rightarrow miners try to extend every chain
 - \Rightarrow no consensus!




 \Rightarrow no consensus!

Forbid extending 2 chains



- *easy* to check if good solution!
 - \Rightarrow miners might not extend best chain


 \Rightarrow no consensus!




 \Rightarrow miners might not extend best chain

 \Rightarrow no consensus!

Take challenge from past



Take challenge from past




• easy to check if good solution!

 \Rightarrow miners might not extend best chain


 \Rightarrow no consensus!

Take challenge from past



 \Rightarrow miners might grind blocks leading to good challenge in future


 \Rightarrow proof of work



 \Rightarrow miners might grind blocks leading to good challenge in future

 \Rightarrow proof of work


Make challenge hash of π only





 \Rightarrow miners might grind blocks leading to good challenge in future


 \Rightarrow proof of work

Make challenge hash of π only










Use **signatures** (tied to proof) to link blocks



Use **signatures** (tied to proof) to link blocks

More ecological?

• no ongoing cost



 \bullet unused disk space \Rightarrow decentralized



Y a-t-il des questions?