Confusing biological rhythms and physical clocks
Today’s ecological relevance of Bergson-Einstein debate on time

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Abstract The reflections on the nature of time in Relativity Theory will be hinted in reference to the new bridges recently proposed by Connes and by Rovelli’s “perspectival” approach, two major steps towards a unification of quantum, thermodynamical and relativistic times. The so called “time of philosophers”, a time of the cognizing ego, from Saint Augustin to Husserl and Bergson, is based on a different, but relevant perspective and it has been traditionally opposed to the “time of physicists”. In between these two approaches, we discuss a proper time of phylogeny and ontogeny, in biology, with their own rhythms and specific irreversibility. On the one side, time, in biology, needs to be scientifically objectivised as an invariant of the knowing subject and thus move, as in physics, “from the subjective-absolute to the objective-relative” (Weyl, and Rovelli as for time). On the other, the “geometry” of life’s rhythms and the “extended present”, in our approach, radically differ from the prevailing spatialization of physical time that Bergson soundly criticizes. The proper irreversibility and the central, “operatorial”, role of time in biology will be stressed, as nothing in biology can be understood except in the light of a temporal perspective, both evolutionary and organismal. In particular, today’s eco-systemic changes bring to the limelight some disruptions of the evolutionary fine-tuning of biological rhythms and physical clocks that may be better understood by highlighting their theoretical differences as well as their environmental interactions.

« It is to the credit of Bergson’s philosophy to have pointed out forcefully this deep division between the world of mathematical concepts and the immediately experienced continuity of phenomenal time (“la durée”). »
(H. Weyl, Das Kontinuum, 1918)

1 - Introduction
In the history of science, when physicists faced a change of scale or observed different (or differently) phenomena, they invented a new theory. Then, the unification of the diverse theories becomes a major knowledge aim and, if achieved, a true revolution: the proposal of another theory that “brings together” unrelated or even incompatible phenomenal descriptions. Newton unified falling apples and planetary movements, totally unrelated phenomena for Galileo; Maxwell brought together magnetism, electricity and optics; Boltzmann correlated molecular movements and thermodynamic principles. Also Einstein
made a major intra-theoric unification: the equivalence of gravitation and inertia. There may be more
unifications, but not many, in view of their relevance and difficulty, such as the still open issue of the
quantum vs the relativistic fields.

As a bridging example towards biology, observe that the adequate scale of analysis required the
development of an autonomous and mathematically rich hydrodynamics of incompressible fluids in
continua, whose properties are not derivable from particle or Quantum Physics - in spite the fact that
also incompressible fluids are notoriously composed by elementary particles. Major progresses are
being made in the search for unity and borderline theories between these and other frames, see
(Chibbaro et al. 2015) for a broad survey, (Longo 2016) for a review. Then, as for biology, note that
there is a lot of water in an organism and that Classical as well as Quantum Electrodynaminc effects
contribute to cell’s semi-permeability and macromolecular dynamics in cells (Arani et al. 1995). As a
matter of fact, quantum and classical processes may blend, within a cell, and yield phenotypic
consequences, (Del Giudice et al., 1983; 1986), see (Buiatti Longo 2013) for more references. As these
phenomena are not inter-derivable or are even theoretically incompatible1, none of the corresponding
physical theory may allow, alone and even less in an inconsistent conjunction, to deduce the
fundamental properties of organisms, from Darwin’s principles for phylogenesis to our modest
proposals for ontogenesis (Soto, Longo 2016). A future unified theory of the fragmented physical
frames, at least those witnessed in a cell, may be of major help also in biology. For the time being, it
may be wise to work, following Darwin and many others, to an autonomous theorizing of biological
processes, in search for a future unification, as it mostly happened in physics when facing new
phenomena or observing differently old ones.

The needed theoretical richness, that requires a permanent dialogue of theories, applies also to the
different approaches to time, the focus of this paper. It is then surprising to observe, on one side, the
technical depth of the debate on time in Relativity Theory and, on the other, the attitude of many
physicists who consider the Relativistic (or Quantum, not both) Theory of Time as … a theoretical
“absolute”. Claims such that “time does not exist, because it is not present in the “fundamental
equations””, make us think that this is too bad for the fundamental equations that, in spite of their
beauty and relevance, may thus remain confined to a specific theoretical frame and phenomena2. In
particular, in no way they would help to discuss biological time, unless we invent a new unifying
theory – a remote target – or at least some bridging ideas – the aim of this paper in relation to Rovelli’s
perspectival approach to time. In order to construct a bridge, though, one needs the two sides of the
ditch, in particular an autonomous theory of biological time. On the one hand, we refer to Rovelli’s
approach to time in physics that is based on an analysis of the relativizing choice of the thermal coarse
graining (Rovelli 2015). On the other, we develop previous work on biological time and rhythms in
collaboration with Bailly and Montévil (see references) and frame it by the notions of characteristic
time and time scales for biological functions, as defined by the “closure of constraints” in (Montévil
Mossio 2015).

We will thus not present a historical account of the Einstein-Bergson debate, but refer to some its
developments in order to propose a perspectival epistemology of time in the sciences of nature and hint
to its relevance in the current ecosystemic crisis, partly due to a poor understanding (or little care) of
the physical singularity and autonomy of life. A pertinent theory of biological time may also contribute

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1 With respect to classical or relativistic approaches, Quantum Mechanics is either incomplete or inconsistent,
claims Einstein in EPR, (Einstein et al. 1935), an incompatibility result with classical and relativistic physics,
see (Longo 2018) for a comparative analysis with other “incompleteness” theorems.

2 The general form of a quantum dynamics of variables, with no time parameter, has been given by Wheeler
and De Witt (Rovelli 2008). Wheeler-deWitt equation is a variant of Schrödinger equation in a
diffeomorphism invariant (relativistic) context, a tentative formal bridge between the two theories.
to the philosophical analysis of pre-conscious or conscious (intentional) time (the “time of philosophers”): biological rhythms may induce a primary form of protension, as pre-conscious expectation; the mathematical “gluing” of retension (pre-conscious memory) and protension will point towards a simple formalization of the subjective experience of the continuity of phenomenal time. Both analyses may help to objectivize some aspects of Bergson’s notion of “durée” as well as its relation to “continua” and thus to recompose the deep division stressed by Weyl (in the “exergue” above).

2 - The Thermal Time Hypothesis and the regulating objectivity of physical time

“All a priori statements in physics have their origin in symmetry” (Weyl, 1952)

In the commonly used mathematics of modern physics, the Cantorian one dimensional continuum as a line of points with no jumps nor lacunae, identically describes and entirely displays under our eyes both space and time. Thus Weyl’s unsatisfaction in the “exergue” in the first section: there is no way to isolate the phenomenal/perceived time of the present as a Cantorian point; the mathematical continuum does not allow a privileged interval of measurement or of conscious access to time. Bergson’s “durée” instead is an incompressible, indivisible interval, where consciousness of the present is possible as it is coextensive to memory of the past and expectation of the future (Bergson, MM), an approach that permeates philosophy, from Saint Augustin to Husserl. In this perspective, future cannot be displayed as a line given in space, even less if made out of Cantorian points.

Moreover, Weyl, the author of *Space, Time, Matter*, the 1919 founding book for the mathematics of Relativity, is well aware that (General) Relativity Theory ((G)RT) moved the description of time even further away from the cognitive/experienced time, since it allows no preferred independent time variable: space-time may be understood as a unique “block” subject to the same transformations; up to minor differences, space and time yield the same invariant properties under these transformations (diffeomorphism invariance or general covariance). In this sense, GRT definitely “spatialised” time and erased its specificity (Weyl, 1919); in particular, its orientation, as a flow from past to future, disappears\(^4\). Finally, and this is mathematically crucial, one cannot describe a relativistic dynamics as an evolution depending on a pre-given time parameter (Connes Rovelli 1994)\(^5\).

However, as for the choice and the orientation (the “arrow”) of the time parameter in physics, A. Connes and C. Rovelli made major contributions by proposing a triangular relation between the analyses of time in quantum (QM), thermodynamical (TD) and relativistic frames (GRT).

In short, recall first that measurement in QM does not commute: if the speed of a particle is measured first and the position later one obtains a different result from a measurement done in the inverse time order. This sets an orientation of time. In TD, instead, the time orientation is given by increasing entropy, which may be expressed as a move from a fine-grained to a coarser grained access to phenomena. That is, from a more to a less detailed description of its microscopic behavior, or a \(^3\) Bergson’s quotations refer to “Oevres” (Bergson 1984) by a two letters abbreviation of the intended book.
\(^4\) The view points within RT and its philosophy, beginning with Einstein late reflections on time, differ, see (Bouton Huneman 2018) on this debate. Under all interpretations though, “jamais vous ne tirerez du schéma de Minkowski l’idée d’un flux temporel” (Bergson, DS).
\(^5\) “The general form of a mechanical theory that describes the evolutions of variables with respect to each other is given by a phase space and a constraint C. The relations between the variables are given by the orbits generated by C in the subspace C=0. The parametrization of these orbits has no physical meaning” (Rovelli, 2019). As already hinted, the general form of a quantum dynamics of variables, with no time parameter, is Wheeler - De Witt equation.
description in which some of these fine details have been smoothed over. In a given system, temperature, typically, yields a coarse-grained, macroscopic, representation of the particles in aggregate. Energy transformations, as they tend to reduce differences in temperatures, increase entropy and lead to a coarser graining of the intended system. Thus, measurement or the choice of a coarse graining fix a dimension and a direction of time, in QM and TD, respectively, as argued next.

By building on classical results by Gelfand, which allow to reconstruct (Riemannian) geometry from (commutative) algebras, A. Connes has been reconstructing, since many years, the geometry of QM in terms of non-commutative algebras (Connes 1994). Then, he unified, mathematically, the orientation of time due to quantum measurement and the thermodynamic understanding of the arrow of time in terms of entropy (Connes Rovelli 1994). In short, the arrow of time defined by quantum non-commutativity and the one determined by macroscopic states (or coarse graining) in TD may be described by the same algebraic frame – the “non-commutative von Neumann algebras”. These define an a-symmetric “flow”, which may be interpreted as an oriented time in either theory.

Now, Rovelli’s Thermal Time Hypothesis refers precisely to the statistical state, or the statistical distribution given by the chosen coarse graining, as determining physical time and its direction (i.e. moving towards a coarser graining), (Rovelli 1993), (Rovelli 2008). The coarse graining or blurring is due to the fact that we are ignorant of the microscopic details of the observed process. The time of physics is, ultimately, the expression of our ignorance of the world, or of the limitations of measurement, in particular. Note that in both QM and TD, measurement or quantitative “access” to phenomena, with their limitations, are crucial. Rovelli’s “Time is ignorance” echoes Bergson's transcendental view of time, as constituted by an observing/measuring consciousness, ignoring an open future.

However, for Rovelli, the interaction of different subsystems may suffice to fix a “statistical state that determines which variable is physical time”, with no need of an “a priori hypothetical “flow” that drives the system to a preferred statistical state” (Rovelli 2019). That is, measurement may be replaced by the interaction of different systems, in principle sub-systems of a “larger” system. After all, a measurement instrument in QM is a classical (macro) system that, by a “friction” or coupling with micro-phenomena, co-constitute the observable properties and states of the measured particle. Similarly as for the choice of the coarse graining in TD. Note that different choices of macroscopic observables and coarse graining, in the same process, may lead to opposing time directions (a simple example is given in (Rovelli 2015)). In reality, this choice is not arbitrary as it depends on the specific coupling between the intended systems. But which subsystems may force an (oriented) time parameter in the interaction with other subsystems? In the next section we will discuss a fundamental one: a living cell.

In other words, time is perspectival, as Rovelli calls it, as it is relative to a specific access or coupling friction that fixes either the order of measurement of quantum observables or the coarse graining in the analysis of thermodynamic processes. Time is as relative as speed, since it similarly depends on the reference system, if we just broaden the notion of reference system to the choice of the order of quantum measurement or of the coarse graining. The analysis of the transformations and their invariants with respect to reference systems at uniform relative speed, Galileo’s relativity, made the analysis of motion objective and started modern science: the laws of motion are invariant w.r. to Galileo’s transformations. A relativizing understanding of oriented time, by considering also the access to phenomena as part of the choice of reference systems, may give the proper invariance properties and the corresponding transformations, and thus construct a new objectivity for the “order of time”. By an instrumental use of a Kantian terminology, we may then say that objectivized (oriented and

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6 Entropy is the logarithm of the “number of ways that the insides can be arranged, so that from the outside it looks the same” (Feynman 1963).
measurable) time acquires a regulating role in physics: it contributes to the intelligibility of certain phenomena, by ordering them. Typically, it is mathematized as a totally ordered parameter in thermodynamic diffusion and entropy. Yet, it is not constitutive, in the sense we will propose in biology: the underlying particles’ trajectories make the processes intelligible with no need of an oriented time, which is an a posteriori result of a statistics. Note, instead, that conservation properties (of energy, momentum …), which may be described as symmetries, by Noether’s Theorems (Kosmann-Schwarback 2010; Longo, Montévil 2014), are constitutive and posited as a priori in physics, as Weyl would say. That is, they participate to the co-constructed existence of physical objects and allow the objectivity of mathematized laws and deductions⁷. On the contrary, the orientation and the origin of time are major symmetry breakings – and no a-symmetric “flow” may be a physical a priori, following Einstein, Weyl, Rovelli. And time has lost its transcendental, a priori status in physics.

However, in spite of the common linear-cantorian representation, the epistemology of time is a controversial one in physics, even in a regulating, non-constitutive role. From the relativistic orthodoxy on the “fundamental” non-existence of time, from (McTaggart 1908) to (Calender 2017), and the weak (purely relational) and reversible forms of time in GRT (van Frassen 1985), to the proper irreversibility of thermodynamical time in (Nicolis, Prigogine, 1977). Now, also relativistic time needs to be revised in view of the novelties in Cosmology. Cosmology is a “historical science” and it should deal with an irreversible time with an origin, the Big Bang, in the view of many cosmologists; it then presents major challenges for timeless theories⁸. Thus, while thermodynamics analyzes irreversible processes where time assumes a key regulating role, we are far from a unified understanding of GRT, quantum and statistical mechanics or thermodynamics. Along the lines hinted above, a possible broadening of GRT is being proposed under the form of a “general relativistic quantum statistical mechanics”, see (Chirco et al. 2016), (Rovelli, Vidotto 2018) or (Dorato 2016) for a philosophical reflection on Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics. In this perspectival approach, the relativizing choice of the time dimension and its direction, by a coarse graining, regulates knowledge construction by an observer. Yet, it may also be analyzed in terms of interacting subsystems, as mentioned above: the interaction fixes the coarse graining. A major opening towards our approach in biology.

3 - The intrinsic objectivity of biological time

“In physics, a lowered energy state is not necessarily disorder, because it simply results in the identical molecule with a lowered energy state. The fact that such a molecule might be biologically inactive may not concern the physicist, but it definitely does concern the biologist ….“ (Hayflick, 2007).

An organism, a cell, fixes the thermodynamic coarse graining at the molecular scale: typically, it is viable only in a certain interval of temperature, a measure of energy transformation, thus of entropy production. More generally, the biological function of any component of an organism forces its entropic

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⁷ For example, an apple falls, a planet moves for “symmetry reasons”, since GRT unifies gravitation and inertia in Riemann’s manifolds and inertia is a conservation property. Following Weyl, gauge symmetries (Yang, Mills 1954) geometricize also non-gravitational interactions. And a physicist may say today: this particle must exist for symmetry reasons – and then he/she knows what and where to measure. Moreover, equations, from Newton to Navier-Stokes, Einstein and Schrödinger, are written and solved in a phase space, a priori given by the intended theory, a fundamental invariance or symmetry of the theory.

⁸ In the strict relativistic view, intersecting cones of the future with different apex points, in Minkowski's representation, must contain identical events. These events must then be fully and a priori determined, as no coordination is possible between remote apex points. Thus, not only the space of possibilities (the phase space) is given a priori, but even the potentialities are actual according to this interpretation, see the debate in (Bouton, Huneman 2018).
level, within an interval of viability, according to the organism and its context. The dimension and the
direction of thermal time is then fixed. We call intrinsic or constitutive the approach to time in biology
hinted in the cursory review below, following (Bailly et al. 2011), (Longo, Montévil 2014), (Longo
2017).

3.1 – Biological rhythms vs. physical frequencies
The analysis of time in multicellular organisms requires first a key distinction between physical and
biological “clocks”. The spinning Earth, the relative movements of the Moon and the Sun have the
dimension of (the inverse of) time (a frequency) and set fundamental physical clocks for life: days,
months, seasons. On top of them, many organisms constructed their autonomous rhythms, such as
heartbeats and respirations. All mammals, say, have the same number of total heartbeats and
respirations, on average $1.2 \times 10^9$ and $0.8 \times 10^9$, respectively, in their lifespan, a major biological invariant
in wild species. So, a wild mouse or elephant, whose lifespans are of about 2 and 80 years, respectively
(on average and varying with the species), have about a $40:1$ ratio of heart frequency per minute (up
to about 600 beats per minute for a mouse and 15 beats for an elephant). Similarly as for respiration
frequencies, once one scales the number $0.8 \times 10^9$ above to a species' average lifespan. These numbers
must then be understood in terms of “pure numbers”: they have no physical dimension, but scale to a
frequency, that is to the dimension of (the inverse of) time, once they are referred to a life span – which
has an average allometric dependence on the $1/4$th power of the biomass in wild animals, see (Günther,
Morgado 2005), (Longo Montévil 2014) for details and references. Thus, biological rhythms do not
depend on the physical clocks mentioned above, but are tuned to them, like during night sleep or
hibernation. Some frequencies and rhythms are very closely tuned, such as the day/night (circadian)
frequency that forces a biological rhythm: endocrine activities (melatonin production among others)
internalize, as a circadian rhythm, the external circadian frequency. In case of jet-lag, we need a few
days to re-adjust the internal endocrine circadian rhythm to the day/night frequency.

This distinction, rhythms vs frequencies in biology, is crucial, yet it is rarely formalized; we tried in
(Bailly et al. 2011), (Longo, Montévil 2014). In short, evolution set organismal internal clocks, such as
heartbeats. These rhythms are or became independent from physical frequencies and constitute major
biological invariants, as hinted above. A simple geometric representation of both may be obtained by
adding to the oriented dimension of thermodynamical time a second compactified dimension (a circle),
in the style of Kaluza-Klein theory in physics as for space (Wesson 1999). This yields a “cylinder”, as a
two dimensional manifold or a geometric schema for biological time, unrelated to space. Rhythms are
then described as spirals along the cylinder, an effective diagram for the interplay of irreversible
physical processes (linear time dimension) and internal clocks (spiraling along the cylinder), see the
figures in (Bailly et al. 2011), (Longo, Montévil 2014). Our schematic cylinders allow to represent the
independence and tuning of the two dimensions of biological time and apply to each individual
organism, by a locality of time representation that resembles Rovelli’s disordered, localized time-cones.

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9 A physical clock sets a frequency (dimension: inverse of time) by an oscillation, a circular movement, an
irradiation …. Thus, it fixes the dimension of time and a metrics on it: “time is movement that may be counted”,
beautifully says Aristotle.

10 Note that Galileo used his own heartbeats in order to measure the frequency of a pendulum, the lamplight in
the cathedral of Pisa, and this lead to the invention of clocks regulated by pendula. Then, he used time as a
parameter to describe falling bodies, a revolutionary step in physics.

11 The setting up of heartbeats is not the result of a programmed oscillator, but of a systemic property: at a
critical transition during embryogenesis, interacting embryonic heart membranes, ion’s flows, cells’ microtubules
and neural oscillations resonate and set the rhythm. This gradually correlates to the entire body physiology and
even regulates pertinent gene expressions (Noble 2006, 2012).
However, in contrast to Rovelli's space-time cones, the inter-organismal fine tuning of rhythms and frequencies is at the core of our ecosystemic perspective on time, as hinted next. Organisms use also *accumulators* to measure physical time. Cicadas, which live 13 or 17 years underground before hatching, use an accumulator of the sugar absorbed from the roots of trees in order to emerge with the frequency set along evolution (Williams, Simon 1995) – the surprising prime numbers are probably selected since they cannot be divided by reproduction times of predators. In their dance, bees communicate to the others in the beehive the *flying time* to pollens. That time is measured by internal accumulators and rhythms, which are used also to estimate foraging time: even when the circadian frequency is experimentally disabled, foraging honeybees “are still able to demonstrate interval timing, suggesting that the systems are independent” (Foster, Kreitzman 2004). With the current climate change, as angiosperms follow the seasonal temperature, an increasing temperature may force early blossoming, so that pollinators may reach different flower species with wrong timings, (Memmott et al. 2007). The pollinators/flowers evolutionary fine tuning of internal rhythms vs external frequencies, in foraging and pollination, is a very relevant phenomenon for many food chains and may then be disrupted. A mechanistic view of time or of nature does not help in seeing these ecosystemic disruptions.12

Rhythms and frequencies fix durées: typically, the time in between two iterations of a rhythm. Accumulators add further measurable time intervals. An ecosystem is a *tissue of correlated and recorded “durées”*, as Bergson would put it, (During 2009), (Ronchi, Leoni 2007). The changes in this tissue or heterochrony, as altered characteristic times in ontogeny, contribute to evolutionary changes. For example, in the three-spined stickleback (*Gasterosteus aculeatus*), heterochrony in the expression of adaptive traits contributed to speciation in a “limnetic” and a “bentic” form. Their “ancestral population occupies both of the habitats observed in the descendent species pairs and exhibits both phenotypes at different times during its life cycle, a pattern that suggests that the different recurrent forms may have originated not by parallel evolution but by altered timing (heterochrony) in the expression of those traits” (West-Eberhard 2005).14

Time scales and characteristic times are then crucial notions in biology. The “closure of constraints” in (Montévil Mossio 2015) describes biological functions as part of a “mutual dependence between a set of constituents which could not exist in isolation, and which maintain each other through their interactions”. Each functional closure applies at a precise time scale and for a characteristic time. Functions then define biological rhythms, such as metabolic, endocrine and cardiac rhythms: from enzymes, which have a time scale and a characteristic time related to their catalytic activity and to the (un-)binding to a substrate in a reaction, to major organismal systems, such as the vascular system, all have a proper time scale and a characteristic time.15 During embryogenesis, the increasing levels of functional nesting and interactions in the forming organism can be analyzed in terms of a complexifying closure of constraints. This provides a properly biological and *measurable* “coarse graining” of organization: an increasingly *finer* (more complex) organization sets the strictly irreversible and biological arrow of time of growing functionalities in an organism, while producing new autonomous rhythms.16 If your pet theory of organisms allows to conceive the formed baby to

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12 For a synthetic analysis of ecosystemic disruptions, including chronobiological ones, see (Montévil 2020a).
13 “Partout où quelque chose vit, il y a, ouvert quelque part, un registre où le temps s’inscrit.” (Bergson, EC)
14 See (Huneman 2018) for more aspects of timing and time scales in micro and macro-evolution.
15 The ions’ flow of an action potential in neurons requires about a millisecond to travel a few nanometers, which is much more than the usual time scale in physics for these molecular processes (Lesne 2018). The biological functions and contexts impose their own scales and characteristic time.
16 The anatomical complexity of an organism can be measured (Bailly Longo 2009), (Longo Montévil 2014). We called “anti-entropy” this new observable whose space geometry and dimensions matter (in contrast to
move backwards to the unorganized morula or the zygote, you should better forget it: it has no 
biological meaning – only death suddenly destroys biological organization (or, locally, illness). Time 
irreversibility of biological dynamics is not “just a matter of probability”, as physicists soundly say in 
thermodynamics, but of an irreversible construction of organization and its rhythms, as functional 
“closure of constraints”. In this sense, the measurable time of biological setting up and maintenance/ 
renewal of organization is a new observable time, which we theoretically distinguish from thermal time – 
similarly as one can distinguish potential and kinetic energy in the dimension of energy\(^\text{17}\). More will 
be said below in reference to evolution.

Note that organismal rhythms, such as the cardiac rhythm, force a form of protension: the 
preconscious expectation of the iteration of the rhythm – such as heartbeats (Noble 2006). The 
correlation of frequencies and retention/protension may be witness even in amoebas, which anticipate 
periodic events (Saigusa et al. 2008). In humans, musical notes and rhythms require a join of 
protension and retention, in a least time durée, in order to produce musical sense – similarly as for the 
retention and protension required to understand language. This “gluing” (a mathematical notion) of 
retension and protension in an interval is a fundamental durée in all forms of perception and, 
eventually, in consciousness of time – a simple mathematical description of this phenomenon is given 
in (Bailly et al. 2011, sect 5.4), (Longo Montévil 2011). In our view, the “continuity” that we attribute 
to a trajectory (of a prey, a ball …) results from glueing retension and protension of it, including the 
protensive eye jerks and brain’s associated re-organization described in (Berthoz 2000)\(^\text{18}\).

Finally, organisms continually re-construct themselves, by somatic cell reproduction. Each of these 
reproductions has the characteristic of a “critical transition”: a re-organization of internal and external 
symmetries - from one to two cells; the formation of new coherence structures - the tissue matrix, re-
constructed collagen fibers etc. In an immensely more complex way, this resembles to a para/ferro-
magnetic critical transition, the formation of a snowflake, … (Binney et al 1992). In physics, critical 
transitions are formalized as a point-wise process by the divergence of (the derivatives of) some 
function of the dynamics on one point of the pertinent parameter. In biology instead, the “durée” of 
these transitions is crucial as it internally contains several, nested, critical transitions (e.g. DNA split, 
proteome’s reorganization …) that make no sense in isolation. Moreover, a multicellular organism 
undergoes thousands of cell reproductions, thus of these nested, extended transitions, in short time 
intervals. The notion of “extended criticality” in (Bailly Longo 2011), (Longo Montévil 2011a), 
unknown to mathematical physics, may help to grasp the peculiarities of this continual reorganization 
which is proper to life; it may be viewed as a topologically dense interval of critical transitions, in a

negentropy as one-dimensional information). Anti-entropy adds, and does not opposes, to entropy, produced also 
by its very setting up, as in all irreversible processes - each cell reproduction increases anti-entropy while 
producing entropy, by energy transformations and by the slight disorder of the a-symmetric division. In short, 
philo- and onto-genesis simultaneously produce entropy and quantifiable, three dimensional and metric 
organization (anti-entropy). (Montévil Mossio 2015) further specified it by adding functional closure, a key 
notion in biology.

\(^{17}\) (Sarti et al 2018) consistently propose to introduce another dimension for this new observable time. This is 
fascinating and may require the invention of a new pertinent dimensional constant to relate the two forms of 
time, such as Boltzmann k in TD, say, a non-obvious step.

\(^{18}\) A frog would never claim that movement is continuous: it sees it by scattered snapshots. We, large 
vertebrates, follow and precede moving preys by continuous eye jerks and, very recently, we invented 
continuous background spaces and their mathematics (Longo 2019). The Cantorian, a posteriori reconstruction 
of phenomenal continua by dimensionless points, justifies Weyl’s dissatisfaction: it is very powerful and 
rigorous, it founds the point-wise time instants of the XVIII century differential calculus, but misses the a priori of 
perception and of its biological timing, as “durées”. Better can be done by more modern mathematics (see the 
footnotes in §5).
non-cantorian continuum. And, at the proper scale, extended criticality yields incompressible, not secable “durées” in the pertinent phase space\(^{19}\).

In summary, the analysis of biological rhythms in terms closure of constraints provides an objectivizing-relative theoretical frame for Bergsonian durées as pertinent and measurable characteristic times and time intervals, at different time scales. Similarly, perception should be analyzed in incompressible intervals of time by glueing retension and protension. Moreover, critical transitions are omnipresent but extended to time intervals. All these durées, in order to be understood in their functionality, cannot be arbitrarily compressed nor divided, unlike a Cantorian time-segment. They set the time of Darwin’s “correlated variations” and of interacting causality in all scales, as described by Noble’s “Biological Relativity” (Noble 2012). We also hinted to the role of variable durées in phylogenetic heterochrony; more should be said as for changing time interactions in embryogenesis (Raff, Wray 1989). In short, the analysis of the network of functional durées, at all levels of organization, and of their changes in organisms and ecosystems is a core biological investigation.

Recall then a major epistemic lesson of Einstein’s GRT:

\[ \text{The geometry of relativistic spaces is a tissue of interactions: when deforming these interactions, the tissue and its geometry change; conversely, a deformation of the geometry changes the interactions, their tissue.} \]

The key role of time in biology and its deformations may be analogously synthesized:

\[ \text{The time of an ecosystem is a tissue of interacting rhythms and frequencies: when deforming these interactions or their tissue, rhythms, frequencies and their tuning change; conversely, a deformation of rhythms or frequencies and of their tuning modifies the tissue, the time of the ecosystem.} \]

Of course, a multicellular organism is an ecosystem, often inhabited by more bacteria than somatic cells. Yet, the converse does not need to hold. In particular, the resilience to time and space (metric) deformations of the tissue of interactions may be incommensurably higher in an ecosystem than in an organism. In biological ecosystems, of either type, the notion of pathology or of “disruption” are perfectly sound and relevant, in particular in reference to the functional fine-tuning of rhythms and frequencies, while they are not in physics. The current ecosystemic crisis requires a close attention also to the changes in the evolutionary network of recorded “durées”, as defined by Bergson.

### 3.2 – The time of evolution

“... ... il faut y joindre tout le passé de l’organisme, son hérédité, enfin l’ensemble d’une très longue histoire” (Bergson EC)

Another distinction is required as for the time of phylogeny and ontogeny. The phase spaces (pertinent observables and parameters) of physical theories may differ, but they are given a priori by each theory\(^{20}\). From Aristotle to Newton, Einstein and Schrödinger, the actual is already “in potentia”, in the space of all possible paths – possibly in (Cartesian) phase spaces or in infinite dimensional (Hilbert’s) spaces of quantum probability’s amplitudes (Schrödinger). Or, “the bifurcation precedes the

\(^{19}\)“La chose et l’état ne sont que des instantanés artificiellement pris sur la transition ; et cette transition, seule naturellement expérimentée, est la durée même.” … “Le concept de durée enveloppe la double idée d’un passage et d’une conservation” (Bergson MM).

\(^{20}\)“It is the theory that fixes the observables” (Einstein), which, in a given physical theory, are fixed or may at most statistically change in a pre-given list (Disertori et al., 2015), (Sethna 2006).
fluctuation” that induces one path or the other, (Thom 1990). In a Darwinian perspective, instead, the pertinent observables and pertinent parameters, thus the space of possible phenotypes and organisms, are produced during and by evolution. “The origin of a new direction of adaptive evolution starts with a population of variably responsive, developmentally plastic organisms”, (West-Eberhard 2005). Variability is co-extensive with life (Darwin’s first principle) and fluctuations, within organisms and organisms-ecosystem, co-constitute bifurcations (Longo et al. 2012), (Longo 2017). In other words, the phase space of evolution is produced by evolution itself, and this is inconceivable in existing mathematical physics21.

Moreover, rare events (hopeful monsters, allopatric speciation …) crucially contribute to phylogeny (Longo 2017), in a very different way from the rare “large fluctuations” that importantly, but rarely influence trajectories in physics (Vulpiani et al. 2014). As a matter of fact, any phylogenetic path, or most of its bifurcations and changes, are marked by and result from rare events (Gould 2002)22.

This approach requires a further distinction. Hurricanes, flames … and all far from equilibrium physical processes are described by an irreversible processual time, in a given phase space. They are all of the same “type”, in a robust mathematical sense, since four billions years on Earth and a sound theory in a pre-given phase space, and its mathematics, effectively describes them. Life instead somewhat changed since its origin. It has a historical time, specified by changing phase spaces and by rare events. Moreover, traces of its past shape the present and the future, very differently from “path dependence” in physics (Longo 2017). This re-use of the past may be analyzed in terms of, for example:

- Gould’s ex-aptation (adaptation ex-post: the new use of an old phenotype), degeneracy (Edelman Gally 2001) and overloading (Longo 2017) of organs and functions,
- degenerate and multiple use of a segment of DNA by (de-)methylation, alternative splicing or overlapping genes, (Pavesi et al 2018),
- activation of cryptic mutations (Paaby, Rockmann 2014) etc,

see (Longo 2017) for more. Intelligibility thus depends also on knowledge of the past and thus, possibly, on diachronic measurement. That is, a biological function, an organism, a species are understood in terms of their history: the structure and function of brain, lungs, … the absurd connectivity in vertebrates eyes (as pointed out by Helmholtz), if compared to the pulp’s homologous one, or “what is a mouse” (Montévil 2019) ... can only be understood in phylo-ontogenetic terms, that is by an analysis of their constitutive history, possibly by accessing to and measuring common ancestors (West-Eberhard 2003), (Lecointre, Le Guyader 2017). The need for synchronic and diachronic measurement as well poses major challenges in biology: the specificity and historicity of each individual is a major theoretical issue and massively affects experimental reproducibility (Montévil 2019). In a Bergsonian perspective, organisms may be only understood within a life flow, their ever changing evolution (Bergson EC).

21 Darwin, in a marvelous page on variation and the production of new phenotypes in evolution (Origin, ch. 5), stresses the “extreme sensitivity” of organisms, their contexts and their interactions to minor or non-detectable changes. R. Thom, in (Thom 1990), insightfully sees the relevance of this issue and, consistently with mathematical physics, observes that it “affects, very seriously, the scientific nature of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution.” (p. 271). Great thinkers are at least aware of their a priori (and metaphysics: Thom’s firm mathematical Platonism) – also when they are wrong.

22 One of the challenges of today’s cosmology, which aims at a historical theory, is that both the observables and the fundamental physical constants may be considered as varying (Uzan 2011). Perhaps, some inspiration from theorizing in evolution, since Darwin, may help cosmologists, such as the focus on changing phase spaces and rare events. Economists, as they also work at a historical theory, have been already inspired from our approach (Koppl et al. 2015).
As mentioned above, the historical time of onto-phylogenesis may be better described by a new observable (or an extra mathematical time-dimension, see the footnote). Following this approach, in (Bailly, Longo 2009), we used a diffusion equation in order to formalize a remark in (Gould 1996), concerning the (largely random) increasing phenotypic complexity in evolution. Intuitively, more “complex” organisms, in the sense of a notion that we formally define and measure (anti-entropy), may construct/occupy new niches – thus they have more chances to fit\(^{23}\). The equation, with real coefficients, is analogous to Schrödinger’s wave equation in QM, which may also be understood as a diffusion equation – in our case, it yields an asymmetric diffusion of bio-mass over “complexity”.

Dually to Schrödinger’s, and for good mathematical reasons, time turns out to be an “operator” and energy (or mass) a parameter, in agreement with the role of energy (or mass) as a parameter in allometric equations in biology (Gould 1966), (Peters 1983), (Longo, Montévil 2014). It is still hard to fully grasp the biological meaning of such a duality, yet, if our analysis is correct, it seems to stress, by a new mathematical frame, the constitutive role of time transformations, whose epistemic status becomes then similar to conservation laws for energy or momentum in physics.

4 – Comparing theories of time

In physics, from Aristotle’s “time is movement that is counted” to Einstein space-localized clocks, it is commonly understood that “time is what is measured by clocks” - see the papers on physical time in (Bouton Huneman 2019). This parallels a common physico-mathematical definition of randomness: “randomness is what is measured by probability” (from Laplace to Kolmogoroff, in the 1930’s, see (Mugur-Schachter, Longo 2014)). Joining the two, as for an issue we already hinted: “time reversibility is just a matter of probability” (see also the Einstein-Ritz debate, (Frisch Pietsch 2016))\(^{24}\). These views, that may be perfectly sound in physics, are largely inadequate in biology.

First, organisms construct their own time as internal rhythms, which, at least in mammals, scale to bio-mass, as mentioned above. Biological rhythms do not just measure, but engender the time of organisms, a complex organismal and ecosystemic tissue constructed in evolution and embryogenesis, in relation to, but differing from physical frequencies (clocks). A possible analysis requires some more geometry than just a time-line and the counting of a frequency on it, as we hinted in §.3. Stressing the difference as well as the interactions may help to understand some of the ongoing ecosystemic changes, which can then be measured. Yet, the conceptual determination may precede measurement; for example, the operatorial role of time specifies our perspective by some mathematics, in spite of the difficulties, or impossibility, in pre-defining and measuring changing spaces of possibilities (the possible phenotypes and organisms) and rare events. More in the next item.

Second, randomness mathematically differs in classical and quantum frames, as it yields different probabilities (e.g. the violation of Bell inequalities, (Aspect et al. 1982)). In general, randomness is “unpredictability in the intended theory” (Calude Longo 2016). Since, in physical theories, phase spaces are generally pre-given, probability, as a measure of randomness (Lebesgue’s measure, typically), may be a priori fixed by the observer and soundly defines randomness\(^{25}\). This is not so in

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\(^{23}\) Anti-entropy is a different observable from negentropy: it is generated while producing entropy (Bailly, Longo 2009) and it measures phenotypic complexity as a dimensional/geometric notion, depending on the physico-chemical materiality of the life processes. This is in contrast to negentropy as “information”, which is one-dimensional and dematerialized (independent from the “hardware”).

\(^{24}\) “La mesure d’une chose est, aux yeux de la physique, cette chose même” (Bergson DS).

\(^{25}\) However, both Poincaré’s analysis (Three Body Problem, 1892) and the standard interpretation of QM provide an epistemic interpretation of classical and quantum randomness, respectively, which conceptually precedes probabilities. They may be both asymptotically related to strong forms of undecidability, (Calude
evolutionary dynamics where the very space of possibilities is not pre-given – it does not precede the dynamics. Thus no probability measure can be given on this “space”. So, unpredictability (randomness) moves from a value within a space of pre-given observables to the very set of possible observables and cannot be measured, (Longo 2017).

Third, as for time reversibility, does one refer to time or to the observed process as reversible? In short, a process may be considered "reversible in time", when it is parametrized over time, \( t \), and setting \(-t\) yields a physically conceivable/possible process. Typically, Newtonian mechanics and all dynamics where the time parameter \( t \) appears as a \( t^2 \), inversing \( t \) in \(-t\) poses no problem (the orbits of planets can be very well be conceived to go in the opposite direction), see (Gayon, Montévil 2019) for a detailed discussion. But also the diffusion of a gas can be thought as time reversible: in the atomistic perspective, since Boltzmann, the inversion of the trajectories of gaz particles is conceivable, it is just a statistical matter with very low probabilities. In some cases, the thermodynamical process (mixing gazes, say) may be reversed by some energy (a centrifuge), with no inversion of the time parameter. As mentioned above, neither chance with low probabilities nor a centrifuge would help to reverse aging nor embryogenesis, from an old man to a baby to a zygote.

In (Longo, Montévil 2017), we show that in existing physical theories, the following events are invariantly correlated: a symmetry breaking, a random event and the (local-processual) irreversibility of time (in short, think to classical bifurcations, to the projection of the QM state function, to thermal diffusion …). A remarkable mathematical unity of physics. This correlation holds also in our approach to the proper irreversible time of biology, in evolution in particular. Yet, the fundamental symmetry that is also broken by the time flow is the conservation of the phase space, i.e. by the changes of the space of possible phenotypes. As already mentioned, this yields a non-measurable form of randomness – yet a very close approach to ours may be already given a mathematical representation, (Sarti et al. 2019).

As for the Bergson-Einstein debate, an irreversible and universal “becoming” is at the core of Bergson's philosophy of nature. It is not being that becomes, but becoming is being (Ronchi 2011): life undergoes a permanent change not only in time but “enacted” by time, (Bergson DS). Can this be mathematically specified as a view of time as a (differential) operator, as mentioned above? Indeed, an organism is a becoming: if somatic cells stop reproducing, the organism is dead, it is no more. Species can only become and change: there is no way to stabilize them, not even in a stable environment, observes Darwin. Reproduction with modification is his first principle for species’ evolution and our “default state” for cells also within an organism (Soto Longo 2016). Note though that also physics, QM at least, is moving beyond classical falling stones and relativistic block-universes: “The best language for describing the universe remains a language of happening and becoming, not a language of being. Even more so when we fold quantum theory in. Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG) describes reality in terms of processes” (Rovelli 2018). Yet, LQG has no preferred time variable and its becoming is a matter of space-localized, iterating frequencies. Biology instead, needs time variables, indeed more than one time dimension, in our approach, and they are set by the theory, a priori. Moreover, life’s becoming is a plastic tuning of rhythms and frequencies, as ever changing reproduction of geometric and time’s forms.

5 - Biological Twins vs Atomic Clocks
Thought experiments are very important in science. Yet, they must be proposed or understood at the “right” phenomenal level and possibly not based on nor forcing a philosophical bias. Archimedes imagined a “bag of water” in … water and proposed his principle. Galileo thought of a falling body in a

Longo 2016), in spaces where probabilities may be given but whose analysis is a minor, side issue.
boat in uniform movement and understood the relativity of movement. Einstein dared to take the point of view of a photon surfing on a light wave. Turing imagined himself as a “human computer” writing 0s and 1s on “a child’s arithmetic book”, in a perfectly “desultory manner”, (Longo 2018t). As written and as they are commonly interpreted, in reference to the phenomena they refer to, these deep and original insights by imagination are sound and very expressive.

Consider instead the ancient Zeno’s paradox about the arrow never reaching a target as it first needs to pass by \( 1/n \)-th of the distance to the target, for all \( n > 1 \). This is a fantastic mathematical invention, a very early reflection on infinity: the “paradox” of the infinite in the finite or of the infinite divisibility of a continuous segment. It opened the way to Euclid’s geometry of continua and, later, to the infinitesimal calculus that made western science. However, it is a physical nonsense. A figure of thought should be compatible with effective observations, as the four founding thought experiments above, in particular with measurement, the only form of quantifiable access we have to (physical) “reality”. No length of a physical object, no position of a tip of an arrow, may be given by a rational or real number, exactly: classical measurement is always approximated, it is an interval, at least because of thermal fluctuations. A fortiori, if one refers to or measures the position of a moving arrow, one always obtains an interval, both in space and time. That is, the arrowhead is in an interval of space and a moving one will be even more grossly approximated, in time, as time measurement yields always a durée. And the physical “paradox” vanishes.

Bergson, since the 1880’s, stressed that the Zeno’s mathematical invention is based on a lack of understanding of physical movement (Bergson 1889). Bergson criticizes the implicit identification of space and time and the missing appreciation of the “durée”, which is proper, in particular, to the understanding of movement. And he was right: the paradox is physically meaningless, while being one of the founding remarks of western mathematics.

26 « More generally, in the continuity of becoming which is reality itself, the present moment is constituted by the quasi-instantaneous interval (a durée) effected by our perception in the flowing mass, and this interval is precisely that which we call the material world.» (Bergson MM, p. 154)

27 For the reader who considers this argument too “physicalist” or even simplistic, more philosophical insights may be found in (Ronchi, 2011), (Miquel 2013), (During 2014). I entirely share, in particular, Ronchi’s Bergsonian critique of the identification of space and time and his analysis of Bergson’s and other philosophers’ deep reflections, since Greek philosophy, on continua and movement, also inspired by Zeno’s paradox. However, some ambiguities do not allow to focus on properly mathematical and physical theorizing on these matters. For example, Bergson claims that one can always “divide 'une chose' (matter? an object?), but not an action”. Also a “chose” though cannot be divided indefinitely, nor can space or time, both in a classical and in a quantum physical understanding of “dividing” – only pure mathematics allows it, in particular in the Cantorian Universe of Sets, a piling up of dimensionless points. More recent Topos Theoretic approaches, since Grothendieck ( Verdier et al. 1972), may provide a better fit with the relativizing objectivity of physics, beyond the Absolute and Stratified Universe of Sets and Points still prevailing in the mathematics and philosophy of physics. Diverse Universes (categories and sheaves), “with no points” nor stratified (not “predicative”), (Johnstone 1977), (Asperti Longo 1991), and their relative transformations may allow to revisit the debate in physics and philosophy, (Zalamea 2012), (Longo 2015). In particular, Categories and Toposes provide an analysis of invariant concepts in mathematics methodologically much closer to Einstein’s “Invariantentheorie”, as he preferred to call his own theory, than the Cantorian-Russellian stratified absolutes still prevailing, even in physics. These absolutes provide an image of or a mathematical projection on nature of a foundation built on point-elements as solid bricks on top of solid bricks, a parody of complexity as the stacking of the simple. A recent category-theoretic approach, where Lagrangian submanifolds in symplectic geometry form the indivisible, but complex elements, proposes interesting bridges between relativistic gauge and quantum indetermination (Catren 2014). We did and may invent more mathematics beyond the fantastic one which lead from Zeno to Cantor.
Similarly, Bergson is not at ease with the “twins’ paradox” as it was later called Langevin’s example of relativistic delays of clocks under different accelerations, described as differently aging humans. Unfortunately, Bergson tries to criticize the paradox in physical terms, by claiming that each twin equivalently (symmetrically) moves w.r.to the other – this is wrong since one is in an inertial system (sitting on Earth), while the other is accelerated. However, Bergson’s critique is also based on his understanding of the time of consciousness as a tissue of interacting durées. From our perspectival epistemology, his view of time as a dialogue of consciousness is beyond biology and its proper scientific objectivization. Moreover, Bergson searches for a universal time, if not an absolute, by referring to an identity of intimate durées in subjectivistic terms. However psychological, his views are grounded on living organisms, our reference here, with their own rhythms, as internal clocks, and their durées. Let’s then develop our focus on biological rhythms, which allow to measure aging. As we noticed, they are a condition of possibility for Bergson’s durée in consciousness.

The “paradox” of time measurements in different reference systems is a fantastic physical insight since the early days of RT and empirically corroborated by astronomical measurements and human made atomic clocks – the time of GRT applies to the clocks on our satellites (GPS uses it). Yet, it is biologically misleading. Biological rhythms are either resilient to differences in nano-seconds or it makes little physical and biological sense to imagine a viable ecosystem sufficiently accelerated as to be taken close enough to the speed of light and obtain biologically relevant time differences w.r.to an inertial one. As for the first issue, quantum phenomena and their timing may be relevant in biology as they may have phenotypic effects (Buiatti, Longo 2013), but nano-seconds are irrelevant in relating organisms’ biological rhythms. They are as irrelevant as measuring micro-fluctuations in meteorology or as integrating Schrödinger’s equation for the quanta composing water in the hydrodynamic analysis of the El Nino oceanic current, a dynamics of incompressible fluids better understood in continua (Chibbaro et al. 2015). Secondly, no complex organism can stand much more than 1g acceleration beyond a short time lapse. Then, what kind of viable ecosystem and how much energy is it needed to accelerate such an ecosystem at about 1g for years, once away from Earth? Energetic considerations and the tissue of correlations of biological rhythms and frequencies, required for life, are out of the scope of this theatrical thought experiment. Bergson may be technically wrong, but he is sending us a warning not to conflate the two dimensions of time (rhythms vs. frequencies), similarly as he had suggested not to confuse mathematics and physical movement in Zeno’s paradox.

In summary, the choice of the right scale of access and measurement as well as the analysis of the pertinent observables and interactions, are at the core of the scientific investigation. After 1945,

28 In Bergson’s long argument, Pierre and Paul measuring relativistic time in S and S’, live the same durée:
   « Donc, le Temps vécu et compté dans le système, le Temps intérieur et immanent au système, le Temps réel enfin, est le même pour S et pour S’. » Thus, la durée is the same for the two conscious beings and only by mathematics one may abstractly understand the different speed of the clock of the other, that is that they are in differently accelerated reference systems: « Qu’est-il donc, sinon une simple expression mathématique destinée à marquer que c’est le système de Pierre, et non pas le système de Paul, qui est pris pour système de référence ? » (Bergson, DS, 1984). Bergson, while appreciating Einstein’s “Invariententheorie”, warns against giving an ontological status to mathematical invariants.

29 In photosynthesis, picoseconds may matter as for energy transfer. But this fundamental interface inert/life is far from biological rhythms.

30 Maël Montévil and a particularly jaundiced biologist and physician friend, a collaborator of the European Space Agency (ESA), suggested that “it is the ... traveling twin that will get old sooner! Whatever we do to reconstruct an artificial ecosystem in a spaceship, for the time (his/her biological rhythms) required for the experiment at 1g acceleration (an animal cannot stand more, nor less, for long), the bio-psychic stress will heavily affect his health”. The physicist may observe that he/she does not deal with these issues. Then, he/she should better refer only to physical clocks.
Einstein went back to the issue of time: “what about the psychological origin of the concept of time?” (Einstein 1952). His answer refers to different observers comparing lightnings that would appear in different order of time according to different distances, in view of the bounded speed of light: “In order to arrive at the idea of an objective world, an additional constructive concept still is necessary: the event is localised not only in time, but also in space.” A very pertinent argument in astronomy or for timing by atomic human made clocks, but a biologically irrelevant issue as for interacting organisms in their niches and ecosystems on Earth. Jokes are fun (drolligsten) also said Einstein in reference to the twins' paradox, but they must be limited at their scale of pertinence – so, in his late years, Einstein often and more openly reconsidered Bergson’s arguments (Canales 2015).

Thus, in our view, Bergson disagreed with the abuses of many physicists who considered and still now consider a quantum or a relativistic theory of time as the theory to which all other theories should be reduced or even as a theoretical absolute - “une physique qui s’érige en métaphysique” (Bergson, DS). Note finally, that, without following Bergson’s universalistic-metaphysical argument, organisms on Earth do have a universal or global clock, coordinating also their autonomous rhythms, their durées: the spinning of Earth on itself, its movement around the Sun, the turning Moon, three fundamental physical frequencies beating the “a priori” background time of life.

**Conclusion**

Our critique joins Bergson’s not because of some physicists’ lack of attention to the “evidence” of time, since science is a constant fight against evidence and common sense, but because we reject a view of science as the occupation of reality by already mastered tools, with little theoretical care for the specificities of different phenomenal domains. And this, against the extraordinary history of inventiveness which is proper to physics. Biology instead, the most difficult scientific discipline as Einstein wrote in a letter to Schrödinger, should be grounded just on some physics of macromolecules - plus vague references (“metaphores”) to DNA centered information and programming with heavy consequences on research (Longo 2018c).

We must acknowledge though that our objectivizing interpretation of Bergson’s durées is not straightforward, as it is instrumentally forced in order to discuss today’s approaches to biological time. Poincaré, in (Poincaré 1917), soundly describes it differently: “time as conceived by Bergson's disciples is that durée which, far from being a pure quantity free of any quality, is, so to speak, the very quality itself whose various parts partly penetrate each other and differ qualitatively from each other. This durée could not be an instrument for scientists; it could only play this role by undergoing a profound transformation, by spatializing itself, as Bergson says. It had to become measurable: what cannot be measured cannot be an object of science. Now, measurable time is also essentially relative.” … “Moreover, psychological time, the Bergsonian durée, from which the scientist's time has come out, serves to classify the phenomena that occur in the same consciousness; it is powerless to classify two psychological phenomena that have two different consciences as their theater or, a fortiori, two physical phenomena.”

We tried here to set the notion of durée at the core of a tissue of objective-relative correlations in biology, following Relativity’s main epistemic teaching, yet without identifying/subordinating time to

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31 As observed above, Bergson, while rejecting Newton’s absolute time, focuses on “the unity of material time within a universe characterized by a plurality of rhythms of duration (durée), but also on the idea of an absolute of movement captured in “durée”, irreducible to the reference framework imposed by the principle of the relativity of movement” (During 2014). This would provide a global or universal time-framework, as “a principle of coordination and homogenization of flows of heterogeneous “durées”” (During 2014), which is our approach as for life, on this Earth.
space. In this attempt, we did not need to assume a universal consciousness nor to attribute “consciousness” to all forms of life (‘‘la conscience est coextensive à la vie’’ for Bergson). The changing evolutionary and historical nature of “consciousness” must instead be acknowledged: this notion requires an analysis of the “critical transitions” that may help to single out its constitution. For example, the invention of human language and of … writing, which allowed to see the invisible, language and our own thinking, to “reflect” on them, are two of these most recent transitions. Then the western consciousness of time, from the vision of a circle, an iteration with no novelty in ancient Greece, in Pytagora’s school and in the tragic iteration of events in Aeschylus, became an open ended line from Sophocles to Kant (Rebondi 2007), (Deleuze 1978). A uniform or universal conception of consciousness, of time in particular, for all living entities, independent from biological and human history, is beyond our scientific perspective.

However, does a scientific concept strictly need to be “measurable”? Joining Poincaré, both Bergson and Einstein would say so. Thus, Bergson’s principal denial of the scientific nature and measurability of notions such as time durée and randomness justifies Poincaré’s critique and drives Bergson’s analysis towards a metaphysics away from biology, as a science. Metaphysical investigations are very interesting, but are a different, highly needed, framing job - if the molecular biologists of the Central Dogma were at least conscious of their metaphysics, we would perhaps have some better genetics, from GMOs to cancer research (Longo 2018c).

In our scientific attempt, we first tried to specify durées by biological rhythms and characteristic times and, thus, suggested possible tools to measure them. Moreover, we singled out and qualified with enough, we hope, scientific rigor the notion of historical time and of biological randomness - as relative unpredictability (see the references more than the cursory presentation in §.3). In our approach, evolutionary randomness, in the dynamics of phase spaces and rare events, is not measurable, by probabilities typically. Science though may also proceed by first singling out conceptual contours and qualifications at the interface with phenomena, then, perhaps, but not necessarily, provide new mathematical spaces for measurement. These spaces, yet to be invented (but Hilbert spaces for QM were also a late invention), may be a possible development of the work in (Sarti et al 2019), as for historicity and randomness.

Finally, the constructed objectivity of time proposed here, with its different roles (regulating vs constitutive, in physics vs biology), does not exclude the knowing subject. There is always a residual of it in the choice of the reference system and its metrics, in the broad Rovellian sense above (the choice of the coarse graining, as for time), as well as in defining the transformations that single-out the invariants w.r. to that choice. On the one side, though, a living organism does objectively fix the thermal time coarse graining, as we observed. On the other, we decided to work at the organismal and evolutionary levels, as for their timing: the theoretical choice is perspectival and its empirical grounding requires fixing also observables and measurements, as Einstein observed. Thus, a philosophical reflection on consciousness of time, à la Bergson, may help to historicize our perspectival construction: our own open ended, creative appreciation of the biological time operator is the result of a historical formation of sense. In order to set it on sufficiently robust grounds, we tried to raise the epistemological question of its scientific pertinence by an analysis of the “... oppositional pair: subjective-absolute and objective-relative [that] seems ... to contain one of the most fundamental epistemological insights that can be extracted from natural sciences” … “But perhaps this question can be answered by pointing toward the essentially historical nature of that life of the mind of which my own existence is an integral but not autonomous part. It is light and darkness, contingency and necessity, bondage and freedom, and it cannot be expected that a symbolic construction of the world in some final form can ever be detached from it.” (Weyl 1949).
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(Longo's papers are downloadable from: http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo/download.html )


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