### Traces Properties Semantics and applications to verification

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# Program of this lecture

Goal of verification

Prove that  $\llbracket P \rrbracket \subseteq S$ (i.e., all behaviors of P satisfy specification S) where  $\llbracket P \rrbracket$  is the program semantics and S the desired specification

Last week, we studied a form of  $[\![P]\!]\dots$ 

### Today's lecture: we look back at program's properties

• families of properties:

what properties can be considered "similar" ? in what sense ?

o proof techniques:

how can those kinds of properties be established ?

• specification of properties:

are there languages to describe properties  $\ensuremath{?}$ 

- In this lecture we look at trace properties
- A property is a set of traces, defining the admissible executions

Safety properties:

- something (e.g., bad) will never happen
- proof by invariance

Liveness properties:

- something (e.g., good) will eventually happen
- proof by variance

Beyond safety and liveness: hyperproperties (e.g., security...)

### State properties

As usual, we consider  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbb{S}, 
ightarrow, \mathbb{S}_\mathcal{I})$ 

First approach: properties as sets of states

- A property  $\mathcal{P}$  is a set of states  $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathbb{S}$
- $\mathcal{P}$  is satisfied if and only if all reachable states belong to  $\mathcal{P}$ , i.e.,  $[\![\mathcal{S}]\!]_{\mathcal{R}} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$  where  $[\![\mathcal{S}]\!]_{\mathcal{R}} = \{s_n \in \mathbb{S} \mid \exists \langle s_0, \dots, s_n \rangle \in [\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^*, s_0 \in \mathbb{S}_{\mathcal{I}}\}$

Examples:

• Absence of runtime errors:

 $\mathcal{P} = \mathbb{S} \setminus \{\Omega\} \quad \text{where } \Omega \text{ is the error state}$ 

• Non termination (e.g., for an operating system):

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ s \in \mathbb{S} \mid \exists s' \in \mathbb{S}, s \rightarrow s' \}$$

Second approach: properties as sets of traces

- A property  $\mathcal{T}$  is a set of traces  $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathbb{S}^{\infty}$
- $\mathcal{T}$  is satisfied if and only if all traces belong to  $\mathcal{T}$ , i.e.,  $[\![S]\!]^{\propto} \subseteq \mathcal{T}$

### Examples:

- Obviously, state properties are trace properties
- Functional properties:

e.g., "program  ${\it P}$  takes one integer input  ${\it x}$  and returns its absolute value"

• Termination:  $\mathcal{T}=\mathbb{S}^*$  (i.e., the system should have no infinite execution)

# Monotonicity

#### Property 1

```
Let \mathcal{P}_0, \mathcal{P}_1 \subseteq \mathbb{S} be two state properties, such that \mathcal{P}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{P}_1.
Then \mathcal{P}_0 is stronger than \mathcal{P}_1, i.e. if program \mathcal{S} satisfies \mathcal{P}_0, then it also satisfies \mathcal{P}_1.
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#### Property 2

Let  $\mathcal{T}_0, \mathcal{T}_1 \subseteq \mathbb{S}$  be two trace properties, such that  $\mathcal{T}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{T}_1$ . Then  $\mathcal{T}_0$  is stronger than  $\mathcal{T}_1$ , i.e. if program  $\mathcal{S}$  satisfies  $\mathcal{T}_0$ , then it also satisfies  $\mathcal{T}_1$ .

#### Property 3

Let  $S_0, S_1$  two transition systems, such that  $S_1$  has more behaviors than  $S_0$  (i.e.,  $[\![S_0]\!] \subseteq [\![S_1]\!]$ ), and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a (trace or state) property. Then, if  $S_1$  satisfies  $\mathcal{P}$ , so does  $S_0$ .

Proofs: straightforward application of the definitions Xavier Rival Traces Properties

### Outline

# Safety properties

### Informal definition: safety properties

A safety property is a property which specifies that some (bad) behavior will never occur, at any time

- Absence of runtime errors is a safety property ("bad thing": error)
- State properties is a safety property ("bad thing": reaching  $\mathbb{S} \setminus \mathcal{P}$ )
- Non termination is a safety property ("bad thing": reaching a blocking state)
- "Not reaching state *b* after visiting state *a*" is a safety property (and **not** a state property)
- Termination is not a safety property

We now intend to provide a formal definition of safety.

## Towards a formal definition

#### How to refute a safety property ?

- $\bullet$  We assume  ${\cal S}$  does not satisfy safety property  ${\cal P}$
- Thus, there exists a counter-example trace
   σ = ⟨s<sub>0</sub>,..., s<sub>n</sub>,...⟩ ∈ [[S]] \ P;
   it may be finite or infinite...
- The intuitive definition says this trace eventually exhibits some bad behavior, at some given time, corresponding to some index *i*
- Therefore, trace  $\sigma' = \langle s_0, \dots, s_i \rangle$  violates  $\mathcal{P}$ , i.e.  $\sigma' \not\in \mathcal{P}$
- We remark  $\sigma'$  is finite

# A safety property that does not hold can always be refuted with a finite counter-example

### A Few Operators on Traces

**Prefix:** We write  $\sigma_{i}$  for the prefix of length *i* of trace  $\sigma$ :

**Suffix** (or tail):

$$\sigma_{i\rceil} = \epsilon \quad \text{if } |\sigma| < i$$
  
 $(\langle s_0, \dots, s_i \rangle \cdot \sigma)_{i+1\rceil} \quad ::= \sigma \quad \text{otherwise}$ 

### Upper closure operators

#### Definition: upper closure operator (uco)

We consider a preorder  $(S, \sqsubset)$ . Function  $\phi : S \to S$  is an **upper closure** operator iff:

• monotone

• extensive: 
$$\forall x \in S, x \sqsubseteq \phi(x)$$

• idempotent: 
$$\forall x \in S, \ \phi(\phi(x)) = \phi(x)$$

Dual: lower closure operator, monotone, reductive, idempotent

#### **Examples:**

 on real/decimal numbers, or on fraction: the ceiling operator, that returns the next integer is an upper-closure operator

# Prefix closure

#### Definition: prefix closure

The prefix closure operator is defined by:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \mathsf{PCI}: & \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S}^{\infty}) & \longrightarrow & \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S}^{*}) \\ & X & \longmapsto & \{\sigma_{\lceil i} \mid \sigma \in X, \, i \in \mathbb{N}\} \end{array}$$

Example: assuming

$$S = \{ \langle a, b, c \rangle, \langle a, c \rangle \}$$

then,

$$\mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{S}) = \{\epsilon, \langle a \rangle, \langle a, b \rangle, \langle a, b, c \rangle, \langle a, c \rangle \}$$

#### **Properties**:

- PCI is monotone
- PCI is idempotent, i.e.,  $PCI \circ PCI(X) = PCI(X)$
- PCI is not extensive (infinite traces do not appear anymore)

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### Limit

### Definition: limit

The limit operator is defined by:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \mathsf{Lim}: & \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S}^{\infty}) & \longrightarrow & \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S}^{\infty}) \\ & X & \longmapsto & X \cup \{\sigma \in \mathbb{S}^{\infty} \mid \forall i \in \mathbb{N}, \ \sigma_{\lceil i} \in X\} \end{array}$$

#### Operator Lim is an upper-closure operator

**Proof**: exercise!

#### Example: assuming

$$\mathcal{S} = \{ egin{array}{ccc} \epsilon, & \langle a 
angle \ & \langle a, b 
angle & \langle a, b, a 
angle \ & \langle a, b, a, b 
angle & \langle a, b, a, b, a 
angle & \ldots \end{array} \}$$

then,

 $\mathsf{Lim}(\mathcal{S}) = \mathcal{S} \uplus \{ \langle a, b, a, b, a, b, \ldots \rangle \}$ 

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Traces Properties

# Towards a formal definition for safety

### Operator Safe

Operator Safe is defined by  $Safe = Lim \circ PCI$ .

Operator Safe saturates a set of traces S with

- prefixes
- infinite traces all finite prefixes of which can be observed in S

Thus, if Safe(S) = S and  $\sigma$  is a trace, to establish that  $\sigma$  is not in S, it is sufficient to discover a finite prefix of  $\sigma$  that cannot be observed in S.

- if  $\sigma$  is finite the result is clear (consider  $\sigma$ )
- otherwise, if all finite prefixes of  $\sigma$  are in S, then  $\sigma$  is in the limit, thus in S.

### Safety: definition

A trace property  $\mathcal{T}$  is a safety property if and only if  $Safe(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{T}$ 

# Safety properties: formal definition

#### An upper closure operator

Operator Safe is an upper closure operator over  $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S}^{\infty})$ 

#### Proof:

### Safe is monotone since Lim and PCI are monotone

#### Safe is extensive:

indeed if  $X \subseteq \mathbb{S}^{\infty}$  and  $\sigma \in X$ , we can show that  $\sigma \in \mathbf{Safe}(X)$ :

- if  $\sigma$  is a finite trace, it is one of its prefixes, so  $\sigma \in PCI(X) \subseteq Lim(PCI(X))$
- if  $\sigma$  is an infinite trace, all its prefixes belong to PCI(X), so  $\sigma \in Lim(PCI(X))$

# Safety properties: formal definition

**Proof** (continued):

### Safe is idempotent:

 as Safe is extensive and monotone Safe ⊆ Safe ∘ Safe, so we simply need to show that Safe ∘ Safe ⊆ Safe

• let 
$$X \subseteq \mathbb{S}^{\propto}, \sigma \in \mathsf{Safe}(\mathsf{Safe}(X))$$
; then:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \sigma \in \mathsf{Safe}(\mathsf{Safe}(X)) \\ \Rightarrow & \forall i, \ \sigma_{\lceil i} \in \mathsf{PCI} \circ \mathsf{Safe}(X) & \text{by def. of Lim} \\ \Rightarrow & \forall i, \ \exists \sigma', j, \ \sigma_{\lceil i} = \sigma'_{\lceil j} \land \sigma' \in \mathsf{Safe}(X) & \text{by def. of PCI} \\ \Rightarrow & \forall i, \ \exists \sigma', j, \ \sigma_{\lceil i} = \sigma'_{\lceil j} \land \forall k, \ \sigma'_{\lceil k} \in \mathsf{PCI}(X) & \text{by def. of PCI} \\ & \text{by def. of Lim and case analysis over finiteness of } \sigma' \\ \Rightarrow & \forall i, \ \exists \sigma', j, \ \sigma_{\lceil i} = \sigma'_{\lceil j} \land \sigma'_{\lceil j} \in \mathsf{PCI}(X) & \text{if we take } k = j \\ \Rightarrow & \forall i, \ \sigma_{\lceil i} \in \mathsf{PCI}(X) & \text{by simplification} \\ \Rightarrow & \sigma \in \mathsf{Lim} \circ \mathsf{PCI}(X) & \text{by def. of Lim} \\ \Rightarrow & \sigma \in \mathsf{Safe}(X) \end{array}$$

# Safety properties: formal definition

### Safety: definition

A trace property  ${\mathcal T}$  is a safety property if and only if  ${\bf Safe}({\mathcal T})={\mathcal T}$ 

#### Theorem

If  ${\mathcal T}$  is a trace property, then  ${\sf Safe}({\mathcal T})$  is a safety property

### **Proof**:

Straightforward, by idempotence of Safe

### Intuition:

- if T is a trace property (not necessarily a safety property), Safe(T) is the strongest safety property, that is weaker than T
- at this point, this observation is not so useful... but it will be soon!

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# Example

We assume that:

- $\mathbb{S} = \{a, b\}$
- T states that a should not be visited after state b is visited; elements of T are of the general form

 $\langle a, a, a, \ldots, a, b, b, b, b, \ldots \rangle$  or  $\langle a, a, a, \ldots, a, a, \ldots \rangle$ 

Then:

- **PCI**(*T*) elements are all finite traces which are of the above form (i.e., made of *n* occurrences of *a* followed by *m* occurrences of *b*, where *n*, *m* are positive integers)
- Lim(PCI(T)) adds to this set the trace made made of infinitely many occurrences of a and the infinite traces made of n occurrences of a followed by infinitely many occurrences of b
- thus,  $\text{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) = \text{Lim}(\text{PCI}(\mathcal{T})) = \mathcal{T}$

Therefore  $\mathcal{T}$  is indeed formally a safety property.

## State properties are safety properties

#### Theorem

Any state property is also a safety property.

#### Proof:

Let us consider state property  $\mathcal{P}$ . It is equivalent to trace property  $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{P}^{\alpha}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) &= \mathsf{Lim}(\mathsf{PCl}(\mathcal{P}^{\infty})) \\ &= \mathsf{Lim}(\mathcal{P}^{*}) \\ &= \mathcal{P}^{*} \cup \mathcal{P}^{\omega} \\ &= \mathcal{P}^{\infty} \\ &= \mathcal{T} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore  $\mathcal{T}$  is indeed a safety property.

# Intuition of the formal definition

Operator Safe saturates a set of traces S with

- prefixes
- infinite traces all finite prefixes of which can be observed in S

Thus, if **Safe**(S) = S and  $\sigma$  is a trace, to establish that  $\sigma$  is not in S, it is sufficient to discover a **finite prefix of**  $\sigma$  that cannot be observed in S.

Alternatively, if all finite prefixes of  $\sigma$  belong to S or can observed as a prefix of another trace in S, by definition of the limit operator,  $\sigma$  belongs to S (even if it is infinite).

Thus, our definition indeed captures properties that can be disproved with a finite counter-example.

# Outline

# Proof by invariance

- We consider transition system S = (S, →, S<sub>I</sub>), and safety property T.
   Finite traces semantics is the least fixpoint of F<sub>\*</sub>.
- We seek a way of verifying that S satisfies T, i.e., that  $[\![S]\!]^{\propto} \subseteq T$

### Principle of invariance proofs

Let  $\mathbb{I}$  be a set of finite traces; it is said to be an **invariant** if and only if:

• 
$$\forall s \in \mathbb{S}_{\mathcal{I}}, \langle s \rangle \in \mathbb{I}$$

• 
$$F_*(\mathbb{I}) \subseteq \mathbb{I}$$

It is stronger than  $\mathcal{T}$  if and only if  $\mathbb{I} \subseteq \mathcal{T}$ .

The "by invariance" proof method is based on finding an invariant that is stronger than  $\mathcal{T}.$ 

# Soundness

### Theorem: soundness

The invariance proof method is **sound**: if we can find an invariant for S, that is stronger than safety property T, then S satisfies T.

### Proof:

We assume that  $\mathbb I$  is an invariant of  $\mathcal S$  and that it is stronger than  $\mathcal T$ , and we show that  $\mathcal S$  satisfies  $\mathcal T$ :

- by induction over *n*, we can prove that  $F_*^n(\{\langle s \rangle \mid s \in \mathbb{S}_{\mathcal{I}}\}) \subseteq F_*^n(\mathbb{I}) \subseteq \mathbb{I}$
- therefore  $\llbracket \mathcal{S} \rrbracket^* \subseteq \mathbb{I}$
- thus,  $\text{Safe}([\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^*)\subseteq\text{Safe}(\mathbb{I})\subseteq\text{Safe}(\mathcal{T})$  since Safe is monotone
- we remark that  $[\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^{\propto} = \textbf{Safe}([\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^*)$
- $\mathcal{T}$  is a safety property so  $\text{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{T}$
- $\bullet$  we conclude  $[\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^{\propto} \subseteq \mathcal{T}$  , i.e.,  $\mathcal{S}$  satisfies property  $\mathcal{T}$

# Completeness

#### Theorem: completeness

The invariance proof method is **complete**: if S satisfies safety property T, then we can find an invariant I for S, that is stronger than T.

#### **Proof:**

We assume that  $[\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^*$  satisfies  $\mathcal{T}$  , and show that we can exhibit an invariant.


Then,  $\mathbb{I} = [\![S]\!]^*$  is an invariant of S by definition of  $[\![.]\!]^*$ , and it is stronger than  $\mathcal{T}$ .

#### Caveat:

- $\bullet \ [\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^{\propto}$  is most likely not a very easy to express invariant
- it is just a convenient completeness argument
- so, completeness does not mean the proof is easy !

# Example

We consider the proof that the program below computes the sum of the elements of an array, i.e., when the exit is reached,  $s = \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} t[k]$ :



Principle of the proof:

- for each program point l, we have a local invariant I<sub>l</sub> (denoted by a logical formula instead of a set of states in the figure)
- the global **invariant** I is defined by:

 $\mathbb{I} = \{ \langle (\ell_0, m_0), \dots, (\ell_n, m_n) \rangle \mid \\ \forall n, \ m_n \in \mathbb{I}_{\ell_n} \}$ 

### Outline

### Liveness properties

#### Informal definition: liveness properties

A liveness property is a property which specifies that some (good) behavior **will eventually occur**.

- Termination is a liveness property "good behavior": reaching a blocking state (no more transition available)
- "State a will eventually be reached by all execution" is a liveness property "good behavior": reaching state a
- The absence of runtime errors is not a liveness property

As for safety properties, we intend to provide a **formal definition** of liveness.

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## Intuition towards a formal definition

#### How to refute a liveness property ?

- We consider liveness property  $\mathcal{T}$  (think  $\mathcal{T}$  is termination)
- ullet We assume  ${\mathcal S}$  does **not** satisfy liveness property  ${\mathcal T}$
- Thus, there exists a counter-example trace  $\sigma \in \llbracket S \rrbracket \setminus T$ ;
- Let us assume  $\sigma$  is actually finite... the definition of liveness says some (good) behavior should eventually occur:
  - ▶ how do we know that  $\sigma$  cannot be extended into a trace  $\sigma \cdot \sigma'$  that will satisfy this behavior ?
  - maybe that after a few more computation steps, σ will reach a blocking state...

# Intuition towards a formal definition

To refute a liveness property, we need to look at infinite traces.

Example: if we run a program, and do not see it return...

- should we do Ctrl+C and conclude it does not terminate ?
- should we just wait a few more seconds minutes, hours, years ?

# Towards a formal definition: we expect any finite trace be the prefix of a trace in $\ensuremath{\mathcal{T}}$

 $\ldots$  since finite executions cannot be used to disprove  ${\cal T}$ 

### Formal definition (incomplete)

$$\mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^*$$

# Definition

### Formal definition

Operator Live is defined by  $\text{Live}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{T} \cup (\mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus \text{Safe}(\mathcal{T}))$ . Given property  $\mathcal{T}$ , the following three statements are equivalent:

(i)  $\text{Live}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{T}$ (ii)  $\text{PCI}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^*$ (iii)  $\text{Lim} \circ \text{PCI}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^{\infty}$ When they are satisfied,  $\mathcal{T}$  is said to be a liveness property

#### Example: termination

- The property is \$\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{S}^\*\$
   (i.e., there should be no infinite execution)
- Clearly, it satisfies (*ii*): PCl(*T*) = S<sup>\*</sup> thus termination indeed satisfies this definition

# Proof of equivalence

### Proof of equivalence:

### (*i*) **implies** (*ii*):

We assume that  $\text{Live}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{T}$ , i.e.,  $\mathcal{T} \cup (\mathbb{S}^{\propto} \setminus \text{Safe}(\mathcal{T})) = \mathcal{T}$ therefore,  $\mathbb{S}^{\propto} \setminus \text{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) \subseteq \mathcal{T}$ .

Let  $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}^*$ , and let us show that  $\sigma \in \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$ ; clearly,  $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}^{\propto}$ , thus:

- either  $\sigma \in \text{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) = \text{Lim}(\text{PCI}(\mathcal{T}))$ , so all its prefixes are in  $\text{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$ and  $\sigma \in \text{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$
- or  $\sigma \in \mathcal{T}$ , which implies that  $\sigma \in \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$

```
(ii) implies (iii):

If PCI(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^*, then Lim \circ PCI(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^{\infty}

(iii) implies (i):

If Lim \circ PCI(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^{\infty}, then

Live(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{T} \cup (\mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus (Lim \circ PCI(\mathcal{T}))) = \mathcal{T} \cup (\mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus \mathbb{S}^{\infty}) = \mathcal{T}
```

## Example

We assume that:

- $\mathbb{S} = \{a, b, c\}$
- T states that *b* should eventually be visited, after *a* has been visited; elements of T can be described by

 $\mathcal{T} = \mathbb{S}^* \cdot \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbb{S}^* \cdot \mathbf{b} \cdot \mathbb{S}^{\infty}$ 

Then T is a liveness property:

- let  $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}^*$ ; then  $\sigma \cdot a \cdot b \in \mathcal{T}$ , so  $\sigma \in \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$
- thus,  $\mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^*$

# A property of **Live**

#### Theorem

If  $\mathcal{T}$  is a trace property, then  $Live(\mathcal{T})$  is a liveness property (i.e., operator Live is idempotent).

**Proof:** we show that  $PCI \circ Live(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{S}^*$ , by considering  $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}^*$  and proving that  $\sigma \in PCI \circ Live(\mathcal{T})$ ; we first note that:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \mathsf{PCI} \circ \mathsf{Live}(\mathcal{T}) &=& \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T}) \cup \mathsf{PCI}(\mathbb{S}^{\propto} \setminus \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T})) \\ &=& \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T}) \cup \mathsf{PCI}(\mathbb{S}^{\propto} \setminus \mathsf{Lim} \circ \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T})) \end{array}$$

- if  $\sigma \in \mathsf{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$ , this is obvious.
- if  $\sigma \notin \mathbf{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$ , then:
  - $\sigma \notin \operatorname{Lim} \circ \operatorname{PCI}(\mathcal{T})$  by definition of the limit
  - thus,  $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus \text{Lim} \circ \text{PCl}(\mathcal{T})$
  - σ ∈ PCI(S<sup>∞</sup> \ Lim ∘ PCI(T)) as PCI is extensive when applied to sets
    of finite traces, which proves the above result

### Outline

## Termination proof with ranking function

- We consider only termination
- We consider transition system  $\mathcal{S}=(\mathbb{S},
  ightarrow,\mathbb{S}_\mathcal{I})$ , and liveness property  $\mathcal{T}$
- We seek a way of verifying that  ${\cal S}$  satisfies termination, i.e., that  $[\![{\cal S}]\!]^{\propto}\subseteq \mathbb{S}^*$

### Definition: ranking function

A ranking function is a function  $\phi : \mathbb{S} \to E$  where:


- $(E, \sqsubseteq)$  is a well-founded ordering
- $\forall s_0, s_1 \in \mathbb{S}, \ s_0 \to s_1 \Longrightarrow \phi(s_1) \sqsubset \phi(s_0)$

#### Theorem

If  ${\mathcal S}$  has a ranking function  $\phi,$  it satisfies termination.

### Example

#### We consider the termination of the array sum program:



#### **Ranking function:**

$$\begin{split} \phi: & \mathbb{S} & \longrightarrow & \mathbb{N} \\ & (f_0, m) & \longmapsto & 3 \cdot n + 6 \\ & (f_1, m) & \longmapsto & 3 \cdot n + 5 \\ & (f_2, m) & \longmapsto & 3 \cdot n + 4 \\ & (f_3, m) & \longmapsto & 3 \cdot (n - m(\texttt{i})) + 3 \\ & (f_4, m) & \longmapsto & 3 \cdot (n - m(\texttt{i})) + 2 \\ & (f_5, m) & \longmapsto & 3 \cdot (n - m(\texttt{i})) + 4 \\ & (f_6, m) & \longmapsto & 0 \end{split}$$

# Proof by variance

- We consider transition system  $S = (S, \rightarrow, S_I)$ , and liveness property T; infinite traces semantics is the greatest fixpoint of  $F_{\omega}$ .
- We seek a way of verifying that S satisfies  $\mathcal{T}$ , i.e., that  $[\![S]\!]^{\propto} \subseteq \mathcal{T}$

### Principle of variance proofs

Let  $(\mathbb{I}_n)_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ ,  $\mathbb{I}_{\omega}$  be elements of  $\mathbb{S}^{\infty}$ ; these are said to form a variance proof of  $\mathcal{T}$  if and only if:

- $\mathbb{S}^{\omega} \subseteq \mathbb{I}_0$
- for all  $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, \omega\}$ ,  $\forall s \in \mathbb{S}, \ \langle s 
  angle \in \mathbb{I}_k$
- for all  $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, \omega\}$ , there exists l < k such that  $F_{\omega}(\mathbb{I}_l) \subseteq \mathbb{I}_k$
- $\mathbb{I}_{\omega} \subseteq \mathcal{T}$

Proofs of soundness and completeness: exercise, similar to the previous proof but using the definition of  $[\![\mathcal{S}]\!]^{\propto}$  instead

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**Traces Properties** 

## Outline

# The decomposition theorem

#### Theorem

Let  $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathbb{S}^{\alpha}$ ; it can be decomposed into the conjunction of safety property Safe( $\mathcal{T}$ ) and liveness property Live( $\mathcal{T}$ ):

 $\mathcal{T} = \text{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) \cap \text{Live}(\mathcal{T})$ 

- Reading: Recognizing Safety and Liveness. Bowen Alpern and Fred B. Schneider. In Distributed Computing, Springer, 1987.
- Consequence of this result: the proof of any trace property can be decomposed into
  - a proof of safety
  - a proof of liveness

## Proof

- Safety part: Safe is idempotent, so Safe(T) is a safety property.
- Liveness part:

Live is idempotent, so  $Live(\mathcal{T})$  is a liveness property.

• Decomposition:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) \cap \mathsf{Live}(\mathcal{T}) &=& \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) \cap (\mathcal{T} \cup \mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T})) \\ &=& \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) \cap \mathcal{T} \\ && \cup \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) \cap (\mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus \mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T})) \\ &=& \mathcal{T} \cup \emptyset \\ &=& \mathcal{T} \end{array}$$

Decomposition of trace properties

# Example: verification of total correctness

- i, s integer variables t integer array of length n*l*<sub>0</sub> : s = 0: *h* : i = 0: **while**(i < n){  $l_2$ : l3 : s = s + t[i];(a : i = i + 1: l5 : } 6: . . .
- Property to prove: total correctness
  - the program terminates
  - and it computes the sum of the elements in the array


# Application of the decomposition principle

Conjunction of two proofs:

- Proved with a ranking function
- Proved with local invariants

# Safety and Liveness Decomposition Example

We consider a very simple greatest common divider code function:




### Specification

When applied to positive integers, function f should always return their GCD.

# Safety and Liveness Decomposition Example

We consider a very simple greatest common divider code function:



### Specification

When applied to positive integers, function f should always return their GCD.

### Safety part


For all trace starting with positive inputs, a **conjunction of two properties**:

- no runtime errors
- the value of b is the GCD

Liveness part

Termination, on all traces starting with positive inputs

## The Zoo of semantic properties: current status



- Safety: if wrong, can be refuted with a finite trace proof done by invariance
- Liveness: if wrong, has to be refuted with an infinite trace proof done by variance

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**Traces Properties** 

## Outline

# Notion of specification language

- Ultimately, we would like to verify or compute properties
- So far, we simply describe properties with sets of executions or worse, with English / French / ... statements
- Ideally, we would prefer to use a mathematical language for that
  - to gain in concision, avoid ambiguity
  - ► to define sets of properties to consider, fix the form of inputs for verification tools...

### Definition: specification language

A specification language is a set of terms  $\mathbb{L}$  with an interpretation function (or semantics)

$$\llbracket . \rrbracket : \mathbb{L} \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S}^{\propto})$$
 (resp.,  $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S})$ )

• We are now going to consider specification languages for states, for traces...

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# A State specification language

A first example of a (simple) specification language:

### A state specification language

 $\bullet$  Syntax: we let terms of  $\mathbb{L}_{\mathbb{S}}$  be defined by:

$$p \in \mathbb{L}_{\mathbb{S}} ::= \mathbb{Q}l \mid \mathbf{x} < \mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x} < n \mid \neg p' \mid p' \land p'' \mid \Omega$$

• Semantics:  $\llbracket p \rrbracket_{s} \subseteq \mathbb{S}_{\Omega}$  is defined by

**Exercise:** add =, 
$$\lor$$
,  $\Longrightarrow$ ...

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## State properties: examples

### Unreachability of control state $l_0$ :

- specification:  $\Omega \vee \neg @l_0$
- property:  $\llbracket \Omega \lor \neg @l_0 \rrbracket_s = \mathbb{S}_\Omega \setminus \{(l_0, m) \mid m \in \mathbb{M}\}$

### Absence of runtime errors:

- specification: ¬Ω
- property:  $[\![\neg\Omega]\!]_{\mathtt{s}} = \mathbb{S}_{\Omega} \setminus \{\Omega\} = \mathbb{S}$

### Intermittent invariant:

- principle: attach a local invariant to each control state
- example:

## Propositional temporal logic: syntax

We now consider the specification of trace properties

- Temporal logic: specification of properties in terms of events that occur at distinct times in the execution (hence, the name "temporal")
- There are many instances of temporal logic
- We study a simple one: Pnueli's Propositional Temporal Logic

### Definition: syntax of PTL (Propositional Temporal Logic)

Properties over traces are defined as terms of the form

## Propositional temporal logic: semantics

The semantics of a temporal property is a set of traces, and it is defined by induction over the syntax:

Semantics of Propositional Temporal Logic formulae

$$\begin{split} \llbracket p \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} &= \{ s \cdot \sigma \mid s \in \llbracket p \rrbracket_{\mathbf{s}} \wedge \sigma \in \mathbb{S}^{\infty} \} \\ \llbracket t_0 \lor t_1 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} &= \llbracket t_0 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} \cup \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} \\ \llbracket \neg t_0 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} &= \mathbb{S}^{\infty} \setminus \llbracket t_0 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} \\ \llbracket \bigcirc t_0 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} &= \{ s \cdot \sigma \mid s \in \mathbb{S} \wedge \sigma \in \llbracket t_0 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} \} \\ \llbracket t_0 \mathfrak{U} \mathfrak{t}_1 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} &= \{ \sigma \in \mathbb{S}^{\infty} \mid \exists n \in \mathbb{N}, \forall i < n, \sigma_i \rrbracket \in \llbracket t_0 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} \wedge \sigma_n \rrbracket \in \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_{\mathbf{t}} \} \end{split}$$

Temporal logic operators as syntactic sugar

Many useful operators can be added:

• Boolean constants:

true ::= 
$$(x < 0) \lor \neg (x < 0)$$
  
false ::=  $\neg$ true

#### • Sometime:

 $\Diamond t ::= \operatorname{true} \mathfrak{U} t$ 

intuition: there exists a rank n at which t holds

• Always:

$$\Box t ::= \neg(\Diamond(\neg t))$$

intuition: there is no rank at which the negation of t holds

**Exercise:** what do  $\Diamond \Box t$  and  $\Box \Diamond t$  mean ?

## Propositional temporal logic: examples

We consider the program below:

#### Examples of properties:

• "when  $l_4$  is reached, x is positive"

$$\Box$$
(@ $l_4 \Longrightarrow x \ge 0$ )

• "if the value read at point  $\it \ell_0$  is negative, and when  $\it \ell_6$  is reached, x is equal to 0"

$$\Box\left(\left( @ \ell_1 \land x < 0 \right) \Longrightarrow \Box ( @ \ell_6 \Longrightarrow x = 0 ) \right)$$

Beyond safety and liveness

## Outline

Security properties

We now consider other interesting properties of programs, and show that they do not all reduce to trace properties

#### Security

- Collects many kinds of properties
- So we consider just one:

an unauthorized observer should not be able to guess anything about private information by looking at public information

- Example: another user should not be able to guess the content of an email sent to you
- We need to formalize this property

# A few definitions

#### **Assumptions:**

- We let  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbb{S}, 
  ightarrow, \mathbb{S}_\mathcal{I})$  be a transition system
- States are of the form  $(l, m) \in \mathbb{L} \times \mathbb{M}$
- $\bullet\,$  Memory states are of the form  $\mathbb{X}\to\mathbb{V}$
- We let  $\ell, \ell' \in \mathbb{L}$  (program entry and exit) and  $x, x' \in \mathbb{X}$  (private and public variables)

#### Security property we are looking at

Observing the value of x' at  $\ell'$  gives no information on the value of x at  $\ell$ 

## A few examples

A secure program (no information flow, no way to guess x):

$$\begin{array}{ll} l : & \mathbf{x}' = 84; \\ l' : & \dots \end{array}$$

An insecure program (explicit information flow, x' gives a lot of information about x, so that we can simply recompute it):

$$\begin{array}{ll} l : & \mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{x} - 2; \\ l' : & \dots \end{array}$$

An insecure program (implicit information flow, through a test):

$$\ell$$
: if  $(x < 0) \{x' = 0; \}$   
 $\ell'$ : ...

#### How to characterize information flow in the semantic level ?

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## Non-interference

We consider the **transformer**  $\Phi$  defined by:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \Phi: & \mathbb{M} & \longrightarrow & \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{M}) \\ & m & \longmapsto & \{m' \in \mathbb{M} \mid \exists \sigma = \langle (\ell, m), \dots, (\ell', m') \rangle \in \llbracket \mathcal{S} \rrbracket \end{array}$$

### Definition: non-interference

There is **no interference** between (l, x) and (l', x') and we write  $(l', x') \not \rightarrow (l, x)$  if and only if the following property holds:

$$\forall m \in \mathbb{M}, \forall v_0, v_1 \in \mathbb{V}, \\ \{m'(\mathbf{x}') \mid m' \in \Phi(m[\mathbf{x} \leftarrow v_0])\} = \{m'(\mathbf{x}') \mid m' \in \Phi(m[\mathbf{x} \leftarrow v_1])\}$$

### Intuition:

- if two observations at point  $\ell$  differ only in the value of x, there is no difference in observation of x' at  $\ell'$
- in other words, observing x' at  $\ell'$  (even on many executions) gives no information about the value of x at point  $\ell$ ...

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**Traces** Properties

## Non-interference is not a trace property

- We assume  $\mathbb{V} = \{0, 1\}$  and  $\mathbb{X} = \{x, x'\}$  (store *m* is defined by the pair (m(x), m(x')), and denoted by it)
- We assume L = {l, l'} and consider two systems such that all transitions are of the form (l, m) → (l', m')
  - (i.e., system S is isomorphic to its transformer  $\Phi[S]$ )

$\Phi[\mathcal{S}_0]$ :	(0,0)	$\mapsto$	$\mathbb{M}$	$\Phi[\mathcal{S}_1]$ :	(0,0)	$\mapsto$	$\mathbb{M}$
	(0,1)	$\mapsto$	$\mathbb{M}$		(0, 1)	$\mapsto$	$\mathbb{M}$
	(1, 0)	$\mapsto$	$\mathbb{M}$		(1, 0)	$\mapsto$	$\{(1,1)\}$
	(1, 1)	$\mapsto$	$\mathbb{M}$		(1, 1)	$\mapsto$	$\{(1,1)\}$

- $\mathcal{S}_1$  has fewer behaviors than  $\mathcal{S}_0 \text{: } [\![\mathcal{S}_1]\!]^* \subset [\![\mathcal{S}_0]\!]^*$
- $\mathcal{S}_0$  has the non-interference property, but  $\mathcal{S}_1$  does not
- If non interference was a trace property,  $S_1$  should have it (monotony)

#### Thus, the non interference property is not a trace property

## Dependence properties

### Dependence property

- Many notions of dependences
- So we consider just one:

what inputs may have an impact on the observation of a given output

### • Applications:

- reverse engineering: understand how an input gets computed
- **slicing:** extract the fragment of a program that is relevant to a result
- This corresponds to the negation of non-interference

# Interference

#### Definition: interference

There is **interference** between  $(l, \mathbf{x})$  and  $(l', \mathbf{x}')$  and we write  $(l', \mathbf{x}') \rightsquigarrow (l, \mathbf{x})$  if and only if the following property holds:

$$\exists m \in \mathbb{M}, \exists v_0, v_1 \in \mathbb{V}, \\ \{m'(\mathbf{x}') \mid m' \in \Phi(m[\mathbf{x} \leftarrow v_0])\} \neq \{m'(\mathbf{x}') \mid m' \in \Phi(m[\mathbf{x} \leftarrow v_1])\}$$

- This expresses that there is at least one case, where the value of x at  $\ell$  has an impact on that of x' at  $\ell'$
- It may not hold even if the computation of x' reads x:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \ell : & \mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{0} \star \mathbf{x}; \\ \ell' : & \dots \end{array}$$

### Interference is not a trace property

- We assume  $\mathbb{V} = \{0, 1\}$  and  $\mathbb{X} = \{x, x'\}$  (store *m* is defined by the pair (m(x), m(x')), and denoted by it)
- We assume L = {l, l'} and consider two systems such that all transitions are of the form (l, m) → (l', m') (i.e., system S is isomorphic to its transformer Φ[S])
- $\mathcal{S}_1$  has fewer behavior than  $\mathcal{S}_0 \text{: } [\![\mathcal{S}_1]\!]^* \subset [\![\mathcal{S}_0]\!]^*$
- $\bullet \ \mathcal{S}_0$  has the interference property, but  $\mathcal{S}_1$  does not
- If interference was a trace property,  $S_1$  should have it (monotony)

#### Thus, the interference property is not a trace property

## Hyperproperties

### Conclusion:

• The absence of interference between (l, x) and (l', x') is not a trace property:

we cannot describe as the set of programs the semantics of which is included into a given set of traces

 It can however be described by a set of sets of traces: we simply collect the set of program semantics that satisfy the property

This is what we call a hyperproperty:

### Hyperproperties

- Trace hyperproperties are described by sets of sets of executions
- Trace properties are described by sets of executions

**2-safety**: to disprove the absence of interference (i.e., to show there exists an interference), we simply need to exhibit **two finite traces** 

Conclusion

## Outline

## The Zoo of semantic properties

Sets of sets of executions non-interference, dependency	
Trace properties total correctness	
Safety properties never reach $s_0$ before $s_1$	Liveness properties termination
State properties absence or runtime errors partial correctness	

## Summary

To sum-up:

- Trace properties allow to express a large range of program properties
- Safety = absence of bad behaviors
- Liveness = existence of good behaviors
- Trace properties can be **decomposed** as conjunctions of safety and liveness properties, with **dedicated proof methods**
- Some interesting properties are **not trace properties** security properties are *sets of sets of executions*
- Notion of specification languages to describe program properties