Symmetric Crypto Block Cipher

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Family of permutations

- Block cipher = family of 2^k substitutions on an alphabet of size 2ⁿ indistinguable from randomly chosen substitutions
- Constructions:
 - Feistel scheme (DES)
 - SPN: Substitution-Permutation Network (AES)

Block cipher

- Cipher (E,D) «eff. algs» such that D(k,E(k,m))=m
- Main drawback of stream cipher: lacks of theory to construct secure PRG
- Iterate many times a «small» round function F



Data Encryption Standard

- DES (IBM 1973) and NBS (1977)
- Key Length: 56 bits
- Block Length: 64 bits
- 16 rounds with 48-bit round keys



Feistel scheme

- Designed by Horst Feistel at IBM
- Transform random function to random permutation



Feistel security

• Could you distinguish one-round Feistel ?

• Could you distinguish two-round Feistel ?

• Could you distinguish three-round Feistel ?

f function



Attacks against DES

- Before 1990: attacks against round reduced version (less than 16 rounds)
- 1990-92: Differential cryptanalysis
- 1993-94: Linear cryptanalysis
- other attacks: Davies-Murphy, side-channel



In practice, the most efficient attack is the exhaustive search (EFF, copacabana)

Main drawback of DES

- Exhaustive key search in 2⁵⁶ (3DES)
- Block size (collision for 2³² blocks)
- Differential / Linear Cryptanalysis
- DES: well-designed and withstands successfully 30 years of cryptanalysis

Security game

- Block cipher must be indistinguishable from a random permutation
 - for all k, E(k,x) is a permutation which looks random provided the key is not known





Adv(A)=|Pr[b=b']-1/2|

Birthday Paradox

- Randomy and independently chose k balls among N balls, whenever $k \approx \sqrt{N}$, Pr[coll]> $\frac{1}{2}$
- If N=365, the probability that two people same birthday is $\frac{1}{2}$ when k \approx 23
- Pr(no coll with k balls)= (1-1/N)(1-2/N)...(1-(k-1)/ N)<exp(∑i i/N)=exp(k(k-1)/2N)
- if $k \approx \sqrt{N}$, $Pr(coll) > \frac{1}{2}$
- Two sets N and M of random elements in a set D: Number of expected collisions is |N|×|M|/|D| (Birthday paradox with boys and girls)

$2DES \rightarrow 3DES$

Differential Attack

• Consider an Even-Mansour Scheme

Advanced Encryption Standard

- Substitution / Permutation Network
- Key Length: 128 / 192 / 256 bits
- Round numbers: 10 / 12 / 14 (last round w/o MixColumns)
- Block Length: 128 bits
- Designed by Daemen and Rijmen
- Standardized by NIST in 2000

AES



Diffusion: 2 tours Attaque sur 6 tours en 2⁴⁸ Attaque sur 7 tours en 2¹⁰⁰ Pas d'attaque au-delà mais en attaque par canaux auxiliaires

Security

- MDS Property of the MixColumn
- Diffusion: In 2 rounds, any difference affect the whole cipher
- Security against
 Differential / Linear
 Cryptanalysis: good
 properties of the SBox

- Square Attack
- Side-channel Attack (timing, Power Analysis) are the most efficient attacks against AES

Modes of operation

• How to encipher larger messages ?

• ECB, CBC, CTR, OFB, CFB



Drawbacks: - deterministic Advantages: - parallelisable

Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption







Ciphertext Block Chaining (CBC)

- Encrypting: $C_0 = IV, ..., C_i = E(k, C_{i-1} \oplus M_i)$
- Decrypting: $M_i = D(k, C_i) \oplus C_{i-1}$



Drawbacks: - sequential Advantages: - randomized - propagation of error in decryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Ciphertext FeedBack (CFB)

• How to use a block cipher as a stream cipher ?



Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode encryption



Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode decryption

Output FeedBack (OFB)

• How to use a block cipher as a stream cipher ?



Output Feedback (OFB) mode encryption



Output Feedback (OFB) mode decryption

Counter Mode (CTR)

Better solution



Counter (CTR) mode encryption



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

Security

- Confidentiality is ensure by the mode of operation
- Integrity: first block of CBC ?
- Main idea: the ciphertext must be indistinguishable from random for polynomial-time adversaries
- Security Game:

• Example on CBC: