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Security Notions for Broadcast Encryption

ACNS '11 Best Student Paper Award

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Abstract. This paper clarifies the relationships between security notions for broadcast encryption. In the past, each new scheme came with its own definition of security, which makes them hard to compare. We thus define a set of notions, as done for signature and encryption, for which we prove implications and separations, and relate the existing notions to the ones in our framework. We find some interesting relationships between the various notions, especially in the way they define the receiver set of the challenge message. In addition, we define a security notion that is stronger than all previous ones, and give an example of a scheme that fulfills this notion.

Keywords: Broadcast Encryption, Adaptive Security, Security Models

Version history

- 2011-05-10: Removed claim that [DPP07] fulfills the $\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{C}$-definition. Adapted table 2.
- 2011-12-10: Added comment in section 3.2 about the inclusion of the id header S in the winning condition of the security game. Fixed example scheme to include S in the MAC.

1 Introduction

Broadcast encryption (BE) is a cryptographic primitive that was first described by Fiat and Naor in [FN94]. It provides a content holder the ability to publish the content to a specific subset of the registered users. This is used in practice by copyright protection mechanisms for digital media such as DVDs, so that if the keys for a series of DVD players become known, this series will not be able to play DVDs produced after the series is revoked [NNL01]. But while work on the related topic of multi-cast encryption progressed, BE did not receive much attention until the last decade, when Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech presented their (symmetric-key) subset-cover framework along with a security model and a security analysis [NNL01]. Since then, many BE schemes have been proposed, but for each scheme the security proof was done in a new security model. Because of these various and often *ad-hoc* security models, it is hard to compare the merits of these schemes, as it is not always clear how the security notions relate to each other.

Gentry and Waters [GW09], for example, defined a security notion they call "adaptive", because the adversary can corrupt users adaptively before the challenge phase. But there is a notion that is "even more" adaptive, where the adversary can still corrupt users *after* the challenge phase. The goal of this paper is thus to provide a better picture of the meaningful security models for BE, and to compare them. In particular, we investigate whether the various adaptive notions of corruption coincide or not.

Related Work. The first scheme to come with a security argument was the subset-cover framework introduced by Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech [NNL01]. The framework uses symmetric keys, where the sender and the receivers share some secrets, so the security proof relies on assumptions about the symmetric primitives (one-way functions and block ciphers). Dodis and Fazio [DF03] presented the first CCA2-secure public-key Trace and Revoke (TR) scheme along with a security model covering CCA2 and generalized CCA2. When one considers possible corruption after the target ciphertext has been sent, one has to deal with forward-security. This was done by Yao, Fazio, Dodis, and Lysyanskaya [YFDL04] who first considered forward-security for HIBE and then by extension for BE. Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [BGW05] designed a fully collusion-resistant BE scheme and proposed a security model for it, where the adversary can corrupt all the users, except the target users. Thereafter, Boneh and Waters [BW06] presented a fully collusion-resistant TR scheme secure against adaptive attacks. Delerablée, Paillier, and Pointcheval [DPP07] also presented a fully collusion-secure dynamic

BE scheme (DBE) and presented a new matching security model. More recently, Gentry and Waters [GW09] defined two additional security notions they call "semi-static" and "adaptive", as well as a generic transformation from a semi-static secure scheme into an adaptively secure scheme, and then a semi-static secure scheme to which they later apply the transformation.

Contribution. As shown above, many security notions were proposed in the literature. In this paper, we define a more systematic security model for broadcast encryption schemes, and construct a generic security framework for BE. We take into account, as usual in the "provable security framework", oracles to model the means available to the adversary, such as the possibility to join new users, to corrupt users, and to decrypt messages. It is worth noting that small details can have a high impact. For example, the choice of the set of users to which the challenge message is sent also plays a role in how the models relate to each other. We investigate the relationships between the different notions, and find that in some cases, two notions are equivalent or separated depending on the availability of some oracles or the collusion-resistance of a BE scheme. After describing the relationships between notions in our framework, we have a closer look at the security models and the schemes proposed in the literature, and discuss where they are in our framework, which then helps to compare them.

Our results are relevant for existing BE schemes. From the proof found in [GW09], it is clear that the two-key transformation actually achieves the stronger 2-adaptive-security level.

Organization. In section 2 we provide a formal definition of broadcast encryption, or more precisely key encapsulation, and specify some terminology. In section 3 we define our security framework. Section 4 relates the different security notions to each other. In section 5 we embed the existing security models from the literature into our framework. In section 6, we describe which security notions have been achieved by existing protocols and describe an (inefficient) protocol that achieves the strongest notion.

2 Definitions

Broadcast encryption (BE) schemes enable the sender of a message to specify a subset of the registered (the *target set* or *privileged set*), who will be able to decrypt the ciphertext sent to all users via a broadcast channel. The complement of the target set (in the set of the registered users) is called the *revoked set*. To accomplish user revocation when sending a message, a BE generally generates three parts: the *Id Header*, that is a bit-string that unambiguously identifies the target set/revoked set; the *Key Header*, that encapsulates a session key for the privileged users; and the *Message Body*, that contains the payload encrypted under the session key.

Since for all the schemes, the *Id Header* and the *Message Body* are similar, in this paper, we will focus on the *Key Header* part only, which can be seen as a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Furthermore, when no more information is given, we will consider a public-key key encapsulation system with possibly stateful decoders: encryption key is public, the decryption keys of the users can evolve, but the updates will be global and sent on a public channel, and ephemeral keys are distributed to be used together with symmetric encryption (DEM: Data Encapsulation Mechanism). We will nevertheless sometimes make remarks about alternative cases.

Definition 1 (Dynamic Broadcast Encapsulation). A dynamic broadcast encapsulation scheme is a tuple of algorithms $\mathcal{DBE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Join}, \mathsf{Encaps}, \mathsf{Decaps})$:

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$, where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the system (omitted in the following); and returns a master secret key MSK and an encryption key EK. It also initiates an empty list Reg. If the scheme is asymmetric, EK is public, otherwise it can be seen as a part of the MSK.
- $\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, Reg, \mathsf{id})$ takes as input the master secret key, the list Reg, and a user identifier id. If $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{UI}$ (where $\mathcal{UI}$ is the set of valid user identifiers, usually $\mathbb{N}$) and $\mathsf{id} \notin Reg$, outputs a user secret key $\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ and a public user tag $\mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}}$. The pair $(\mathsf{id}, \mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}})$ is appended to Reg. Else, outputs $\perp$.
- $\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$ takes as input the encryption key, the list Reg, and a target set S and outputs a key header H and a session key $K \in \{0,1\}^k$.

– $\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}, S, H)$ takes as input a user secret key, the target set S, and the key header H. If $\mathsf{id} \in S$, outputs the session key K.

The correctness requirement is that for any (polynomial size) set of joined users $U \subset \mathcal{UI}$, any target set $S \subset U$ and for any $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{UI}$, if $\mathsf{id} \in S$ then the decapsulation algorithm gives back the ephemeral session key. See figure 1.

$(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{EK}, Reg) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$;
`for all` $\mathsf{id} \in S$: $(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}}, Reg) \leftarrow \mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, Reg, \mathsf{id})$;
$(H, K) \leftarrow \mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$.

$i \in S \Rightarrow \mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk}_i, S, H) = K$

Fig. 1. $\mathcal{DBE}$: Correctness

2.1 Terminologies and Various Types of Schemes

Join Algorithms. When the Join algorithm can be run at the setup phase only, with no later evolution of the group, we say the scheme is *static* (instead of *dynamic*). For a dynamic scheme, several kinds of Join functionalities are possible:

Passive, no input (except a counter i); it generates a public tag upk_i to identify the user;
Active, the input is id; it generates a public tag $\mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ to identify the user;
Identity-Based, the input is id, and the public tag $\mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ is simply id.

We stress that the default case in this paper (when no other version is specified) is that Join is passive.

Target Set. A broadcast encryption scheme is called *inclusive* when the target set is specified by the list of authorized users, and *exclusive* when the target set is specified by its complement $\mathcal{R}$, the set of revoked users.

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms. We described above a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) where only a key is generated. The payload is then encrypted with a symmetric mechanism to get a full encryption scheme. All the broadcast encryption schemes known to the authors can be written as KEMs, e. g. the bilinear BE schemes from [BGW05,GW09] generate a random group element which is then multiplied to the message. This random group element can be considered as the symmetric key, and group multiplication as the symmetric encryption. To achieve CCA2-security for the full broadcast encryption, given a CCA2-secure key encapsulation, we additionally need to bind all the components of the ciphertext together.

Encryption and Decryption Keys. The encryption key can be either public (asymmetric) or private (symmetric), in the former case, we talk about *public-key* broadcast encryption, in the latter we say this is a *private-key* broadcast encryption. The decryption keys can either be defined and sent to the users at the join phase and never modified again, or be updated each time another user joins the system. In the former case, the decoders are said to be *stateless* since there is no state to evolve. In the latter case, the decoders are called *stateful* because they have to keep their state up-to-date. They thus have to be always on-line to receive the update information.

Default. As already mentioned, in this paper, we focus on public-key key encapsulation system with possibly stateful decoders.

3 Security Notions

Besides the various properties that a broadcast encryption scheme can satisfy, many security notions have been defined to take all the threats into consideration. We will thus review them, and try to give a cleaner view. As usual, security notions are defined by the goal the adversary want to achieve, and by the means that are available. We first define our standard security notions, and then compare them with some alternatives defined in the literature.

3.1 Standard Security Notions

Since we are studying a KEM [CS03], the goal of the adversary is to distinguish two keys in a key encapsulation, noted IND for *key indistinguishability*: after having received the public parameters, in the first phase (the FIND phase) the adversary outputs a target set S; then the challenger runs the key encapsulation algorithm, on this set S, that outputs the ephemeral K and the encapsulation H. It then chooses a random key K' and a random bit b and sets $K_b = K$ and $K_{1-b} = K'$. Upon receiving (H, K_0, K_1), the adversary runs the second phase (the GUESS) during which it has to decide whether H encapsulates K_0 or K_1, which means it has to guess the bit b.

Oracles can be available at different periods of time (Setup, FIND-phase, or GUESS-phase) which defines several kinds of attacks. Figure 2 shows the experiment $\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-d}x\mathsf{ay}\mathsf{cca}z}_{\mathcal{DBE},\mathcal{A}}(k)$, where the oracles OJoin_1, $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_1$ and $\mathsf{ODecaps}_1$ are available during the FIND-phase, and the oracles OJoin_2, $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_2$ and $\mathsf{ODecaps}_2$ are available during the GUESS-phase. According to the exact definition of these oracles, we have an IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**z** security game, for x-Dynamic (Join), y-Adaptive (Corrupt) and CCA-z (Decaps). If not otherwise specified, use of the variables x, y, z means that they can be replaced by any level defined below.

The Join *Oracle.* It can be available at the Setup-time only. In this case, the adversary can make a number of non-adaptive Join-queries, where he receives the results only at the end of the Setup-phase, together with the parameters and MSK, EK. As said above, we then talk about a **static scheme**, and the attack is *S-Dynamic* (or Dyn**S**), and both the oracles OJoin_1 and OJoin_2 output $\perp$. The Join-oracle can be available during the first phase only, then $\mathsf{OJoin}_1 = \mathsf{Join}$ but the OJoin_2 oracle outputs $\perp$, and the attack is *1-Dynamic* (or Dyn**1**); it can be available always, then $\mathsf{OJoin}_1 = \mathsf{OJoin}_2 = \mathsf{Join}$, and the attack is *2-Dynamic* (or Dyn**2**).

The Corrupt *Oracle.* Corruptions can be more or less adaptive. Again, the adversary may have to decide before the Setup-time which users will be corrupted. This is a **selective attack** or *S-Adaptive* (also denoted Ad**S**), which is meaningful for static schemes (Dyn**S**) only (otherwise there are no users to corrupt during the Setup-phase), and then both the oracles $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_1$ and $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_2$ output $\perp$. It can be available during the first phase only, then $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_1 = \mathsf{Corrupt}$ but the $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_2$ oracle outputs $\perp$, and the attack is *1-Adaptive* (or Ad**1**). It can be available during the full security game, then $\mathsf{OCorrupt}_1 = \mathsf{OCorrupt}_2 = \mathsf{Corrupt}$, and the attack is *2-Adaptive* (or Ad**2**). Eventually, the adversary can have no access at all to the Corrupt oracle: we say the attack is *0-Adaptive* (or Ad**0**).

The Decaps *Oracle.* As usual for chosen-ciphertext security, the Decaps-oracle can be available or not. It can never be available in the CPA (or CCA**0**) scenario, and both the oracles $\mathsf{ODecaps}_1$ and $\mathsf{ODecaps}_2$ output $\perp$; it can be available during the first phase only, then $\mathsf{ODecaps}_1 = \mathsf{Decaps}$ but the $\mathsf{ODecaps}_2$ oracle outputs $\perp$, and the attack is CCA**1**; it can be available during the full security game, then $\mathsf{ODecaps}_1 = \mathsf{ODecaps}_2 = \mathsf{Decaps}$, and the attack is CCA**2**.

For the IND-goal, the natural restriction for the adversary is not to ask for the decapsulation of the challenge header H nor corrupt any user in the target set S.

Remark 2. For private-key schemes, the adversary is granted access to the encapsulation oracle instead of the encryption key. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on the public-key setting for dynamic broadcast encryption schemes (noted PKDBE).

$\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-d}x\mathsf{ay}\mathsf{cca}z-b}_{\mathcal{DBE},\mathcal{A}}(k)$
$(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{EK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$;
$\mathcal{Q}_C \leftarrow \emptyset$; $\mathcal{Q}_D \leftarrow \emptyset$;
$(st, S) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{OJoin}_1(\cdot),\mathsf{OCorrupt}_1(\cdot),\mathsf{ODecaps}_1(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)}(\mathsf{param})$;
$(H, K) \leftarrow \mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$; $K_b \leftarrow K$; $K_{1-b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$;
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{OJoin}_2(\cdot),\mathsf{OCorrupt}_2(\cdot),\mathsf{ODecaps}_2(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)}(st; S, H, K_0, K_1)$;
`if` $\exists i \in S, (i, S, H) \in \mathcal{Q}_D$ `or` $i \in \mathcal{Q}_C$
`then return` 0;
`else return` b';

where $x \in \{s, 1, 2\}$, $y \in \{0, s, 1, 2\}$, $z \in \{0, 1, 2\}$.

$\mathsf{OJoin}(i)$
$(\mathsf{usk}_i, \mathsf{upk}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{msk}, i)$;
`return` upk_i;

$\mathsf{OCorrupt}(i)$
$\mathcal{Q}_C \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}_C \cup \{i\}$;
`return` usk_i;

$\mathsf{ODecaps}(i, S, H)$
$\mathcal{Q}_D \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}_D \cup \{(i, S, H)\}$
$K \leftarrow \mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk}_i, S, H)$;
`return` K;

Fig. 2. $\mathcal{DBE}$: Key Privacy (IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**)

Definition 3. A public-key DBE scheme $\mathcal{DBE}$ is said to be $(t, N, q_C, q_D, \varepsilon)$-IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-secure if in the security game presented in figure 2, the advantage, denoted $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-d}x\mathsf{ay}\mathsf{cca}z}_{\mathcal{DBE}}(k, t, N, q_C, q_D)$, of any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ registering at most N users (OJoin oracle), corrupting at most q_C of them ($\mathsf{OCorrupt}$ oracle), and asking for at most q_D decapsulation queries ($\mathsf{ODecaps}$ oracle), is bounded by ε:

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-d}x\mathsf{ay}\mathsf{cca}z}_{\mathcal{DBE}}(k, t, N, q_C, q_D) =$$
$$\max_{\mathcal{A}}\{\Pr[\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-d}x\mathsf{ay}\mathsf{cca}z-1}_{\mathcal{DBE},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-d}x\mathsf{ay}\mathsf{cca}z-0}_{\mathcal{DBE},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1]\} \ .$$

3.2 Alternatives and Variants

Forward-Secrecy. For dynamic exclusive schemes (the target set is defined by the list of revoked users), new users are by definition included in the target sets of the message headers, even if they did not exist at the time the header was sent. Furthermore, since new users are included in the challenge set S, the adversary is not allowed to corrupt them. This means the encryption does not provide forward-secrecy. To model forward-secrecy, we can allow corruption of joined users, and in this case the encryption key EK must evolve when a new user joins the system.

For dynamic inclusive schemes (the target set is defined by the list of authorized users), the Ad**2** notion provides *forward-secrecy* since any user not in the target set can be corrupted in the second phase.

Target Set. In the default security game, the adversary chooses the target set S at the end of the first phase, the FIND phase which consists in finding the best S for winning the game. But some papers in the literature restricted this choice:

- The adversary announces the target set before the setup phase [BGW05]. We call this *selective security*, denoted Targ**S**. This can only happen in static schemes, because the adversary needs to know the set of users to choose the target set from.
- The target set is automatically set to all uncorrupted users at the end of the first phase [DF03]. We call this *fixed-target-set security*, denoted Targ**F**.

When needed, the default case (the adversary chooses the target set S at the end of the FIND-phase) is denoted Targ**C**.

Malleability of the Id Header By restricting the adversary only to asking queries different from (S, H) to the decapsulation oracle, our security definition implies non-malleability of the id header. If the adversary manages to submit a query (i, S', H) with a different target set for the original header, he wins the game. Our definition thus goes beyond the one found in [BGW05], where the restriction is that the same H must not be queried to the decapsulation oracle. By removing S from the list $\mathcal{Q}_D$, our definition can be weakened so it does not require S to be protected.

Security Models in the Literature. We can now characterize all the security models defined in the literature into our formalism: These notions are summarized in table 1, when S is the target set and C the corrupted users set.

- In [YFDL04], the authors defined the full access to the Corrupt oracle, but for a static scheme (no Join oracle). In order to accommodate the forward-secrecy, they included time slots. Disregarding the latter, the security model is similar to IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**2**-CCA**2**-Targ**F**. Essentially the adversary is restricted to corrupting only users from a time slot later than the one the challenge message was sent in. In our model, IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**2**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-security does only make sense for $x = 2$, as otherwise no users can be corrupted in the GUESS-phase (because the target set is fixed to $U \setminus C$ and the adversary cannot join new users after the challenge phase).
- In [Del08] the authors define a security model for IBBE they call IND-sID-CCA (selective ID CCA-security), which is IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**2**-CCA**2**-Targ**S**-security in our notation.
- The partial access to the Corrupt oracle has been used in [BW06] and [GW09]. In our notation, the authors used IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**1**-CCA**0** security, since no decapsulation queries were available.
- As noted above, the the fixed-target-set security was introduced in [DF03], but no Corrupt queries were allowed in the second phase, and the system was static (no Join query). In our formalism, this is IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**1**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**, according to the Decaps-oracle access.
- *Semi-static* security has been introduced in [GW09] in order to build a generic conversion into Adaptive-1. In this setting, the adversary must announce the set of corrupted users before the setup phase, as we defined as *selective attack*. In our notation, this is IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**S**-CCA**0** security.[1]
- In the *static* model due to [BGW05], the adversary also has to announce its target set before the setup phase (selective attack). In our notation, this is IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**S**-CCA**2**-Targ**F** security with fixed target set. The authors also define a CPA version.[2]

Security	before setup	FIND-Phase	Challenge-Phase	GUESS-Phase
Ad**2**		Corrupt	S	Corrupt
Ad**2**Targ**F**		Corrupt		Corrupt
Ad**1**		Corrupt	S	
Ad**1**Targ**F**		Corrupt		
semi-static	C		S	
static	C			

Table 1. Adversarial Capabilities

Collusion Resistance. We can also distinguish between two types of collusion-resistance: full collusion-resistance, where there is no limit on the number of Corrupt-queries, and t-collusion-resistance, where the number of queries is bounded by t (which can depend on the number of users N). With our parameters, we implicitly consider all the cases.

4 Relationship between the Security Notions

In this section, we shed light on the relationships between the security notions we defined in the last section. We start in section 4.1 with the hierarchy of Decaps-oracles, where we expect no surprises.

[1] More precisely, in the *semi-static* version of the experiment, the adversary must commit to a set $\tilde{S}$ before the setup phase. He is allowed to corrupt any user not in $\tilde{S}$ after the setup phase, and must choose a challenge set $S \subseteq \tilde{S}$. An equivalent formulation is that the adversary chooses the set C of users to corrupt before the setup phase (because he can corrupt all users not in $\tilde{S}$), but chooses S at the challenge phase. This formulation is only equivalent for fully collusion-resilient schemes, but it is for these schemes that the notions were designed.

[2] In the *static* version of the experiment [BGW05], the adversary has to announce the set S of users he wants to attack before the setup phase. He then receives the private keys of all users not in S after the setup phase. An equivalent definition is that he chooses the set C of corrupted users, and the S is fixed to be all the users except C. To allow the adversary to choose the target set, the adversary announces both C and S before the setup phase. This definition where the adversary chooses both C and S can also be used in not fully collusion-secure schemes and is the one considered in this section.

In section 4.2, we explore the Join-oracle, of which we defined three different versions: For the passive version, which takes no input, all notions are equivalent; For the active version, which takes input and outputs a user tag, we can separate all notions. For the IBBE version, which takes an arbitrary string as input, but does not output a user tag (the upk is the identity of the user), we can show equivalences and separations based on the availability of a Corrupt-oracle. In section 4.3, we address the Corrupt-queries, and gaps appear according to the number of such queries, and thus the level of collusion-resistance. In section 4.4, we examine the various ways in which the target set can be chosen.

4.1 Separating CPA and CCA

We remember the well-known separation between CPA (CCA**0**), CCA**1**, and CCA**2**-security for PKE from [BDPR98]. The same separation applies in the case of broadcast encryption, first because if we set $\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$ to
$(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{EK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$; $(\mathsf{usk}_1, \mathsf{upk}_1) \leftarrow \mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, 1)$; $\mathsf{dk} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{usk}_1, \mathsf{ek} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{EK}||\mathsf{upk}_1$, we obtain a single-user KEM scheme. But for completeness, and as a warm-up, we give a proof of the relationship for BE, whatever the size of the target set, part of which leans closely on the proof in [BDPR98].

Theorem 4. *The following implications are strict:*

$$\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{2} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{1} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{0}.$$

4.2 Separating Notions of Dynamicity

In this section, in order to compare the Join-oracle access, we also have to consider the three versions of the Join-algorithm, as defined in section 2.1: *passive*-Join, if it takes no input; *active*-Join, if it takes an input; *ID-based*-Join, if the output tag upk is the input identity.

Easy Implications. As above, there is a clear hierarchy on the Join oracle access: at the setup time only, in the first phase, or at anytime

Theorem 5. *The following implications hold for all versions of the* Join oracle: IND-Dyn**2**-Ady-CCA**z** $\Rightarrow$ IND-Dyn**1**-Ady-CCA**z** $\Rightarrow$ IND-Dyn**S**-Ady-CCA**z**.

Passive Join. This is a standard definition in the literature. Interestingly enough, in this context all the notions are equivalent, since the adversary cannot influence the output.[3]

Theorem 6. *If* Join *takes no input,we have the following equivalences*

$$\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}.$$

Proof. Because of the trivial implications, it remains to show that Dyn**S** $\Rightarrow$ Dyn**2**. Given a successful Dyn**2**-adversary $\mathcal{A}^d$ that makes N_1 queries to the Join-oracle in phase 1, and N_2 queries to the Join-oracle in phase 2, we construct a successful Dyn**S**-adversary $\mathcal{A}^s$ that joins $N = N_1 + N_2$ users before the setup phase. Because the Join-oracle takes no input, its behavior is exactly the same in phase 1 and phase 2. Therefore $\mathcal{A}^s$ can store the results and then answer all Join-queries made by $\mathcal{A}^d$ later.

Active Join with Large Input. If the Join-algorithm is interactive or takes input from the adversary (that can be sufficiently large, i. e. $|\mathcal{UI}|$ is superpolynomial), the adversary can influence the Join-process:

Theorem 7. *If* Join takes input and outputs a public tag, the following implications are strict

$$\text{IND-Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \text{IND-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \text{IND-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}.$$

[3] It is interesting to note that the equivalence is for our above notions only: for passive-Join, a query in the first phase is strictly more useful than a query in the second phase. As a consequence, if we consider in details the number of queries in each phase, as done in [PP04] for the encryption and decryption oracles, we can show that $\mathsf{Dyn}(N_1 + N_2, 0) \rightarrow \mathsf{Dyn}(N_1, N_2) \rightarrow \mathsf{Dyn}(0, N_1 + N_2)$, and these implications are strict. However, in the above theorem, we do not fix the number of queries.

Identity-Based. In this case, the OJoin-oracle only outputs a user secret key $\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ (because $\mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}} = \mathsf{id}$). This means that in order to gain anything from the output, the adversary must also be able to corrupt users.

Theorem 8. *For ID-Based Broadcast Encryption, the following implications are strict*

$$\begin{array}{l}
\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \\
\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \\
\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \\
\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}
\end{array}$$

4.3 Separating Forms of Corruption

Theorem 9.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \\
\quad \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z},
\end{array}$$

and for BE schemes that are not fully collusion-secure all implications are strict.

Proof. The implications are clear, since having access to an oracle never makes an adversary weaker. The separations follow from lemmas 10, 11, 12, and 13

Separation of no Corruption from Selective Corruption. Recall that for $\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}$, the only version of Dyn that makes sense is $\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}$ (section 3.1).

Lemma 10. $\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \not\Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$.

Separation of Selective Corruption from 1-Adaptive Corruption. In a model with selective corruption, the adversary must announce the set C of corrupted users before seeing the encryption key. To make a difference, we would have to give some information on the subset of the users to corrupt in the encryption key: we thus embed such information using a secret sharing scheme to make sure all of the identified users (special users) have to be corrupted.

We need to make sure that the subset is hard to guess by chance: this is the case for IBBE, where the size of the set $\mathcal{UI}$ is exponential and any user is hard to guess. In case $\mathcal{UI}$ is of polynomial size, the size of the subset must not be too small, otherwise all of them will be corrupted even by a selective-corruption adversary with significant probability. If t is the number of special users, there are $\binom{N}{t}$ ways of choosing them, where N is polynomial in the security parameter. To make the binomial be super-polynomial for a polynomial N, we need t to be non-constant.

How can we be sure the adversary corrupts at most t users? First, it can be set by definition, using the t-collusion-secure level. For IBBE, $\binom{|\mathcal{UI}|}{1}$ is already exponential in the security parameter. However, without any additional constraint, for a basic broadcast encryption scheme, if $N - t$ is constant, then $|S|$ must also be constant, and we are actually dealing with a simple multi-encryption scenario. Multicast security of encryption schemes has been considered in [BPS00]. The authors proved that standard IND-CPA encryption schemes remain secure even if the same message is sent to different users in parallel. This makes the case where the adversary is always sending only to a constant number of users less interesting to us. It thus seems reasonable to exclude these cases from BE. In the following, we thus focus on t-collusion-secure schemes, where t must be less than the total number of users minus a non-constant number.

Lemma 11. *For a t-collusion-secure scheme (for t and $N - t$ non-constant numbers),*

$$\mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z} \not\Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}.$$

Separation of 1-Adaptive Corruption from 2-Adaptive Corruption.

Lemma 12. *For a t-collusion-secure scheme (for t and $N-t$ non-constant numbers),*

$$\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \not\Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \text{ for } z \in \{0,1\}.$$

As noted, the proof requires t and $N-t$ to be non-constant. But we can also note that it does not work in the CCA**2**-setting, because on the one hand the scheme is malleable, and on the other hand the adversary could simply query the H_i's to the Decaps-oracle.

Lemma 13. *For a t-collusion-secure scheme (for t and $N-t$ non-constant numbers),if SUF-CMA-secure MAC, IND-CCA2-secure symmetric encryption and homomorphic OWF exist,*

$$\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{2} \not\Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{2}.$$

MAC, symmetric encryption, and homomorphic OWF are defined in appendix A.1.

4.4 Choice of the Target Set

Selective Security.

Lemma 14. *The following implication is strict:*

$$\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S}.$$

Fixed Target Sets. In our definition the adversary chooses the target set S of the challenge. In the DPP security model [DPP07], S is automatically the set of all non-compromised users. The same situation appears in [BGW05], where the adversary outputs S before the setup and receives the secret keys for all users in $U \setminus S$. A similar definition is given for the BGW model. We could reformulate the BGW model so that the adversary outputs the set C of the keys he wants to know, and S is set to $U_1 \setminus C_1$. This formulation is obviously equivalent. We want to investigate the relationship between these two notions.

Note that under the "fixed" definition, the notions IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**1**-CCA**z** and IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**2**-CCA**z** for $x \in \{s,1\}$ are equivalent since in any case the adversary cannot corrupt users after the challenge phase (all the non-corrupted users at the end of the first phases are in the target set and cannot be corrupted).

Theorem 15. *All the following implications are strict*

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \\
&\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \Leftrightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \\
&\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \\
&\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F}
\end{aligned}$$

The theorem follows from lemmas 14, 16, 17, and 18.

Lemma 16. $\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F}$
for $y \in \{0,s\}$.

Proof. From an adversary $\mathcal{A}^f$ against the IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-security of a BE scheme, we build an adversary $\mathcal{A}^S$ against the IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-Targ**S**-security. If the model has no corruption or static corruption, $\mathcal{A}^S$ runs $\mathcal{A}^f$, who outputs C, chooses the same C and sets his target set $S = U \setminus C$.

Lemma 17. $\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S}$.

Proof. Given a successful adversary $\mathcal{A}^S$, we construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}^f$ as follows. $\mathcal{A}^S$ outputs his target set S and the set of users to corrupt C before the Setup phase. $\mathcal{A}^f$ chooses $C' = U \setminus S$.

Lemma 18. $\mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \not\Rightarrow \mathit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S}$.

Proof. In the IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-experiment, the target set is always fixed to $S = U$. Given a IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-secure scheme Π, we modify it into a scheme Π' that is still IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ secure, but not IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ**S**. The only change is that if $|S| = 1$, Π'.Encaps sets $K = 0$ (or determines the key in a deterministic way by fixing all random coins e. g. to 0).

Theorem 19. *For fully collusion-resilient BE schemes, the following implications are strict*

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} &\Leftrightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \\ &\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \quad (y \in \{1,2\}) \end{aligned}$$

The theorem follows from lemmas 14 and 20. It seem curious at first that the relationship between fixed target set and selective security is inverted for models with no corruption, but in this case the fixed target set means that it is always set to U, while the selective security allows some freedom of the adversary to choose.

Lemma 20. *For fully collusion-resistant BE schemes*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Leftrightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \quad (y \in \{1,2\}).$$

Proof. It is clear that if the adversary can choose S freely, he can set it to $U \setminus C$. Let $\mathcal{A}^{choice}$ be a successful adversary against a BE scheme that can choose his target set S. Then we construct $\mathcal{A}^{fixed}$ as follows: $\mathcal{A}^{fixed}$ faithfully forwards all queries. When $\mathcal{A}^{choice}$ outputs his challenge target set S, $\mathcal{A}^{fixed}$ first issues corrupt queries so that $U \setminus C = S$, then asks for the challenge and forwards it to $\mathcal{A}^{choice}$. He forwards the guess bit b and wins with the same probability as $\mathcal{A}^{choice}$.

Note that $\mathcal{A}^{fixed}$ corrupts more users, which could reduce the tightness of a security proof, and causes the proof to fail in a t-resilient setting where $t < N - 1$ (if $t = N - 1$, the scheme is fully collusion-resistant).

In the following, we denote by $\nleftrightarrow$ the fact that $\not\Rightarrow$ in both directions.

Theorem 21. *For BE schemes where the adversary must leave at least two users uncorrupted, the following implications are strict:*

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} &\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \\ &\nleftrightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \end{aligned}$$

$$\textit{and } \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \quad (y \in \{1,2\})$$

The theorem follows from lemmas 14, 22, 23, and 24.

Lemma 22. *If the adversary is restricted to leaving at least 2 users uncorrupted, the following implication is strict*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \quad (y \in \{1,2\}).$$

Lemma 23. *If the adversary is restricted to leaving at least 2 users uncorrupted,*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{x}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \not\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S}.$$

We can easily see that the adversary does not get weaker if he can choose the target set freely from the set of uncorrupted users $U \setminus C$, because he can choose $S = U \setminus C$ as in the fixed case.

Lemma 24.

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \not\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{y}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \textit{ for } y \in \{1,2\}.$$

5 Relationships Between Notions from the Literature

A security notion that our model does not cover is defined in [DPP07]. In this model, the adversary accesses a JoinCorrupted oracle instead of the Corrupt oracle. That means he must decide whether to corrupt a user before the user is joined, but the choice can depend on information gained previously. The model defined in [DPP07] is Dyn**1**, as the adversary has access to a Join oracle before the challenge phase, CCA**0** and Targ**F**, as the challenge set is *fixed* to $S = U \setminus C$, so it is rather similar to IND-Dyn**1**-Ad**1**-CCA**0**-Targ**F**-model in our framework, except that the Corrupt oracle is replaced with JoinCorrupted. We call it the *partially adaptive* model. As in the previous section, we also denote Targ**C** the default case where the adversary can choose S as any subset of $U \setminus C$.

Theorem 25. *We have the following implications*

$$\begin{aligned} &\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{F} \Rightarrow \textit{partially adaptive} - \text{CCA}\mathbf{z} - \text{Targ}\mathbf{C} \\ &\Rightarrow \textit{partially adaptive} - \text{CCA}\mathbf{z} - \text{Targ}\mathbf{F} \Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S} \end{aligned}$$

that are all strict (the first one only if t-collusion secure with t and $N - t$ non-constant).

The proof can be found in appendix A.13.

We now have almost all the results we need to establish the relationship between the security notions that can be found in the existing literature to fill the picture on figure 3. We now complete it.

Theorem 26. *The following implication is strict*

$$\textit{Partially adaptive} - \text{CCA}\mathbf{z} - \text{Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{0}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C}.$$

Proof. From any semi-static adversary $\mathcal{A}^S$ we construct a partially adaptive adversary as follows. $\mathcal{A}^S$ announces N and C before the setup phase. $\mathcal{A}^{pa}$ asks for JoinCorrupted on all users in C and simply joins all users in $U \setminus C$. The separation is analogous to the one in lemma 11.

We relate semi-static security to the version of static security with 1-adaptive corruption defined in [GW09].

Theorem 27. *The following implication is strict*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{0}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{C} \Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{0}\text{-Targ}\mathbf{S}.$$

Proof. From any selectively 1-adaptive adversary $\mathcal{A}^a$ we construct a semi-static adversary $\mathcal{A}^s$. $\mathcal{A}^a$ announces N and S before the setup phase. $\mathcal{A}^s$ forwards N and sets $C = U \setminus S$. He now has enough information to answer all Corrupt-queries. The separation is analogous to the one in lemma 14.

Theorem 28. *Partially adaptive*-CCA**z**-Targ**F** $\nleftrightarrow$ *IND*-Dyn**S**-Ad**S**-CCA**z**-Targ**C**.

Remark 29. To conclude this section on the security notions found in the literature, we take a closer look at the proof in [GW09]. We see that the after applying the two-key transformation, a scheme can be proved 2-adaptively secure using the same proof, because the simulator has the secret keys of each user and can answer Corrupt-queries in the GUESS-phase as easily as in the FIND-phase.

6 Previous Schemes

Let us now discuss on the previous schemes in order to compare them. Table 2 sum up the security levels for each of them.

*: for t-collusion secure schemes with t and $N-t$ non-constant
(all implications are strict)



Fig. 3. Relations between Security Notions from the Literature

	DF03	BGW05	DPP07	Del08	GW09	Naive
Dyn	Dyn**S**	Dyn**S**	Dyn**S**	Dyn**1**	Dyn**S**	Dyn**2**
Ad	Ad**1**	Ad**S**	partially	Ad**2**	Ad**2**	Ad**2**
CCA	CCA**2**	CCA**0**	CCA**0**	CCA**0**	CCA**0**	CCA**2**
Targ	Targ**F**	Targ**F**	Targ**F**	Targ**S**	Targ**C**	Targ**C**

Table 2. Comparison between schemes.

DF03. Dodis and Fazio[DF03] proposed the first scheme that is secure against adaptive adversaries. However, their scheme is in the Targ**F** model. Consequently, the scheme can only be Ad**1**-secure, because any corrupted user in the second phase is implicitly included in the target set and can thus decrypt. One of the main disadvantages of the DF03 scheme is that the bound of maximum revoked user r_{max} should be fixed before the setup and as soon as there are more than r_{max} corrupted users, the scheme can be totally broken. The DF03 scheme can be shown to be Ad**2**-secure when the target set is adversarially chosen with the size of the revoked set bounded by r_{max} and the total number of corrupted users in both first and second phases is also bounded by r_{max}.

BGW05. In [BGW05], Boneh, Gentry, and Waters presented new methods for achieving fully collusion-resistant systems with short ciphertexts. However, the scheme is only proved secure in the static model (Dyn**S**). As discussed in [GW09], the BGW proof of security requires an "exact cancellation" and there is not an obvious way to prove BGW05 to be semi-statically secure.

DPP07. In [DPP07], Delerablée, Paillier, and Pointcheval proposed a dynamic scheme that is partially adaptive secure.

Del08. The identity-based broadcast encryption in [Del08] deals with 2-adaptive corruption and enjoys CCA security with constant ciphertext and private key sizes. However, the adversary has to announce its target set before the setup phase which corresponds to our selective security model.

GW09. In [GW09], the authors aim to construct efficient schemes that are adaptively secure and that resist to full collusion. The adaptive security mentioned in the paper correspond to our Ad**1** model. However, their schemes can be easily proved secure in Ad**2** model. They introduced a two-key transformation that convert a semi-static system of $2N$ users into a adaptive secure system of N users. Their schemes are not dynamic.

A Secure Broadcast Encryption Scheme

Let us now propose a simple scheme that is IND-Dyn**2**-Ad**2**-CCA**2**-secure to show that it is possible. The naive BE scheme where the center shares a key with every user is not IND-Dyn**2**-Ad**2**-CCA**2**-secure, but adding a MAC makes it secure.

Definition 30. Let $\mathcal{PKE}$ be an IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme with key length κ, $\mathcal{MAC}$ a SUF-CMA MAC. We build a BE scheme Π in the following way.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$ $\mathsf{MSK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \emptyset; \mathsf{EK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \emptyset; Reg \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \emptyset$
- $\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, i)$ `if` $\exists \mathsf{pk} : (i, \mathsf{pk}) \in Reg$ `return` $\perp$;
  `else` $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{sk}_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$; $Reg \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} Reg \cup \{(i, \mathsf{pk}_i)\}$; `return` $(\mathsf{sk}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i)$
- $\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$: $K, \mathcal{K}_m \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^k$;
  `for all` $i \in S : c_i \leftarrow \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Encrypt}(\mathsf{pk}_i, K||\mathcal{K}_m)$;
  $\sigma \leftarrow \mathcal{MAC}_{\mathcal{K}_m}(S||c_1|| \ldots ||c_{|S|})$;
  $H \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} c_1|| \ldots ||c_{|S|}||\sigma$
- $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{sk}_i, S, H)$: $K||\mathcal{K}_m = \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{sk}_i, c_i)$
  `if` $\mathcal{MAC}.\mathsf{Verify}(\mathcal{K}_m, \sigma, c_1|| \ldots ||c_{|S|})$ `return` K;
  `else return` $\perp$

Theorem 31. *The above BE scheme is IND-Dyn2-Ad2-CCA2-secure.*

The proof can be found in appendix A.15.

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A Proofs and Definitions

A.1 Definitions

Definition 32 (Homomorphic One-Way Function). Let $(G, +)$ and $(H, *)$ be two groups with $2^{k-1} \leq |G| \approx |H| \leq 2^k$. A PPT-computable function $f : G \to H$ is

- *one-way* if $\forall \mathcal{A} : \Pr[x \xleftarrow{\$} G; y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^k, f(x)); f(y) = f(x)]$ is negligible.
- *homomorphic* if $f(x + y) = f(x) * f(y)$.

Definition 33 (Symmetric Encryption Scheme). $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$:

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$, where k is the security parameter, generates a secret key $\mathsf{sk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_e$.
- $\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{sk}, m)$ produces a ciphertext c on the input message m and the secret key sk.
- $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, c)$ decrypts the ciphertext c under the secret key sk. It outputs the plaintext, or $\perp$ if the ciphertext is invalid.

Such an encryption scheme is said to be (t, q_D, ε)-IND-CCA2-secure (semantic security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks) if in the security game presented on Figure 4, the advantage, denoted $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{PKE}}(k, t, q_D)$, of any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ asking at most q_D decryption queries to the $\mathsf{ODecrypt}$ oracle is bounded by ε:

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{PKE}}(k, t, q_D) = \max_{\mathcal{A}} \{\Pr[\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}-1}_{\mathcal{PKE},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}-0}_{\mathcal{PKE},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1]\}.$$

$\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}-b}_{\mathcal{SE},\mathcal{A}}(k)$
$\mathcal{Q}_D \leftarrow \emptyset$, $(\mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$;
$(state, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{ODecrypt}(\cdot),\mathsf{OEncrypt}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{FIND}; 1^k)$;
$c^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Encrypt}(\mathsf{ek}, m_b)$;
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{ODecrypt},\mathsf{OEncrypt}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{GUESS}, state; c^*)$;
`if` $c^* \in \mathcal{Q}_D$ `then return` 0;
`else return` b';

$\mathsf{ODecrypt}(c)$
$\mathcal{Q}_D \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}_D \cup \{c\}$;
$m \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, c)$;
`return` m;

$\mathsf{OEncrypt}(c)$
$c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{sk}, m)$;
`return` c;

Fig. 4. $\mathcal{SE}$: Semantic Security against adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA2)

Definition 34 (Message Authentication Code). A message authentication code is a 3-tuple of algorithms $\mathcal{MAC} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{GenMac}, \mathsf{VerifMac})$:

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$, where k is the security parameter, generates a secret key $\mathsf{sk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_m$.
- $\mathsf{GenMac}(\mathsf{sk}, m)$ takes as input the secret key and a message, and generates the MAC value σ.
- $\mathsf{VerifMac}(\mathsf{sk}, m, \sigma)$ takes as input the secret key, the message and the alleged signature. It checks the validity of the signature and returns 1 if it is valid, 0 else.

In the following, we will require the strong unforgeability of a one-time MAC: even after one MAC generation query, the adversary cannot generate a new valid pair, even for the already authenticated message. This strong unforgeability is formalized in the security game presented on Figure 5, where the adversary wins if it successfully verifies a pair that has not been generated by the authentication algorithm. Such a message authentication code is said to be $(t, q_m, q_v, \varepsilon)$-SUF-CMA-secure (strong existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks) if in the security game presented on Figure 5, the success, denoted $\mathrm{Succ}^{\mathsf{suf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC}}(k, t, q_m, q_v)$, of any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, asking at most q_m MAC values ($\mathsf{OGenMac}$ oracle) and q_v verifications ($\mathsf{OVerifMac}$ oracle) is bounded by ε:

$$\mathrm{Succ}^{\mathsf{suf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC}}(k, t, q_m, q_v) = \max_{\mathcal{A}} \{\Pr[\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{suf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1]\}.$$

This definition includes One-Time MAC when $q_m = 1$.

$\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{suf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC},\mathcal{A}}(k)$
$\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$;
$\mathcal{Q}_S \leftarrow \emptyset$; $\mathcal{Q}_V \leftarrow \emptyset$;
$\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{OGenMac}(\cdot),\mathsf{OVerifMac}(\cdot,\cdot)}(1^k)$;
`if` $\exists(m,\sigma) \in \mathcal{Q}_V, (m,\sigma) \notin \mathcal{Q}_S$ `then return` 1;
`else return` 0;

$\mathsf{OGenMac}(m)$
$\sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{GenMac}(\mathsf{sk}, m)$;
$\mathcal{Q}_S \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}_S \cup \{(m,\sigma)\}$
`return` σ;

$\mathsf{OVerifMac}(m,\sigma)$
$c = \mathsf{VerifMac}(\mathsf{sk}, m, \sigma)$;
`if` $c = 1$ `then` $\mathcal{Q}_V \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}_V \cup \{(m,\sigma)\}$;
`return` c;

Fig. 5. $\mathcal{MAC}$: Unforgeability (SUF-CMA)

A.2 Proof of Theorem 4

Proof. The implications are clear, since having access to an oracle always makes a stronger adversary.

CCA**0** *vs.* CCA**1**. For this separation, we can use a simpler, proof because we do not have to worry about non-malleability. We modify an IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**0**-secure BE scheme Π into a scheme Π' that is still IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**0** but obviously not IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**1**:

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S) : (H,K) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$; `return` $(0||H, K)$
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk_{id}}, S, b||H)$:

  `if` $b = 0$ `then` $K \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk_{id}}, S, H)$; `return` K; `fi`;
  `if` $b = 1$ `then return` $\mathsf{usk_{id}}$; `fi`;

Π' is clearly not IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**1**, because one call to the decapsulation oracle reveals the secret key. Π' remains IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**0**, because the decapsulation oracle only differs and in such an attack it is not used. Furthermore, everything the adversary interacts with, EK and the OJoin and OCorrupt oracles, is unchanged and the only task of the simulator is to prepend a 0 to the challenge key header.

CCA**1** *vs.* CCA**2**. This separation can use malleability with a bit b as above, except that b is disregarded in the decapsulation process:

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S) : (H,K) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$; `return` $(0||H, K)$
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk_{id}}, S, b||H) : K \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk_{id}}, S, H)$; `return` K.

This construction is not IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**2**-secure, because on receiving a challenge $0||H$, the adversary can query $1||H$ to the ODecaps, which returns K. It is IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**1**-secure, because all possible queries in the FIND-phase can be perfectly simulated by removing b.

A.3 Proof of Theorem 7

Proof. We first study Dyn**S** vs. Dyn**1**, and then Dyn**1** vs. Dyn**2**.

Dyn**S** *vs.* Dyn**1**. Let Π be a IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-secure BE scheme. We construct a scheme Π' as follows:

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}$: $(\mathsf{EK}', \mathsf{MSK}') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Setup}$; $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{UI}$; $\mathsf{EK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{EK}'||r, \mathsf{MSK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{MSK}'||r$; `return` $(\mathsf{EK}, \mathsf{MSK})$;
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{id})$: $(\mathsf{usk'_{id}}, \mathsf{upk'_{id}}) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{id})$; `if` $\mathsf{id} = r$, `then` $\mathsf{upk'_{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{upk'_{id}}||\mathsf{MSK}$; `fi`; `return` $(\mathsf{usk'_{id}}, \mathsf{upk'_{id}})$;

Π' is not IND-Dyn**1**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-secure, because if the adversary has access to a OJoin oracle, he can query $\mathsf{OJoin}(r)$ and get MSK. Intuitively, Π' is still IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-secure, because the users are joined randomly and $|\mathcal{UI}|$ is super-polynomial: user r is in the user set with negligible probability.

Dyn**1** *vs.* Dyn**2**. We modify a Dyn**1**-secure BE scheme Π in such a way that the Join-oracle effectively doubles as a Decaps-oracle. This means that an id-string fulfills two roles: It is interpreted as a user identifier and as the input to a Decaps-oracle.
Π'.Join(MSK, id):

$(\mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}}) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{id})$;
parse id as (i, S, H); (possible if we assume S and H to have a fixed length)
$(\mathsf{usk}_i, \mathsf{upk}_i) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, i)$; (note that i is a prefix of id)
$K \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk}_i, S, H)$; `if` $K = \perp$ `then` $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$; `fi`;
$\mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}} || K$; `return` $(\mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}})$.

Π' is not IND-Dyn**2**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-secure, because the adversary can use $\mathsf{OJoin}(y)$ to decrypt the challenge message. Intuitively, Π' is still IND-Dyn**1**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-secure, because the adversary has only a negligible chance to guess the challenge key header y (which encapsulates a key of high entropy) before the challenge phase.

A.4 Proof of Theorem 8

We prove this theorem in several steps:

Lemma 35. *For ID-Based Broadcast Encryption, we have*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}$$
$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{S}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}$$
$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \Leftrightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{0}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}$$

Proof. Because the OJoin-oracle has no public output ($\mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}} = \mathsf{id}$), it does not give the adversary any information if he cannot also corrupt the user he joined. This means that having a OJoin oracle without having a OCorrupt oracle at the same time gives the adversary no additional power.

Lemma 36. *For ID-Based Broadcast Encryption, we have*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \not\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{1}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}$$
$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{S}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \not\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}.$$

Proof. The construction is the same as in the first part of the proof of theorem 7, except that the MSK is appended to the usk instead of to the upk, and usk is revealed in case of corruption.

Lemma 37. *For ID-Based Broadcast Encryption, we have*

$$\textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{1}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z} \not\Rightarrow \textit{IND}\text{-Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-CCA}\mathbf{z}.$$

Proof. The construction is the same as in the second part of the proof of theorem 7, except that the "decryption" of the id is appended to the usk instead of to the upk, and usk is revealed in case of corruption.

A.5 Proof of Lemma 10

Proof. Let Π be a BE scheme that is Ad**0**-secure (no corruption). We construct a scheme Π' that is still secure in this model, but no Ad**S**-secure (selective corruption). We only change the Join-algorithm.

- Π'.Join(MSK, id): $(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}}) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{id})$; `return` $(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}} || \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{upk}_{\mathsf{id}})$.

The scheme remains secure against adversaries that do not corrupt any user, because they will never see any $\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}$'s, which is all that changed. In case of corruption, the adversary learns MSK.

A.6 Proof of Lemma 11

Proof. Let Π be a BE scheme that is Ad**S**-secure. We construct a BE scheme Π' that is still Ad**S**-secure but not Ad**1**-secure.

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}(1^k, N)$:

  $(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{EK}') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$;
  Choose a random subset $I \subset U$, with $|I| = t$;
  Use a t-out-of-t secret sharing scheme: $\bigoplus_{i \in I} s_i = \mathsf{MSK}'$;
  $\mathsf{EK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{EK}'||I, \mathsf{MSK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{MSK}'||I||\{s_i\}$;
  `return` $(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{EK})$.

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}'||I||\{s_i\}, \mathsf{id})$:

  $(\mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{id})$;
  `if` $\mathsf{id} \notin I$, $s_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^k$; `fi`;
  $\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}||s_{\mathsf{id}}$;
  `return` $(\mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}})$.

The scheme is insecure under Ad**1** attacks, because the adversary extracts I from EK, then corrupts all users in I and computes the MSK. Intuitively, it remains Ad**S**-secure because the adversary must choose the users he corrupts before setup is called. Therefore, he cannot learn any additional information unless he corrupts all users in I, which happens with negligible probability. This is true if the adversary does not corrupt almost all the users, hence the restriction to t-collusion secure schemes, with t no too big.

A.7 Proof of Lemma 12

Proof. We modify a Ad**1**-secure BE scheme Π as above with a secret sharing, but of the ephemeral key at the challenge phase:

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, S)$:

  $(H', K) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$;
  Choose a random subset $I \subset U$, with $|I| = t$;
  $\forall i \in I : (H_i, K_i) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, \{i\})$
  Set $K_0 = K \bigoplus_{i \in I} K_i$;
  `return` $(H', K_0, \{H_i\}_{i \in I}), K$.

The Decaps-algorithm just uses H', and drop the rest of the ciphertext. Π' is not Ad**2**-secure, since the adversary can corrupt all users in I after receiving the challenge. Π' is still Ad**1**-secure because the adversary cannot guess I before seeing the challenge, under the restriction that the number of corrupted users is not too big.

A.8 Proof of Lemma 13

Proof. We use a proof similar to the one for NM-CCA1 $\not\Rightarrow$ NM-CCA2 in [BDPR98]. Let t be the maximum number of users the adversary is allowed to corrupt, N the number of users at the end of the game. We assume that both t and $N - t$ are non-constant. Assume that $(\mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Enc})$ is an IND-CCA2-secure symmetric encryption, $(\mathsf{GenMac}, \mathsf{VerifMac})$ a SUF-CMA-secure MAC, f a homomorphic OWF with $f(x) + f(y) = f(x + y)$ (an example of this, assuming discrete logarithm is hard, is discrete exponentiation). We modify an IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**1**-CCA**z**-secure BE scheme Π as follows.

$\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$:
$(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{EK}') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Setup}(k)$
`for all` $\mathsf{id} \in U:\ r_{\mathsf{id}} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$;
$\mathsf{MSK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{MSK}' || \{r_{\mathsf{id}}\}$

$\Pi'.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{id})$:
$(\mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}}) \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{id})$;
$\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}} || r_{\mathsf{id}} || \{f(r_i)\}_{i \in U}$;
(if r_{id} undef., $r_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} 0$)
`return` $(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}})$.

$\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S)$:
$(H', K') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}', S)$;
$\mathcal{K}_m, K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$;
choose $T \subset U, |T| = t$
$C \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{Enc}(K', \mathcal{K}_m || K)$
$M \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{GenMac}(\mathcal{K}_m, T||C||H')$;
$H \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} 0||T||C||H'||M$

$\Pi'.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}, S, H)$:
parse $\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}} = \mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}} || r_{\mathsf{id}} || \{f(r_i)\}$;
parse $H = b||T||C||H'||M||R$
`if` $(b = 0$ and $R = \emptyset)$
or $(b = 1$ and $f(R) = \sum_{i \in T} f(r_i))$
  $K' \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \Pi.\mathsf{Decaps}(\mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, S, H')$;
  $\mathcal{K}_m || K \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{Dec}(K', C)$;
  `if` $\mathsf{VerifMac}(\mathcal{K}_m, T||C||H', M) = 1$
  `then return` K
  `else return` $\perp$.
`else return` $\perp$.

Π' is not IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**2**-CCA**z**-secure, because the adversary can corrupt the right users to retrieve all r_i, and then exploit malleability: he can construct a key header that decrypts to the same key as the challenge. However, Π' is still IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**1**-CCA**z**-secure, because the adversary has only a negligible chance to corrupt the right users that he learns only in the challenge phase. The MAC avoid the malleability in this case. The formal proof of non-malleability works similarly to the proof of our naive scheme in Section 6, which can be found in appendix A.15.

A.9 Proof of Lemma 14

Proof. The implication is clear, as it is always possible to choose the same S in the challenge phase that has been output before the setup phase. Let Π be a Targ**S**-secure BE scheme. We construct a BE scheme Π' that is still Targ**S**-secure, but insecure if the adversary is allowed to select the target set during the challenge phase (Targ**C**).

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}$ works as $\Pi.\mathsf{Setup}$, but appends a randomly chosen subset T of users to EK.
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}$ works as $\Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}$, except if the target set S is the set T. In this case, it uses the random coins 0^k (a constant one, publicly known).

Π' is IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**S**-CCA**z**-Targ**S**-secure since the adversary has to announce the target set S before seeing EK. Π' is IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**y**-CCA**z**-Targ**C**-insecure if the adversary can freely choose S after the setup phase, because the adversary receives EK before having to output the challenge set S. Then the challenge K is deterministically chosen. Even if he has to choose C before setup, he can choose $C = \emptyset$, so he can choose any S he wants.

A.10 Proof of Lemma 22

Proof. The implication is clear, as the adversary can always set $S = U \setminus C$. For the reverse direction, we exploit the fact that $|S| > 1$ and modify a scheme Π that we assume to be IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**S**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-secure as follows. If $|S| = 1$, Encaps sets $K = 0$ (or in deterministic way as in the proof of lemma 18).

A.11 Proof of Lemma 23

Proof. If $|C| \leq N - 2$ and the target set is fixed to $S = U \setminus C$, then $|S| \geq N - (N - 2) = 2$ Given a IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-secure scheme Π, we exploit this to construct a scheme Π' that is IND-Dyn**x**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-secure, but not IND-Dyn**S**-Ad**0**-CCA**z**-Targ**S**. The only change is as in the proof of lemma 22: if $|S| = 1$, $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}$ sets $K = 0$.

A.12 Proof of Lemma 24

Proof. Given a IND-Dyn**S**-Ady-CCA**z**-Targ**S**-secure BE scheme Π, we construct another BE scheme Π' that is also IND-Dyn**S**-Ady-CCA**z**-Targ**S**-secure, but is IND-Dyn**x**-Ady-CCA**z**-Targ**F**-insecure.

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}(1^k, N)$: $(\mathsf{EK}', \mathsf{MSK}') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Setup}(1^k, N)$; chooses $T \subset U$; $\mathsf{EK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{EK}'||T$; `return` $(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{EK})$.
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, S)$: $(H', K') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}', S)$ `if` $S = T$ `then` $K \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} 0$

Π' is still IND-Dyn**S**-Ady-CCA**z**-Targ**S**-secure, because the adversary cannot guess T. Π' is not IND-Dyn**x**-Ady-CCA**z** secure, since the adversary can corrupt all users in $U \setminus T$, so that $S = T$.

A.13 Proof of Theorem 25

Proof. We first show the implications. Let $\mathcal{A}^{pac}$ be a partially adaptive choice adversary. From $\mathcal{A}^{pac}$ we construct an adaptive1 adversary $\mathcal{A}^{adap}$ as follows. $\mathcal{A}^{adap}$ forwards all Join-queries made by $\mathcal{A}^{pac}$, and substitutes each call to JoinCorrupted with Join, then Corrupt. When $\mathcal{A}^{pac}$ outputs his target set S, $\mathcal{A}^{adap}$ corrupts all users not in S.

The second implication is clear.

From any selectively adaptive1 adversary $\mathcal{A}^s$ we construct a partially adaptive adversary as follows. $\mathcal{A}^s$ announces S before the setup phase. $\mathcal{A}^{pa}$ joins all users in S and JoinCorrupts all users in $U \setminus S$. He now has enough information to answer all Corrupt queries.

The separations follow from lemmas 38, 39, and 40.

Lemma 38. *If the scheme is t-collusion secure with t and $N - t$ non-constant, JoinCorrupted $\not\Rightarrow$ Corrupt for* Ad**1** *and* Ad**2**.

The advantage the adversary has when using Corrupt queries is that he can view the system after all users are joined, before he has to decide who to corrupt.

We proceed as in the proof of lemma 11, but instead of encoding I in EK, we append a bit to each tag that indicates whether the user is in I. Then, the adversary knows this only after a user has joined.

Proof. Fix a degree of adaptiveness and let Π be a protocol secure in this model. We construct a protocol Π' that is secure in this model, but insecure when the JoinCorrupted oracle is replaced with a Corrupt oracle.

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}$: $(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{EK}') \leftarrow \Pi.\mathsf{Setup}$, then guesses N and determines a random subset $I \subset [1, N]$ of the first N users to be joined with $|I| = t$. Then it uses a linear t-out-of-t secret sharing scheme with $\bigoplus_{i \in I} s_i = \mathsf{MSK}'$ $\mathsf{MSK} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{MSK}||I||\{s_i\}$; `return` $(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{EK}')$.
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{id})$: $(\mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}}) \leftarrow \Pi'.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}', \mathsf{id})$; `if` $\mathsf{id} \in I, \mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}||s_{\mathsf{id}}||1$ `fi`; `if` $\mathsf{id} \notin I, s_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^k$; $\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{usk}'_{\mathsf{id}}||s_{\mathsf{id}}||0$ `fi`; `return` $(\mathsf{usk}_{\mathsf{id}}, \mathsf{upk}'_{\mathsf{id}})$.

Π' is not secure under corruption attacks, because the adversary extracts a description of I from the user tags, then corrupts all users in I and computes the MSK.

Π' is secure under JoinCorrupted attacks , because the adversary must choose the users he corrupts before he joins them. Therefore, he cannot learn any additional information unless he JoinCorrupts all users in I, which happens with negligible probability.

Lemma 39. *When considering partially adaptive attacks,* Targ**F** $\not\Rightarrow$ Targ**C**.

Proof. Let Π be a public-key BE scheme secure against partially adaptive attacks where the challenge set is fixed to $U \setminus C$. Then we construct a BE scheme Π' that is still secure against an adversary whose target set is fixed, but insecure against any adversary who can choose his target set. Let N be the maximum number of users.

- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Setup}$ does the same as $\Pi.\mathsf{Setup}$, then chooses $r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^N$ and appends it to the MSK.
- $\Pi'.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, i)$ does the same as $\Pi.\mathsf{Join}(\mathsf{MSK}, i)$, then appends the i-th bit of r to the tag.

– $\Pi'.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, S)$ does the same as $\Pi.\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, S)$, except when EK has N tags appended and the last bit of these tags encodes S (e. g. S consists of exactly those users i for which $r[i] = 1$). In this case, it outputs the first $|K|$ bits of r as K.

Π' is $\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{F}$*-secure*: Any fixed adversary has to guess S before he starts to corrupt users, because S is determined by his corruptions.

Π' is not $\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{C}$*-secure*: Any adversary that can freely choose S corrupts no users and sets S to the users determined by the public tags.

Lemma 40. *IND-*Dyns*-*$\mathsf{Ad1}$*-*$\mathsf{CCA0}$*-*$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{S}$ $\not\Rightarrow$ *partially adaptive.*

Proof. We use exactly the same separation as in lemma 14.

A.14 Proof of Theorem 28

Proof. Partially adaptive-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{F}$ $\not\Rightarrow$ $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{C}$: To separate the two notions, we construct a BE scheme that is partially adaptive-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{F}$-secure but not $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{C}$-secure by exploiting the fact that if the adversary has to leave at least two users uncorrupted, $|S| > 1$. The scheme is exactly the same as the one in lemma 22.

$\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{C}$ $\not\Rightarrow$ partially adaptive-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{F}$: We build a scheme that is $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{S}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-secure but not partially adaptive-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{z}$-$\mathsf{Targ}\mathbf{F}$-secure by exploiting the fact that the adversary has to announce the corrupted users before seeing the public key. The scheme is exactly the same as the one in lemma 11.

A.15 Proof of Theorem 31

We assume that $\mathcal{A}$ is an adversary against the $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{2}$ security game. We define a sequence of games, $\mathbf{G}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{G}_6$, where $\mathbf{G}_0$ is the $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{2}$ experiment with $b = 0$ and $\mathbf{G}_6$ is the $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{2}$ experiment with $b = 1$. Let ℓ be the number of components in a challenge ciphertext.

Game $\mathbf{G}_0$: This is the $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}$-$\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{2}$-Experiment with $b = 0$. We just recall the generation of the challenge ciphertext (the Encaps oracle), and the simulation of the $\mathsf{ODecaps}$ oracle:

$\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S^*)$:

1. Generate two session keys $\mathcal{K}_e^0$ and $\mathcal{K}_e^1$, as well as a MAC key $\mathcal{K}_m^0$;
2. For each user $i \in S^*$, generate $c_i^* = \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Encrypt}(\mathsf{ek}_i, \mathcal{K}_e^0 || \mathcal{K}_m^0)$;
3. Then, compute $\sigma^* = \mathcal{MAC}.\mathsf{GenMac}(\mathcal{K}_m^0, S^* || (c_i^*)_{i \in S^*})$;
4. Outputs $\mathcal{K}_e^0$, $\mathcal{K}_e^1$ and $H^* = ((c_i^*)_{i \in S^*}, \sigma^*)$.

$\mathsf{ODecaps}(i, S, H)$:

1. Extract $\mathcal{K}_e || \mathcal{K}_m = \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{dk}_i, c_i)$;
2. Check if σ is a valid MAC under key $\mathcal{K}_m$;
3. In case of validity, output $\mathcal{K}_e$, otherwise output $\perp$.

Game $\mathbf{G}_1$: We introduce an additional MAC key that will be used later in the sub-ciphertexts:

$\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S^*)$:

1. Generate two session keys $\mathcal{K}_e^0$ and $\mathcal{K}_e^1$, as well as two MAC keys $\mathcal{K}_m^0$ and $\mathcal{K}_m^1$;

$\mathsf{ODecaps}(i, S, H)$:

2. If $i \in S^*$ and $c_i = c_i^*$, check if σ is a valid MAC under key $\mathcal{K}_m^0$.

Lemma 41. *$\boldsymbol{G}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{G}_0$ are identical:*

$$\Pr_1[\mathcal{A} \to 1] = \Pr_0[\mathcal{A} \to 1].$$

Game $\mathbf{G}_2$: We now use the additional MAC key in the challenge sub-ciphertexts:

> $\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S^*)$:
>
> 2. For each user $i \in S^*$, generate $c_i^* = \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Encrypt}(\mathsf{ek}_i, \mathcal{K}_e^0 || \mathcal{K}_m^1)$;

Lemma 42. *The difference between $\boldsymbol{G}_2$ and $\boldsymbol{G}_1$ is bounded by*

$$\Pr_2[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_1[\mathcal{A} \to 1] \leq \ell \times \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{PKE}}(k, t, q_D).$$

Game $\mathbf{G}_3$: In this game, we reject decryption queries that should decrypt a sub-ciphertext from the challenge ciphertext.

> $\mathsf{ODecaps}(i, S, H = ((c_i)_{i \in S}, \sigma))$:
>
> 2. If $i \in S^*$ and $c_i = c_i^*$, output $\perp$;

Lemma 43. *The difference between $\boldsymbol{G}_3$ and $\boldsymbol{G}_2$ is bounded by*

$$\Pr_3[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_2[\mathcal{A} \to 1] \leq \mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC}}(k, t, 1, q_D).$$

Game $\mathbf{G}_4$: We define the game $\mathbf{G}_4$ as the game $\mathbf{G}_3$, but we encaps $\mathcal{K}_e^1$ instead of $\mathcal{K}_e^0$:

> $\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S^*)$:
>
> 2. For each user $i \in S^*$, generate $c_i^* = \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Encrypt}(\mathsf{ek}_i, \mathcal{K}_e^1 || \mathcal{K}_m^1)$;

Lemma 44. *The difference between $\boldsymbol{G}_4$ and $\boldsymbol{G}_3$ is bounded by*

$$\Pr_4[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_3[\mathcal{A} \to 1] \leq \ell \times \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(k, t, q_D).$$

Game $\mathbf{G}_5$: Previous game is similar to $\mathbf{G}_3$, but with $\mathcal{K}_e^1$ in the challenge ciphertext. We now go back, as in game $\mathbf{G}_2$: we check MAC values of sub-ciphertexts of the challenge ciphertext under $\mathcal{K}_m^0$:

> $\mathsf{ODecaps}(i, S, H)$:
>
> 2. If $i \in S^*$ and $c_i = c_i^*$, check if σ is a valid MAC under key $\mathcal{K}_m^0$.

Since we have the same gap as from $\mathbf{G}_2$ to $\mathbf{G}_3$:

$$\Pr_5[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_4[\mathcal{A} \to 1] \leq \mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC}}(k, t, 1, q_D).$$

Game $\mathbf{G}_6$: We eventually change back the use of the MAC key $\mathcal{K}_m^0$ in the challenge sub-ciphertexts:

> $\mathsf{Encaps}(\mathsf{EK}, Reg, S^*)$:
>
> 2. For each user $i \in S^*$, generate $c_i^* = \mathcal{PKE}.\mathsf{Encrypt}(\mathsf{ek}_i, \mathcal{K}_e^1 || \mathcal{K}_m^0)$;

Since we have the same gap as from $\mathbf{G}_1$ to $\mathbf{G}_2$:

$$\Pr_6[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_5[\mathcal{A} \to 1] \leq \ell \times \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{PKE}}(k, t, q_D).$$

We do not use anymore the key $\mathcal{K}^1_m$: this is exactly the $\mathsf{IND\text{-}Dyn}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{Ad}\mathbf{2}\text{-}\mathsf{CCA}\mathbf{2}$ security game with $b = 1$. If we sum up all the gaps, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr_2[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_0[\mathcal{A} \to 1] &\leq \ell \times \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{PKE}}(k, t, q_D) \\
\Pr_3[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_2[\mathcal{A} \to 1] &\leq \mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC}}(k, t, 1, q_D) \\
\Pr_4[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_3[\mathcal{A} \to 1] &\leq \ell \times \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(k, t, q_D) \\
\Pr_5[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_4[\mathcal{A} \to 1] &\leq \mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf-cma}}_{\mathcal{MAC}}(k, t, 1, q_D) \\
\Pr_6[\mathcal{A} \to 1] - \Pr_5[\mathcal{A} \to 1] &\leq \ell \times \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind-cca}}_{\mathcal{PKE}}(k, t, q_D)
\end{aligned}$$

And this concludes the proof.