Cooperation in R&D: Patenting, Licensing, and Contracting

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There are several aspects of innovative activity that makes it more complex to analyze than the production and distribution of standard physical goods. Innovative activity uses and produces knowledge. This is both costly and risky and the resulting product has (at least partially) the main characteristics of a public good: it is non-rival and non-excludable. Without any sort of protection, individual agent would have little incentive to do research for fear of unsuccessful research effort or for fear of imitation by others (through spillovers or free access).

Outside the possibility of secret holding or lead time and reputation, protection typically relies on some kind of collective arrangements, involving more or less legal intervention, according to degree of verifiability by a court and the willingness of the public authority. Patent protection (with the possibility of licensing the innovation) is one example. Cooperative R&D and research joint ventures are others. Patent protection increases the appropriability of the innovation and allows the selling of the innovation to others. Cooperative R&D or research joint ventures internalize knowledge spillovers, that is the transmission of knowledge from one agent to another. But cooperation may take many contractual forms and does involve moral hazard and adverse selection issues.

In this chapter we will review R&D collective arrangements using game theoretical concepts in various settings, involving either complete or incomplete contracts. Section 1 is devoted to patent protection and the comparison of the main forms of licensing in various industry contexts, structures or sizes, and to the role of various factors such as product differentiation, innovation magnitude, and asymmetric information. In Sect. 2, the long debated issue of the relation of innovative activity to the intensity of competition is reconsidered, and the benefits of various types of cooperative R&D agreements in the presence of externalities are reviewed. The last two sections are devoted to contracting issues. Section 3 reviews the design of licensing mechanisms allowing for full knowledge sharing under incomplete information and optimal development efforts before the production stage. This is done in a complete contract setting. Incomplete contracts are considered in Sect. 4 in order to deal with cumulative or sequential innovation and the

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associated moral hazard problems combining research and development efforts, and the possibility of several buyers for the innovation.

1 Patenting and Licensing

A patent grants an innovator monopoly rights over the use of an innovation for a given period of time. It seeks to provide incentives to innovate as well as to disseminate the innovation. Licensing is a standard way through which an innovation can be diffused. Licensing policies in practice take various forms, but they can be classified into three broad categories: licensing by means of upfront fees, royalties, and policies that combine both fees and royalties.

The theoretical literature on patent licensing can be traced back to Arrow (1962) who argued that a perfectly competitive industry provides a higher incentive to innovate than a monopoly. Licensing under oligopoly was first studied by Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986).[1] The licensing problem in an oligopoly model involves aspects of strategic interaction which necessitates the use of a game theoretic analysis. The strategic interaction is particularly interesting when the innovator is an incumbent firm in an industry because in such a case the firm must consider the effect of licensing on its future profits the patent to rival firms in the oligopoly market. The analysis of licensing problems under asymmetric information (e.g., when some aspect of the innovation is not perfectly known to a potential licensee, or when certain characteristics of the potential licensees are not perfectly known to the innovator) naturally uses tools of principal-agent models. Thus, patent licensing is an area of economics that involves several applications of game theory.

The literature has mostly focused on licensing of cost-reducing innovations, i.e., innovations that result in lower production costs for competing firms who are potential licensees.[2] Considering innovators that are outsiders to the industry, the early literature concluded that licensing by means of upfront fees or auction[3] dominates royalty licensing for an outside innovator in an oligopoly (Kamien and Tauman 1984, 1986; Kamien et al. 1992b). However, empirical studies point out the frequent use of royalties in practice (Firestone 1971; Taylor and Silberston 1973; Caves et al. 1983; Rostoker 1984). It has been subsequently argued that royalty licensing could be optimal when the innovator is one of the incumbent firms in an oligopoly. Royalties are appealing for an incumbent innovator, because they provide the innovator with a competitive edge by raising the effective cost of its rivals. This reasoning was put forward by Shapiro (1985), later formalized by Wang (1998) in a Cournot duopoly and extended to a Cournot oligopoly by Kamien and Tauman (2002).[4] The literature has also sought to explain royalties based on diverse factors such as variation in the quality of the innovation (Rockett, 1990b), risk aversion (Bousquet et al. 1998), product differentiation (Muto 1993; Wang and Yang 1999; Poddar

[1] In the early literature, see also Gallini (1984), Gallini and Winter (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1987), Muto (1987) and Rockett (1990a). See Kamien (1992) for an excellent review of the early literature. Some recent papers include Choi (2001), Filippini (2002), Erkal (2005a), Liao and Sen (2005), Erutku and Richelle (2006), Giebe and Wolfstetter (2008) and Martin and Saracho (2010).

[2] See Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2008) for the analysis of licensing of innovations that lead to better product quality for firms.

[3] It is optimal for the innovator to choose an upfront fee to extract the maximum possible surplus from the licensees. The best way to do this is through an auction. As shown in Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Kamien and Tauman (1986), an auction generates more competition that increases the willingness to pay for a license, compared to a flat upfront fee.

[4] See also Marjit (1990) and Wang (2002) for other issues pertaining to incumbent innovators.

and Sinha 2004; Erkal 2005b), or by integer constraints concerning the number of licenses (Sen 2005a).

One strand of the literature has considered the role of informational asymmetry to explain the use of royalty licensing. Gallini and Wright (1990) studied a model of licensing where the value of the innovation is private information to the innovator, who signals the value through the contract offer. They have shown that an upfront fee licensing contract is offered for innovations with a low value, while for high-value innovations, the innovator offers a royalty contract. In a model of asymmetric information where an innovator interacts with a monopolist who is privately informed of the value of the innovation, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991) have shown that the optimal menu of contracts proposed by the innovator is separating. The contract for the good quality innovation involves only upfront fees, while for the bad quality innovation, the contract is a combination of fixed fee and royalty. Beggs (1992) considered the situation where the innovator is the uninformed party, while the buyer knows the true value of the innovation. In this setting, royalty licensing can make a separating equilibrium possible, and doing so, may ensure that trade takes place in cases where it fails under licensing via upfront fees. Sen (2005b) studied the problem of licensing a cost-reducing innovation between an innovator and monopolist firm, where the cost of the monopolist is its private information. When the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties, the low-cost monopolist is always offered a pure fee contract, while in the contract offered to the high-cost monopolist, the royalty rate is always positive, and moreover, there are cases where this is a pure royalty contract. To sum up, the underlying common theme is, in one form or another, an output-based royalty is used as an effective separating device under asymmetric information.

Sen and Tauman (2007) consider general licensing policies using combinations of upfront fees and royalties for both outside and incumbent innovators and show that consumers and the innovator are better off, firms are worse off and social welfare is improved from licensing. Furthermore, the optimal policies depend on the industry size as well as the magnitude of the innovation; in particular, when the industry size is not too small, licensing of relatively significant non-drastic innovations[5] involves a positive royalty. Compared to an incumbent firm, an outside innovator invests more in R&D and has stronger incentives to innovate. Combinations of fees and royalties have been also studied in other specific duopoly models. In a differentiated duopoly where the innovator is one of the incumbent firms, Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) show that the optimal licensing policy always includes a positive royalty. Under a Stackelberg duopoly where the innovator is the Stackelberg leader, Filippini (2005) shows that the optimal policy involves only a royalty without an upfront fee.

Regarding the relation between industry structure and incentives to innovate, Arrow's initial analysis has been further qualified. Under royalty licensing, the perfectly competitive industry provides the strongest incentives to innovate (Kamien and Tauman 1986). However, when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties, the strongest incentives are provided by industries where the number of firms is not too large or too small (Sen and Tauman 2007) although Arrow's basic intuition is still robust in that a perfectly

[5] A cost-reducing innovation is *drastic* (Arrow 1962) if it is significant enough to create a monopoly with the reduced cost; otherwise it is *non-drastic*. An incumbent innovator of a drastic innovation has no incentive to license its innovation, since it can earn the entire monopoly profit with the reduced cost by using the innovation exclusively. In any industry of size two or more, an outside innovator of a drastic innovation can also earn the monopoly profit by selling the license to only one firm through an auction. See Sen and Stamatopoulos (2009a) for the complete characterization of optimal licensing policies for an outside innovator of a drastic innovation.

competitive industry always provides a stronger incentive than a monopoly. We will come back to such non-monotonicity results in the next section.

In a recent paper, Sen and Tauman (2012) consider combinations of upfront fees and royalties for both outside and incumbent innovators in a Cournot oligopoly under a class of general demand functions where the elasticity is non-decreasing in price. Kamien et al. (1992b) also studied the same general demand framework, but their analysis was restricted to only outside innovators with pure upfront fee and pure royalty policies. Sen and Tauman (2007) considered general policies in combinations of fees and royalties, but they restricted attention to linear demand. Sen and Tauman (2012) extend both of these earlier papers to present a unified approach. They show that many results obtained under linear demand continue to hold in this general set-up. Specifically, they show that: (i) for generic values of magnitudes of the innovation, a royalty policy is better than fee or auction for relatively large industry sizes; (ii) under combinations of fees and royalties, provided the innovation is relatively significant, (a) there is always an optimal policy where the innovation is licensed to practically all firms of the industry and (b) any optimal policy includes a positive royalty.

Another interesting recent development in the literature is to consider the licensing problem in a cooperative game theoretic framework instead of the standard non cooperative approach. There is a small but growing literature on the cooperative approach (Tauman and Watanabe 2007; Watanabe and Muto 2008; Jelnov and Tauman 2009; Kishimoto et al. 2011). One key result of this literature is that as the number of firms in an oligopoly increases asymptotically, the solutions of the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches identify the same value for the patent.

Other issues addressed in the literature include leadership structure (Kabiraj 2004; 2005), strategic delegation (Mukherjee 2001; Saracho 2002), scale economies (Sen and Stamatopoulos 2009b) and the strategic aspects of selling patent rights (Tauman and Weng 2012).

Driven by the greater availability of firm-level data, empirical research on licensing has also grown in recent years (e.g., Macho-Stadler et al. 1996; Anand and Khanna 2000; Yanagawa and Wada 2000). Furthermore, studies have been carried out on licensing contracts using industry data in various countries such as Germany (Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004), Japan (Nagaoka 2005), Spain (Mendi 2005) and India (Vishwasrao 2007). One key insight of this empirical literature is that licensing contracts often vary with respect to country-specific institutional characteristics.

2 Varying Competition Toughness, Spillovers and Research Joint Ventures

When assessing the positive influence of cooperation on innovative activity, a logical starting point is the traditional Schumpeterian view positing a negative association between the number of firms in an industry and each firm's investment in R&D. But, as well stressed by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), the causality is difficult to establish. On the one hand, innovation gives the innovating firm a monopoly advantage, at least partially and temporarily. On the other hand some degree of monopoly rent is needed to finance R&D expenditures. Also important is the Arrowian notion of "incentive to invent" which is determined by the difference between the current and the post-invention profit flows. Arrow's (1962) argument that the incentive to invent is larger in a competitive industry than in monopoly must again be qualified. It does not take into account the possibility

that firms compete strategically both in the market and in R&D. This is the crucial element analyzed by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) in a symmetric and deterministic model of oligopolistic competition with strategically chosen, cost-reducing R&D expenditures and free entry. With the number of firms determined by a zero-profit condition based on the R&D investment cost per firm, a larger equilibrium level of R&D expenditures is associated with a smaller equilibrium number of firms. Because both concentration and R&D levels are endogenously determined, no causality can be deduced.[6] An important consequence of R&D competition clearly appears. Although each firm may choose a small R&D level with respect to the social optimum, through wasteful duplication aggregate R&D expenditures become excessive.

The same kind of excess also appears in stochastic models of patent races (Loury 1979; Lee and Wilde 1980) where firms independently compete over time to achieve a cost reducing innovation. In these models, the time of innovation is a random variable assumed to follow an exponential distribution with a hazard rate that increases with R&D expenditure. The stochastic process is Poisson and each firm chooses its R&D expenditure non-cooperatively. Competition in the product market is of the Bertrand type, and patent protection is assumed to be perfect and infinitely lived so that the first inventor gets all the benefit. In equilibrium, all firms invest in R&D, so there is excessive aggregate investment. But the expected time of innovation is shorter when the number of firms is larger.

The number of competing firms, however, is only one element determining the intensity of competition. In a deterministic growth model with two sectors (a non-innovative perfectly competitive sector and an oligopolistic sector with differentiated products), van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) compare the effect of different regimes of oligopolistic competition, namely Bertrand versus Cournot, on innovation and growth. The number of firms is still determined under free entry by the zero profit condition. Under the more competitive Bertrand regime, the innovation rate and growth is higher than under the Cournot regime. This result appears somewhat paradoxical, since it is essentially due to the smaller equilibrium number of firms (and hence a reduction in product variety) under Bertrand competition. Consequently, each firm is larger allowing for a greater level of R&D expenditures. This effect is reinforced by an increase in the size of the oligopolistic sector due to lower relative prices. In this way, toughness of competition is good for innovation and growth (although the level of innovation remains insufficient from a welfare point of view).

Exploring the relationship between competition and innovation, Aghion et al. (2005) provides both empirical evidence and a theoretical argument in favor of an inverted-U relationship. They analyze a general equilibrium multi-sector growth model in which two firms compete in a patent race in each sector – with each firm investing in R&D to try to move one technological step ahead of the other. Thanks to imitation (or spillovers) the lagging firm is posited to remain in business and never to be more than one step behind. At the Markov-stationary equilibrium, the set of sectors is partitioned into two types of industries – those where the duopolists are at the same technological level (neck-and-neck) and those where there is a technological gap (one firm leading and the other lagging). In each sector the intensity of competition is calibrated by the inverse of the degree of collusion in the product market when the two firms are neck-and-neck. The inverted-U relationship between the intensity of innovation and the (average) intensity of competition at equilibrium is fully explained by the difference in incentives to innovate in a leveled or

[6] Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) point out that innovation may vary inversely with concentration when concentration is high.

unleveled sector. When competition is weak, the lagging firm in an unleveled sector has strong incentives to catch up so that the unleveled state does not last and the industry spends most of the time in the leveled state where R&D intensity is always increasing with the toughness of market competition (in order to "escape" competition). But when competition becomes tougher, the R&D-intensity chosen by a lagging firm in an unleveled sector decreases, as the reward to innovation diminishes, and a Schumpeterian effect appears (and becomes dominant under sufficiently tough competition) in the industry. By averaging R&D-intensities across sectors one gets the inverted-U pattern.

Using a multi-sector model with overlapping generations of consumers and firms and an endogenously determined number of firms, d'Aspremont et al. (2010) obtain a similar non-monotonicity result – but sector by sector. To measure competitive toughness, the authors consider an oligopolistic equilibrium, with parameterized intensity of market competition varying continuously between Cournot and Bertrand. In the first period of competition, all firms are symmetric and act non-cooperatively in choosing their R&D investments which determine their probabilities of success. In the resulting Bernoullian random process, several firms might be simultaneously successful and, due to spillovers, unsuccessful firms remain active if the cost advantage is not too large and market competition not too tough. Then the incentive to invent, as measured by the incremental gain of innovating, is increasing with competitive toughness since the gap between the market shares of successful and unsuccessful firms increases, implying a higher concentration index (e.g. Herfindahl index). When competition becomes too tough (relative to the cost advantage of innovating), then unsuccessful firms are eliminated and only the successful firms compete on the market. The concentration effect disappears[7] and the incentive to invest decreases with competitive toughness, restoring the usual Schumpeterian effect.

2.1 Cooperation and Research Joint Ventures

In all these models, stochastic or deterministic, whether the relationship between innovation and market competition is monotone or not the choice of R&D intensity is non-cooperative and usually suboptimal from a collective point of view. This has raised the question whether allowing cooperative agreements with respect to R&D (but not with respect to the product market) would be beneficial by reducing wasteful duplication of research efforts and promoting greater (or sooner) sharing of inventions. Both in the US, with the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, and in the EU regulation, enabling R&D Block Exemption since 1971, the possibility of inter-firm agreements limited to R&D (under some conditions) has opened the way to R&D cooperation and joint ventures that are exempted from prevailing anti-trust laws. Following this policy change, a large research literature – both empirical and theoretical – has emerged.[8]

Among the first to investigate the welfare effects of introducing R&D cooperation is Katz (1986), who analyzes a four-stage game (allowing for varying intensity of competition at the last, production stage). In the third stage, each firm chooses a level of cost reducing R&D effort. Due to spillover effects, the combination of firm choices determines each firm's effective cost reduction. The opportunity for cooperation emerges in two preliminary stages. In the first, each firm chooses between becoming a member of the research joint venture (RJV) or remaining independent[9]; in the second, the firms decide on an output-

[7] Here the concentration effect is due to the gap between markets shares of successful and unsuccessful firms not to the reduction of the number of firms as in van de Klundert and Smulders (1997).

[8] See Martin (2002).

[9] Katz's (1986) analysis is based on the notion of "stable cartel" as defined by d'Aspremont et al. (1983). Membership decisions consitute a Nash equilibrium.

sharing rule and a cost-sharing rule (choosing to transmit knowledge above the "natural" spillover rate).

An important conclusion is that "cooperative R&D is most likely to have beneficial incentive effects in markets that have strong spillovers" (Katz 1986, p. 542). This statement is made more precise in a simple example by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) using a Cournot duopoly, with each firm having its own laboratory, and comparing the non-cooperative scenario at the R&D development stage to the cooperative R&D scenario, where R&D efforts are chosen to maximize total profit. Under strong spillovers, total welfare is higher with cooperative-R&D. This is confirmed in Kamien et al.'s (1992a) oligopoly model with linear demand, but allowing for more than two firms and varying product substitutability γ, for $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$, (with $\gamma = 1$ corresponding to perfect substitutability and the Cournot case with a homogeneous good). In the model, whatever the number of firms, the cooperative scenario yields greater total welfare than the non-cooperative scenario if and only if the spillover rate β is not smaller than $\gamma/2$ (with this lower bound decreasing with product differentiation). Hence, a similar conclusion holds in the d'Aspremont-Jacquemin (AJ) and Kamien-Muller-Zang (KMZ) models for Cournot competition: cooperative R&D dominates non-cooperative R&D. Note, however, that spillovers are measured differently in the two models – by output spillovers measured in unit cost reduction in the AJ model and by research expenditures (input spillovers) in the KMZ model.

Kamien et al. (1992a) consider in addition a regime of "research joint-venture cartelization," where firms cooperate in R&D effort and share all information. Here, the spillover rate is raised to its maximum, so that the constant unit cost of production decreases as aggregate R&D spending increases. Of course this scenario may appear to be rather extreme. As noted by Martin (2002, p. 462, fn 32), there is case study evidence that a firm, even though participating in an RJV, will not share all its information for strategic reasons (especially if competition is tough on the product market) or for technological or organizational reasons[10]. In the KMZ model, this setup yields the highest welfare level of all because the corresponding equilibrium generates the lowest product prices and the highest per-firm profit.

This type of scenario is also used in models studying the advantage of cooperation under uncertainty. Beath et al. (1988) analyze a patent race where two firms independently compete for a cost reducing innovation over time, and the time of innovation is uncertain. The stochastic process is of the Poisson type, and each firm determines its R&D expenditure by strategically choosing its probability of success. The winner is protected by an infinitely lived but imperfect patent,[11] so that, as in the previous deterministic models, the innovation also reduces the production cost of the loser (according to some given spillover rate). Alternative competitive regimes in the product market are considered and affect the profit flows of the firms. Under the non-cooperative scenario, the R&D game has a different type of equilibrium when the spillover rate is large (imitation is easy) and when it is small (imitation is difficult). In comparing the RJV cartelization scenario (with spillover rate raised to its maximum) and the non-cooperative scenario, two effects are in action: a positive "coordination effect" whereby each firm's R&D cost is smaller under RJV, and a negative "market competition effect" whereby all firms fully use the innovation under RJV cartelization, implying more competition on the product market –

[10] See De Bondt (1996, p. 4) and Martin (2002, p. 462, fn 32).

[11] In most other studies of cooperative R&D under uncertainty, the difficulty of imitation is measured by the length of the period of protection. For an example and references to this literature see Erkal and Piccinin (2010).

the more so the larger is the innovation and the more competitive is the industry. When spillovers are strong, the loser's profit flow is close to the winner's, which is itself close to the per-firm RJV profit flow so that the coordination effect dominates, and the firms gain from RJV cartelization (compared to the non-cooperative scenario). When imitation is difficult and/or competition severe,[12] the per-firm RJV profit flow becomes smaller, and the market competition effect dominates. Consequently, the firms will have no profit incentive to form an RJV.

3 RJVs and Knowledge Sharing with Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard

Much of the literature on Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), discussed above assumes that research effort choices are coordinated, without any moral hazard (free riding) among participating firms. An exception is the paper of Kamien et al. (1992a), in which they consider a case of "RJV-competition". There, as in the case of RJV-cartelization, forming an RJV implies that its participating firms raise the spillover coefficient across their individual research efforts to its maximum, so each firm benefits fully in a deterministic way from the combined research efforts of all participants. This results in a common cost reduction accruing to all firms for producing a substitute set of commodities on which they compete in a product market. However, in a Nash equilibrium, each RJV participant determines its own research effort in a non- cooperative fashion, taking others' effort levels as given. The authors show that, owing to free riding, this leads to the lowest level of aggregate research effort among all the forms of cooperation cum coordination that they examine.

Many of these models also have no other means of cooperation except for the effort spillovers across and coordination of effort choices among RJV participants. In particular, the models do not introduce any notion of cumulative R&D, in which cooperation occurs at an earlier stage of research, followed by independently chosen development efforts. A partial exception is the paper of Grossman and Shapiro (1987) that considers a two stage R&D model of a research race in continuous time, in which, for each firm, participating in the second stage requires success in the first, and winning in the second stage leads to an exogenous strictly positive payoff. Two firms compete in a setting where for each firm success in an initial stage is required to participate to the race in the second stage. Using numerical simulation, the authors consider the firms' total benefits in two distinct settings, involving different cooperative arrangements before both firms have reached the second stage. In the first regime of ex interim licensing, the firms do not coordinate on their research efforts in the first stage, but if (at the time point when) only one of them has succeeded in the first stage, it may choose to share its enhanced knowledge with the other for a license fee (if that would raise total profits). In the second setting (a research joint venture), the firms also coordinate on their choices of first-stage research efforts. The authors find that often such joint ventures decrease the firms' joint profits, owing to the more intense competition (enhanced effort choices) between them at the second stage. However, whenever interim licensing is desirable, then an RJV agreement dominates that.

None of these prior papers allow for incomplete information about the capabilities of firms concerning first-stage research results and the possibility for these results to affect the second-stage research technology. Nor is there any detailed comparison of alternative

[12] Clearly if product market competition is very tough, like in the Bertrand regime, a firm can only have an incentive to invest in R&D if by doing so it can gain a cost advantage.

licensing rules that may induce both efficient effort choices, as well as revelation of the first stage knowledge levels attained by the set of RJV partners. In reality, these issues are often important – for example in the qualities of research personnel that RJV participants contribute to the joint venture. Independent first-stage research being allowed, such choices clearly have an impact on the extent to which knowledge gained from participants' first-stage research is shared among the group.

In Bhattacharya et al. (1992), a model embodying these tradeoffs is developed in a somewhat stylized context. It consists of three stages. In the first, each potential participant in an RJV obtains, for a fixed cost, independent draws of a "level of knowledge" from a common distribution. A higher level of knowledge reduces the total and marginal cost of achieving any given probability of success in the second development stage. These development effort levels are chosen independently by each of the RJV participants, so that an RJV is akin to the licensing-only arrangement in Grossman and Shapiro (1987). However, at the end of the first stage, each of the RJV partners is only aware of its own realized level of knowledge, but not of others'. A licensing mechanism seeks to elicit full revelation, leading to the sharing of knowledge levels by all RJV participants. In doing so, it takes into account the impact of the structure of knowledge licensing fees on second-stage choices, in terms of the extent of development efforts chosen by participants.

Following upon success(es) in the second stage, one (or multiple) firms may gain from the new product or process in the market. To simplify matters, Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington assume that (i) the innovation is drastic, so no other firm can make a positive profit competing with a successful firm using the new technology, and (ii) if there are multiple successful firms among the RJV partners, if they were to compete in the product market then they would do so *à la* Bertrand, and dissipate all rents in the process. The licensing mechanism of an RJV thus also seeks to eliminate such potential competition, via awarding a patent to only one among successful partners, using a competitive auction process. This is a consequence arising from the discrete time modelling of the second stage R&D process, in which success events are independent across the firms.

The realized knowledge levels of differing firms are assumed to be ordered in a Blackwell sense, so that if these were to be all fully revealed, it would be optimal for each firm to carry out its second stage development effort using only the highest of these knowledge levels; there is no complementarity among the firms' knowledge levels, or ideas. However, each firm needs a sufficient incentive to fully disclose the content of its knowledge, as doing so may increase the efficiency of research efforts of other participating firms in the second stage, where they behave non-cooperatively. The paper characterizes licensing mechanisms which serve to elicit full disclosures.

The optimal licensing mechanism contains three features: (i) Identifying the firm which disclosed the highest level of knowledge; (ii) Pre-specifying an *ex post* licensing fee that another sole successful firm in the second stage must pay this first-stage leading firm; and (iii) running an auction among multiple successful firms in the second stage to determine who among them would obtain the right to use the leading firm's intellectual property in the final marketable product, or process. The resulting proceeds again go to the first-stage leading firm. In addition, there may also be transfers to the first-stage (revealed) leader as a function of the level of knowledge revealed, prior to resolution of uncertainty in the second stage.

The paper's main results are as follows. Define P*(K) as each firm's symmetric optimal choice for its probability of second-stage success – given the maximum disclosed level of first-stage knowledge K (i.e., the disclosure level that maximizes the overall expected payoffs of the RJV net of development costs). Then, specifying the *ex post* licensing

fee the first-stage leader is paid by a sole successful developer at the level of its market reward from invention multiplied by P*(K), results in jointly optimal effort level choices by the RJV partners, conditional on full revelations of knowledge in the first stage. In addition, when the RJV partners can make interim transfers to the first-stage leader, which in total equal the overall expected payoff net of development cost summed across other firms, then all externalities arising from revelation of one's knowledge to second-stage rivals are internalized, inducing each RJV participant to fully reveal its first-stage knowledge. This follows as a special case of the public goods mechanism (revelation of preferences) result of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979). Indeed, owing to the assumed Blackwell ordering of knowledge levels, the outcome is also individually rational, conditional on each participant's realized first-stage knowledge level.

When such (potentially large) transfers are infeasible prior to second-stage success, full disclosures of first-stage knowledge levels may still arise in a subset of cases. These include those where each firm's probability of second-stage success, induced by the lowest possible level of first-stage knowledge, is higher than the reciprocal of the number of firms participating in the RJV. Full revelation also arises with restricted licensing fees when the optimally chosen number of RJV participants becomes large, which happens when the fixed cost of carrying out the first-stage knowledge generation becomes small, as does expected per-firm surplus.

In d'Aspremont et al. (1998), the full revelation result with unrestricted fees is extended to an analogous setting in which an RJV's participating firms' accrued knowledge levels are not ordered in a Blackwell sense, but are complementary. Conditional on full revelation, the aggregated knowledge level in an RJV is an increasing function of each participants' level of knowledge. However, the earlier type-contingent individual rationality result need not hold. In addition, in d'Aspremont et al. (2000), the analysis of Blackwell-ordered knowledge levels across RJV participants was extended to a bilateral bargaining setting under incomplete information about each other's level of knowledge, beyond common knowledge of who had the higher level of knowledge. There it is shown that – in contrast with buyer-seller bargaining over private goods in presence of asymmetric information about valuations and costs – it is possible to obtain full revelation of privately known knowledge of any level, with an interim individually rational mechanism. Indeed, all points on such a first-best Pareto frontier accruing from knowledge sharing in a non-cooperative second-stage contest or race which assigns (independent of the level of knowledge) interior weights to the buyer's and the seller's payoffs are incentive compatible for full revelation of knowledge. This is true both in the discrete-time development stage case discussed earlier, and when the development stage is a continuous time race for the first invention, in which the Poisson intensities of earlier invention are enhanced by a higher level of knowledge.

These results owe their origins to a basic feature of knowledge pertinent to R&D and its revelation, which differs from the usual buyer-seller game with private goods. Even though, in the absence of knowledge sharing, a firm with a higher level of knowledge has a higher expected surplus, arising from a higher probability of its second-stage success, its "competitive loss" from transferring an incremental amount of its knowledge to a second-stage rival is strictly increasing in its own knowledge level. As a result its overall objective function when it chooses how much knowledge to reveal, induced by (expected) license fees increasing in the level of its revealed knowledge, is non-concave, a property used to induce full revelation by each type.

4 Incomplete Contracts

There is a growing literature that uses the theory of incomplete contracts[13] for the analysis of R&D. This literature analyzes situations where the quality of an innovation is observable by the R&D participants, but it is not verifiable by courts (in a metric that quantifies its likely benefits). Such a setting is especially important for cumulative R&D or sequential innovation. This case is ubiquitous in the modern economy. As Scotchmer (1991, p. 24) notes, "Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators."[14].

In the case of sequential innovation, an inventor (or a researcher, or a research unit within a corporation) produces an innovation that is then used as an input for another innovator (e.g., a large company or a development unit within a large company) that then develops it further and sells to the final customer. By definition, an innovation is something that is difficult to describe, so the value of this innovation – even when it is observed by both its buyer and seller – is unlikely to be verifiable by a court. This calls for the use of incomplete contract theory. The main question in such a setup is to provide adequate incentives: both for the inventor to invest in the quality of the innovation – and for the buyer of this innovation to exert effort efficiently in developing the innovation into a final product.

The case of sequential innovation differs from the usual incomplete contract setting. Innovation is not a widget – innovation is a non-rival and (usually) a non-excludable good. Therefore, in addition to the two usual moral hazard problems (the incentives for research effort and for development effort), there is yet another source of potential opportunistic behavior. Upon selling an innovation, the original inventor might well resell the innovation to another rival buyer, who could also develop the product and then compete with the first buyer in the final market. Notice that this second sale may be *ex ante* suboptimal for the original seller-buyer coalition (indeed, the rent of the monopolist in the final market is higher than the joint rent of competing buyers).[15] So, if the seller were able to commit to an exclusive sale to the original buyer, she would be able to charge a higher price. The mechanisms that allow such commitment are at the center of this literature.

One simple commitment device would be patenting. If the researcher patents the original invention, and the patent is fully enforceable then the second sale can be ruled out. In this section, we consider instead the case where patents are not perfect. Another potential commitment device is vertical integration: the researcher and developer may merge into one firm under either the researcher's or the developer's control. Finally, there is the possibility of a 'royalty' contract that provides the inventor with a stake in the sales of the final product of the developer (or, more generally, where the payments to the inventor are made contingent on the sales of the final product). The royalty contract reduces the incentive for a second sale, since creating competition for the original buyer of the innovation would undermine the value of the initial inventor's stake. Given the complexity of the three moral hazard problems (not to mention various assumptions on contractibility and financial constraints), it should not be surprising that there is no single comprehensive yet tractable model that covers all the aspects of sequential innovation.

[13] For example see Hart and Moore (1994).

[14] See also the research by Hopenhayn et al. (2006)

[15] The second sale may or may not be socially optimal. On the one hand, it may create competition in the product market and therefore increase final customers' consumer surplus. On the other hand, if it reduces the joint surplus of the original researcher and developer, it may undermine the incentives to invest in the quality of innovation.

Instead, several influential papers have focused on different tradeoffs.

The first incomplete contracts paper in a context of cumulative R&D was developed by Aghion and Tirole (1994). They studied the issue of vertical integration, assuming that there is only one buyer of the innovation, and thereby neglecting the issue of potential leakage to a competing buyer. The main question the paper addresses is the optimal form of vertical organization. Aghion and Tirole consider two scenarios. First, there is a non-integrated case where the research unit is independent from the buyer of the innovation. Second, there is vertical integration in which the buyer controls the research unit.

In the integrated case, the researcher is fully expropriated and therefore has no incentives to invest; at the same time, the buyer of the innovation appropriates the entire surplus and thus has full incentives to invest. In the non-integrated case, the parties share the surplus equally, so that each has weak but non-trivial incentives. Therefore, as in the conventional incomplete contracting literature, the authors find that the non-integrated case provides relatively stronger incentives to the seller of the innovation while vertical integration (under the control of the buyer) provides no incentives to the seller but strong incentives to the buyer. Thus, depending on the relative importance of the buyer's and the seller's investments, the parties can choose the optimal ownership structure.

The authors do not consider a third scenario in which the research unit controls the downstream buyer. They argue that the research unit is likely to be financially constrained so it cannot afford acquiring the ownership of the (usually much larger) developer of the innovation. According to the authors, yet another argument against the researcher owning the developer stems from the inalienability of human capital – that is, the developer is indispensable and cannot be forced by the researcher to develop the innovation. Interestingly, the same inalienability argument should rule out the ownership of the research unit by the buyer. Indeed, such ownership implies that research unit's human capital is alienable; in case of disagreement, the developer of the innovation can extract the human capital and prevent the researcher herself from using the innovation. As this assumption seems too strong, the following literature has moved away from assuming direct alienability of innovator's human capital and has considered alternative concepts of control rights over intellectual property.

Although this has been less noticed by the follow-up literature, Aghion and Tirole's contribution goes far beyond simply extending the main idea of the incomplete contracts literature – the importance of property rights for incentives – to the domain of innovation. They also consider multiple inventions and alternative customers and discuss the idea of contingent ownership (when there is a threat of selling to an alternative customer). They also discuss sequential innovations and trailer clauses in the researcher's contract. However, these extensions are not fully developed.

The first paper to examine sequential innovation with imperfect patents was Green and Scotchmer (1995). The authors focus on the moral-hazard-in-teams problem that is similar to the one in Aghion and Tirole (1994): the trade-off between incentives of the original inventor and sequential innovator. Their setting differs from the former one in two ways. First, the original innovation can be improved through sequential innovation as well as marketed directly as it is. Second, they allow for the role of endogenously imperfect patents in redistributing the incentives from the first to the second innovator. They show that a broader patent (i.e. more complete protection for the original inventor) can indeed undermine the incentives of the subsequent developer. Therefore there can be a scope for a narrower patent, as the latter results in more investment in improvement. Green and Scotchmer also discuss the issue of patent length. If for a given length of a patent it is hard to resolve the moral hazard in teams problem, then a longer patent may

be warranted, despite the usual social costs of longer patents.

In another seminal paper, Anton and Yao (1994) abstract from the issues of incentives for inventing and developing the innovation, but instead focus on issues of the sale of the innovation and the opportunity of a second sale to a competing buyer. Their main result is that the threat of the second sale provides sufficient protection to the inventor so that she can prevent full expropriation by the original buyer of the innovation, and extract a substantial part of the joint surplus. The framework of their paper is very simple. There is one inventor and two potential buyers of her invention. First, the inventor learns an (exogenous) value of her innovation. Then she (randomly) approaches one buyer. The negotiation is structured as follows. The inventor sends the buyer a message. If the innovation is valuable, the inventor can choose to reveal (or not to reveal) the nature of the innovation. If the innovation is not valuable then she cannot reveal the innovation. In response to this message, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (that may include royalty payments contingent on the profits or sales of the final good by the buyer). Then the inventor negotiates with the other buyer. After the negotiations are completed, the inventor chooses to which buyer she should reveal the invention (if she has not done it already).

Two key ingredients of the model lead to the main result. First, in the market for the final good, monopoly profits are higher than the summed profits of the duopolists. Therefore, it is in the interest of the inventor to stick to an exclusive sale using the second sale only as an out-of-equilibrium threat point. Second, the buyers do not know their position in the game tree. Neither buyer can be sure whether the inventor has already accepted or rejected an offer from her competitor. Therefore, each buyer is afraid that if her offer is not good enough, the inventor will turn it down, and instead conclude an agreement with the competitor, with whom she will still have a chance to negotiate with a certain probability. This forces the buyer to offer a non-trivial share of the surplus to the inventor. By contrast, in a finite horizon, perfect information game, the fact that a buyer has complete bargaining power would result in zero payoff for the inventor despite the competition between the buyers. Indeed, in this case, the second buyer would know that the inventor has already concluded negotiations with the first buyer and would therefore make an offer that would leave the inventor with zero rent. Expecting this outcome, the first buyer would also be offer a trivial payoff to the inventor.

One other important part of Anton and Yao's paper is the analysis of financial constraints. In their model, the inventor has a finite level of wealth. This allows the contracts to include not just transfers of stakes from the buyer to the inventor but also the lump-sum payments by the inventor. The paper thus establishes an important role for financial constraints (the higher the investor's wealth, then the greater is the contract space).

These same themes have been further developed in Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006, 2011). In the former paper, the authors study the sale of innovation taking into account the incentives of the buyer to invest in developing the innovation into a marketable product. This creates a moral-hazard-in-teams problem but the nature of this problem is different from the one in Aghion and Tirole (1994). While in Aghion and Tirole there is a tradeoff between the buyer's and seller's incentives to invest in the quality of the innovation, the tradeoff in Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) modeled is between the buyer's incentive to invest and the seller's incentive to refrain from selling the innovation to a competing buyer (The inventor's investment in the value of the first innovation is simply taken as given). Like Anton and Yao, Bhattacharya and Guriev allow for royalty contracts and show that those can indeed help to sustain exclusive sale of innovation in equilibrium, at least for some parameter values. The mechanism is similar: the second sale to a com-

peting buyer undermines the value of the inventor's stake in the first buyer's monopoly rents; therefore a substantially high royalty can create incentives for an exclusive sale. However, giving up a stake in *ex post* rents to the inventor reduces the stake of the buyer herself, thereby undermining the buyer's own incentives to invest. The analysis implies that such a mechanism never achieves the first best outcome. Moreover, it fails to sustain an exclusive sale for some parameter values. This is the case when giving a high royalty rate to the inventor (in order to prevent the second sale) has a sufficiently strong negative effect on the buyer's incentives. The resulting value of the monopoly rent is reduced so much that the value of the royalties does not suffice to prevent the second sale. This logic implies that a royalty-based contract is unlikely to work for less valuable innovations.

Another important feature in Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) is the comparison of the royalty-based sales with those based on patents. Certainly, if the patent system worked perfectly, it would enforce an exclusive sale. This case would be outside the scope of incomplete contract theory, which realistically assumes away perfect enforcement of contracts. Bhattacharya and Guriev instead model a situation where patents are imperfect; in order to obtain a patent, a party has to describe the innovation. Such a description inevitably leaks a part of the innovative knowledge into the public domain. Therefore, even though the inventor can sell its innovation to a single buyer (and thus reap a substantial part of the surplus), a competing buyer will also obtain a part of the innovation's value. In this case, there is no moral-hazard-in-teams problem; the buyer of innovation pays a fixed fee and is a residual claimant in developing the innovation. However, her incentives for development may again be weakened by the fact that the competing buyer receives the publicly available description of the patented innovation, and therefore can also try to develop it and, if successful, compete in the market for the final product. This patent mechanism is likely to outperform the royalty-based contract when leakage of information during patenting is limited and when the value of the innovation is low.[16]

Bhattacharya and Guriev (2011) extend this analysis by allowing for the endogenous choice of investment by the inventor, and studying the role of financial constraints and control rights. In contrast to Aghion and Tirole's "inalienability" definition of control, Bhattacharya and Guriev posit that control of the inventor by the developer can be understood as an *ex ante* contract to constrain ex interim financial contracting with third parties. This ex interim constraint affects the inventor's *ex ante* incentives to invest and may be optimal. This is in accord with one of the major results in the mainstream incomplete contracts theory – an *ex post* inefficiency may help to create a commitment device and, therefore, strengthen *ex ante* incentives. In the well-known Grossman-Hart-Moore theory of property rights, ownership means control over alienable physical capital which is complementary to human capital. Allocation of property rights affects *ex post* bargaining threat points, changes the division of *ex post* surplus, and, therefore, affects the *ex ante* incentives to invest. In Bhattacharya and Guriev's model, external financial capital plays the role of physical capital and allows buyer and seller to negotiate to a more efficient ex interim agreement. This is particularly the case when the realized quality of the interim innovation is low, so that a higher royalty rate is required to prevent a second sale. If the seller could make an interim payment to the buyer, aided by third-party external financing, she could still strike such a bargain, instead of securing an imperfect patent on her innovation, which leads to a low licensing fee for revealing its full content.

Allain et al. (2011) consider a novel aspect of the interaction among these themes of vertical integration, innovation, and leakage to competitors. Here, vertical integration

[16]See also Anton and Yao (2004) for an analysis of related tradeoffs in the context of cost-reducing inventions.

results in easier dissemination of sensitive information within the integrated firm. In the model setting, there are two upstream firms (suppliers) and two downstream firms who buy inputs from the suppliers, innovate and sell the final good to the customers. In the presence of vertical integration between one upstream and one downstream firm, the other downstream firm is no longer happy to buy inputs from the integrated supplier – as this may result in the leakage of her innovation to the competing downstream firm. The upshot is a weaker incentive for the non-integrated downstream firm to invest in innovation. Furthermore, the integrated firm responds with an even stronger investment. The ultimate result is "foreclosure" – the vertically integrated firm crowds out all independent downstream firms. Interestingly, the model is set up in such a way (e.g., by assuming single sourcing) that foreclosure only takes place when there is innovation.

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