

SMT-based Model Checking of Transition Systems

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3 October 2023

Specifying Properties

SMT Solver Basics

Model Checking

Bounded Model Checking and k -induction

Model Checking Lustre Programs: Kind 2

Two types of properties

Safety property: “Something bad never happens”

I.e., a property is invariant and true in any accessible state. E.g.:

- “The variable *temp* is always less than 101.”
- “The variable *temp* never increases by more than 5 in a single step.”

Liveness property: “Something good eventually happens.”

I.e., every execution will reach a state where the property holds.

- “If *heat* is on, *temp* eventually exceeds 10.”

Remark:


“If *heat* is on, *temp* exceeds 10 within 5 minutes.” is a safety property.

And remember that liveness properties are likely to be the least important part of your specification. You will probably not lose much if you simply omit them.

Synchronous Observers

- if $y = F(x)$, we write $ok = P(x, y)$ for the property relating x and y
- and $assert(H(x, y))$ to states an hypothesis on the environment.

```
node check(x:t) returns (ok:bool);  
let  
  assert H(x,y);  
  y = F(x);  
  ok = P(x,y);  
tel;
```



If *assert* remains indefinitely true then *ok* remains indefinitely true
 $always(assert) \Rightarrow always(ok)$.

Any safety property can be expressed as a Lustre program. No need to introduce a temporal logic in the language

[Halbwachs, Lagnier, and Raymond (1993): Synchronous observers and the verification of reactive systems] [Halbwachs, Lagnier, and Ratel (1992): Programming and verifying real-time systems by means of the synchronous data-flow language LUSTRE];

Temporal properties are regular Lustre programs

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SAT solvers

Given a boolean formula b with free variables x_1, \dots, x_n from propositional logic, find a valuation $V : \{x_1, \dots, x_n\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $V(b) = 1$.

- initial algorithm by Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL); various heuristics. Generalization of SAT to QBF (Quantified Boolean Formula)
- a very active/competitive research/industrial topic (see <http://www.satlive.org/>)
- Now, more interest for SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theory) for first-order logic (quantified formula + interpreted/non-interpreted functions)
- Close interaction between a SAT solver and ad-hoc solvers (e.g., simplex method for linear arithmetic constraints)

SMT: Satisfiability Modulo Theories

- SAT = Satisfiability (of Boolean formulas)
- SMT = SAT Modulo Theories
- **Input**: set of constraints (interpreted in a theory)
- **Output**: are the constraints satisfiable?
 - » **sat** and a *model* (an assignment to free variables that satisfies the constraints)
 - » **unsat**: no model exists
 - » **unknown**: could not determine due to resource limits, incompleteness, etcetera.
- Different solvers:
 - » z3 (see also: docs and version in browser)
 - » Alt-Ergo
 - » CVC5
 - » Yices
- Today we will use Z3 and SMT-LIB.

- SMT-LIB defines a common language for interfacing with SMT solvers

[Barrett, Fontaine, and Tinelli (2021):
The SMT-LIB Standard: Version 2.6] <https://smtlib.cs.uiowa.edu/>

- Developed to facilitate research and development in SMT
(in particular, by providing an extensive benchmarking library)
- Lisp-like syntax for
 - » a many-sorted first-order logic with equality
 - » solver commands
 - » declaring theory interfaces
- Solvers like Z3 also provide programmatic interfaces (e.g., Python, OCaml)

Satisfiability: true for some assignment

A `.smt2` file is a sequence of commands. (Fig. 3.6, p. 45 [Barrett, Fontaine, and Tinelli (2021): The SMT-LIB Standard: Version 2.6])

```
(declare-fun a () Bool)      ; uninterpreted function with zero arguments
(declare-const b Bool)      ; similar effect, easier to read

(assert (or a b))
(assert (= a false))

(echo "Is (a or b) and (a = false) satisfiable?")
(check-sat)
(get-model)
```

Try `z3 a_or_b.smt2...`

`z3` looks for a model (an interpretation of the functions) that satisfies all the constraints.

Validity: true for all assignments

What about **proving** one of De Morgan's laws? $\neg(P \vee Q) \Leftrightarrow \neg P \wedge \neg Q$

```
(declare-const P Bool)
```

```
(declare-const Q Bool)
```

```
(assert (= (not (or P Q)) (and (not P) (not Q))))
```

```
(check-sat)
```

z3 says sat. Have we proved the law?

Validity: true for all assignments

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Now z3 says unsat. Have we proved the law?

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(check-sat)
```

Now z3 says unsat. Have we proved the law?

Yes. There are no values for P and Q such that the law is not true.

Satisfiability and Validity

$$\text{satisfiable}(b) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \exists V, V(b) = 1$$

$$\text{valid}(b) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall V, V(b) = 1$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{valid}(b) &= \neg\neg(\forall V, V(b) = 1) \\ &= \neg(\exists V, \neg(V(b) = 1)) \\ &= \neg\text{satisfiable}(\neg b)\end{aligned}$$

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To determine $\text{valid}(P \wedge Q \Rightarrow R)$, ask $\text{satisfiable}(P \wedge Q \wedge \neg R)$ and **require unsat**.

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To determine $\text{valid}(P \wedge Q \Rightarrow R)$, ask $\text{satisfiable}(P \wedge Q \wedge \neg R)$ and **require unsat**.

$$(A \Rightarrow B \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg A \vee B)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{valid}(P \wedge Q \Rightarrow R) &= \neg\text{satisfiable}(\neg(\neg(P \wedge Q) \vee R)) \\ &= \neg\text{satisfiable}((P \wedge Q) \wedge \neg R)\end{aligned}$$

If sat, try **(get-model)**. Can also use **(check-sat-assuming ((and P Q) R))**.

Interacting with the solver

- Typical to run several (check-sat) commands in series.
- Use (push) and (pop) to manage the environment of functions and assertions.

```
(declare-const P Bool)
(declare-const Q Bool)

(push)
(assert (not (= (not (or P Q)) (and (not P) (not Q)))))
(export-assertion "Checking: !(P or Q) <=> !P and !Q (unsat = valid)")
(check-sat)
(pop)
```

```
(push)
(assert (not (= (not (and P Q)) (or (not P) (not Q)))))
(export-assertion "Checking: !(P and Q) <=> !P or !Q (unsat = valid)")
(check-sat)
(pop)
```

- Usually interact with the solver using a programmatic interface. Query results determine future queries.
- Solvers are designed to work incrementally.

Functions

- Functions declared with `declare-fun` are uninterpreted.
- Functions from theories, like `xor`, are interpreted.

See <https://smtlib.cs.uiowa.edu/theories-Core.shtml>

```
(declare-fun f (Bool Bool) Bool)
(assert (and (= (f false false) false)
             (= (f false true) true)
             (= (f true false) true)
             (= (f true true) false)))
```

```
(declare-const a Bool)
(declare-const b Bool)
(assert (not (= (f a b) (xor a b))))
(check-sat)
```

Functions

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```
(declare-fun f (Bool Bool) Bool)
(assert (and (= (f false false) false)
             (= (f false true) true)
             (= (f true false) true)
             (= (f true true) false)))
```

```
(declare-const a Bool)
(declare-const b Bool)
(assert (not (= (f a b) (xor a b))))
(check-sat)
```

- Can also define functions:

```
(define-fun f ((x Bool) (y Bool)) Bool (xor x y))
```

Terms and Formulas

```
 $\langle qual\_identifier \rangle ::= \langle identifier \rangle \mid ( \text{as } \langle identifier \rangle \langle sort \rangle )$   
 $\langle var\_binding \rangle ::= ( \langle symbol \rangle \langle term \rangle )$   
 $\langle sorted\_var \rangle ::= ( \langle symbol \rangle \langle sort \rangle )$   
 $\langle pattern \rangle ::= \langle symbol \rangle \mid ( \langle symbol \rangle \langle symbol \rangle^+ )$   
 $\langle match\_case \rangle ::= ( \langle pattern \rangle \langle term \rangle )$   
 $\langle term \rangle ::= \langle spec\_constant \rangle$   
          |  $\langle qual\_identifier \rangle$   
          |  $( \langle qual\_identifier \rangle \langle term \rangle^+ )$   
          |  $( \text{let } ( \langle var\_binding \rangle^+ ) \langle term \rangle )$   
          |  $( \text{forall } ( \langle sorted\_var \rangle^+ ) \langle term \rangle )$   
          |  $( \text{exists } ( \langle sorted\_var \rangle^+ ) \langle term \rangle )$   
          |  $( \text{match } \langle term \rangle ( \langle match\_case \rangle^+ ) )$   
          |  $( ! \langle term \rangle \langle attribute \rangle^+ )$ 
```

(p. 27, [Barrett, Fontaine, and Tinelli (2021):
The SMT-LIB Standard: Version 2.6])

- Satisfiability without quantifiers is NP-Complete
- With quantifiers it is undecidable.
- The effectiveness of *quantifier elimination* depends on the shape of formulas.
- Take care with your encodings!

Exercise: model checking 1-bit adders

How to be sure that `full_add` and `full_add_h` are equivalent?

$$\forall a, b, c : \text{bool}. \text{full_add}(a, b, c) = \text{full_add_h}(a, b, c)$$

Implement the following interface so that it returns `true` exactly when two full adder implementations return the same value for the same inputs.

```
-- file fulladder.lus
node equivalence(a,b,c:bool) returns (ok:bool);
  var o1, c1, o2, c2: bool;
  let
    (o1, c1) = full_add(a,b,c);
    (o2, c2) = full_add_h(a,b,c);
    ok = (o1 = o2) and (c1 = c2);
  tel;
```

Check equivalence with `z3` and `SMT-LIB!`

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Model Checking: (extremely) partial overview

1981 Explicit state enumeration

[E. M. Clarke and Emerson (1981): Design and Synthesis of Synchronization Skeletons using Branching Time Temporal Logic]

[Queille and Sifakis (1982): Specification and Verification of Concurrent Systems in CESAR]

1992 BDD-based algorithms

[Burch, E. Clarke, McMillan, Dill, and Hwang (1992): Symbolic Model Checking: 10^{20} States and Beyond]

1999 Bounded Model Checking

[Biere, Cimatti, E. Clarke, and Zhu (1999): Symbolic Model Checking without BDDs]

2000 K-induction

[Sheeran, Singh, and Stålmarck (2000): Checking Safety Properties Using Induction and a SAT-Solver]

2003 Interpolation-based

[McMillan (2003): Interpolation and SAT-based model checking]

2011 IC3 Algorithm

[Bradley (2011): SAT-Based Model Checking without Unrolling]

- Lesar: based on BDDs

[Halbwachs, Lagnier, and Ratel (1992): Programming and verifying real-time systems by means of the synchronous data-flow language LUSTRE]

- Kind 2: based on SMT/k-induction/IC3

[Champion, Mepsout, Stickse, and Tinelli (2016): The Kind 2 Model Checker]

- DV of (Ansys) Scade based on Prover SAT/k-induction


Model checking: forward method

The set of reachable states never intersects the set of error states




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
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
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Model checking: forward method

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Model checking: backward method

The states that can reach an error state do not include the initial states



init



Error


Model checking: backward method

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
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


Model checking: backward method

The states that can reach an error state do not include the initial states



Verifying safety properties of reactive systems



- Published in 1995
[Manna and Pnueli (1995): Temporal Verification of Reactive Systems: Safety]
- Companion to
[Manna and Pnueli (1992): The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems]
- Builds on Floyd's inductive invariants
- Temporal logic formulas as 'proof patterns'

The basic 'pattern' for showing invariance

For an assertion φ ,

$$\text{B1. } \Theta \rightarrow \varphi$$

$$\text{B2. } \frac{\{\varphi\} \mathcal{T} \{\varphi\}}{\square \varphi}$$

$$\square \varphi$$

Fig. 1.1. Rule INV-B (basic invariance).

The *verification condition* (or *proof obligation*) of φ and ψ , relative to transition τ , is given by the state formula

$$\rho_{\tau} \wedge \varphi \rightarrow \psi'.$$

We adopt the notation

$$\{\varphi\} \tau \{\psi\}$$

as an abbreviation for this verification condition.

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$$\square \varphi$$

Fig. 1.1. Rule INV-B (basic invariance).

show property of initial states

then for every transition:

- assume the property of the pre state (φ)
- show the property of the post state (φ')

The *verification condition* (or *proof obligation*) of φ and ψ , relative to transition τ , is given by the state formula

$$\rho_{\tau} \wedge \varphi \rightarrow \psi'$$

We adopt the notation

$$\{\varphi\} \tau \{\psi\}$$

as an abbreviation for this verification condition.

Exercise: proving invariance of a simple transition system

- Consider a simple transition system with two integer state variables x and y :
 $init(x, y) := (x = 1) \wedge (y = 1)$
 $trans(x, y, x', y') := (x' = x + 1) \wedge (y' = y + x)$
- And the safety property $prop(x, y) = y \geq 1$.
- Encode this system and use Z3 to prove that the property is invariant.

General rule for showing invariance

For assertions φ , p ,

$$\text{I1. } \varphi \rightarrow p$$

$$\text{I2. } \Theta \rightarrow \varphi$$

$$\text{I3. } \{\varphi\} \mathcal{T} \{\varphi\}$$

$$\square p$$

Fig. 1.5. Rule INV (general invariance).

Not all *invariants* are *inductive invariants*.

Inductive invariants and model checking

- This idea works for manual/interactive proof.
- What about automatic proof (model checking)?
- (BTW, note that SMT solvers do not themselves do induction.)

- k-induction: strengthen P with information from last k steps.
[Sheeran, Singh, and Stålmarck (2000): Checking Safety Properties
Using Induction and a SAT-Solver]
- IC3: automate 'discovery' of strengthenings
[Bradley (2011): SAT-Based Model Checking without Unrolling]

- Generic algorithms
 - » work with SAT solvers on boolean transition systems, or
 - » with SMT solvers on richer transition systems.
 - » avoid or minimize quantifiers, look for efficient encodings

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
k -induction

- Iterate BMC. Explained as a succession of algorithms.

[Sheeran, Singh, and Stålmarck (2000): Checking Safety Properties Using Induction and a SAT-Solver]

- Focus completely on invariant properties ($AG f$)

```
node ring_counter()  
returns (a, b, c : bool);  
let  
  a = true fby c;  
  b = false fby a;  
  c = false fby b;  
tel
```



k -induction: Algorithm 1

Algorithm 1 First algorithm to check if system is P -safe

$i=0$

while True **do**

if not $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}))$ or not $\text{Sat}((\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$ **then**
 return True

end if

if $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{path}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$ **then**

 return Trace $c_{[0..i]}$

end if

$i = i + 1$

end while

$$\text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < n} T(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

$$\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \wedge \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < j \leq n} s_i \neq s_j$$

- Check for existence of loop-free path.
- Check for existence of bad path.

The restriction to loop-free paths is necessary for completeness.

k -induction: Algorithm 1

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init

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Error

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
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
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
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    return True  
  end if  
  if  $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{path}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$  then  
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$   
  end if  
   $i = i + 1$   
end while
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
$i = i + 1$

end while

$$\text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < n} T(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

$$\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \wedge \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < j \leq n} s_i \neq s_j$$

The restriction to loop-free paths is necessary for completeness.



k-induction: Algorithm 2

Algorithm 1 First algorithm to check if system is P -safe

```
 $i=0$   
while True do  
  if not  $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}))$  or not  $\text{Sat}((\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$  then  
    return True  
  end if  
  if  $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{path}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$  then  
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$   
  end if  
   $i = i + 1$   
end while
```

$$\text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < n} T(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

$$\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \wedge \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < j \leq n} s_i \neq s_j$$

Algorithm 2 An improved algorithm to check if system is P -safe

```
 $i=0$   
while True do  
  if not  $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{all}.\neg I(s_{[1..i]}) \wedge \text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}))$   
  or not  $\text{Sat}((\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \text{all}.P(s_{[0..(i-1)]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$  then  
    return True  
  end if  
  if  $\text{Sat}(I(s_0) \wedge \text{path}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$  then  
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$   
  end if  
   $i = i + 1$   
end while
```

- Exclude forward paths that loop back through initial states.
- Exclude backward paths that loop back through error states.
- I.e., tighten the termination conditions.

k-induction: Algorithm 3

Algorithm 2 An improved algorithm to check if system is P -safe

```
 $i=0$   
while True do  
  if not Sat( $I(s_0) \wedge \text{all}.\neg I(s_{[1..i]}) \wedge \text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]})$ )  
  or not Sat( $(\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \text{all}.P(s_{[0..(i-1)]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i))$ ) then  
    return True  
  end if  
  if Sat( $I(s_0) \wedge \text{path}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_i)$ ) then  
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$   
  end if  
   $i = i + 1$   
end while
```

Algorithm 3 An algorithm that need not iterate from 0

```
 $i =$  some constant which can be greater than zero  
while True do  
  if Sat( $I(s_0) \wedge \text{path}(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg \text{all}.P(s_{[0..i]})$ ) then  
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$   
  end if  
  if not Sat( $I(s_0) \wedge \text{all}.\neg I(s_{[1..(i+1)]}) \wedge \text{loopFree}(s_{[0..(i+1)]})$ )  
  or not Sat( $(\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..(i+1)]}) \wedge \text{all}.P(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_{i+1}))$ ) then  
    return True  
  end if  
   $i = i + 1$   
end while
```

$$\text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < n} T(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

$$\text{loopFree}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \text{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \wedge \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < j \leq n} s_i \neq s_j$$

- Start an any i
- Swap order of checks (ifs)
- Check proposition along entire path:
 $\forall_{0 \leq j \leq i}, P(s_j)$
- Extend loop-free check to $i + 1$

k-induction: Algorithm 4

Algorithm 3 An algorithm that need not iterate from 0

```
i = some constant which can be greater than zero
while True do
  if Sat( $I(s_0) \wedge path(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg all.P(s_{[0..i]})$ ) then
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$ 
  end if
  if not Sat( $I(s_0) \wedge all.\neg I(s_{[1..(i+1)]}) \wedge loopFree(s_{[0..(i+1)]})$ )
  or not Sat( $(loopFree(s_{[0..(i+1)]}) \wedge all.P(s_{[0..i]}) \wedge \neg P(s_{i+1}))$ ) then
    return True
  end if
  i = i + 1
end while
```

Algorithm 4 A forwards version of the algorithm

```
i = some constant which can be greater than zero
while True do
  if Sat( $\neg(I(s_0) \wedge path(s_{[0..i]}) \rightarrow all.P(s_{[0..i]}))$ ) then
    return Trace  $c_{[0..i]}$ 
  end if
  if Taut( $\neg I(s_0) \leftarrow all.\neg I(s_{[1..(i+1)]}) \wedge loopFree(s_{[0..(i+1)]})$ )
  or Taut( $(loopFree(s_{[0..(i+1)]}) \wedge all.P(s_{[0..i]}) \rightarrow P(s_{i+1}))$ ) then
    return True
  end if
  i = i + 1
end while
```

$$path(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < n} T(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

$$loopFree(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} path(s_{[0..n]}) \wedge \bigwedge_{0 \leq i < j \leq n} s_i \neq s_j$$

- Reformulate checks as implications
- The first check is the base case of the induction.
- The second is the transition case, and also a check that a loop-free path of length i exists.

k -induction and completeness

- The algorithm is complete for finite transition systems.
- Diameter = length of the longest shortest path in transition system.

$$\mathit{shortest}(s_{[0..n]}) \hat{=} \mathit{path}(s_{[0..n]}) \wedge \neg\left(\bigvee_{0 \leq i < n} \mathit{path}_i(s_0, s_n)\right)$$

- Two extra algorithms that only consider shortest paths, but they require quantifier elimination.

Specifying Properties

SMT Solver Basics

Model Checking

Bounded Model Checking and k -induction

Model Checking Lustre Programs: Kind 2

Model checking Lustre programs: Kind 2

- <http://kind2-mc.github.io/kind2/> (or use web interface: <http://kind.cs.uiowa.edu:8080/app/>)
- SMT-based Model Checker for Lustre: BMC, k-induction, IC3, ...
- Specify properties to check as comments:

```
--%PROPERTY ok;
```

```
> kind2 toggles.lus
```

```
kind2 v1.1.0-214-g00b3d21d
```

```
=====
```

```
Analyzing compare
```

```
  with First top: "compare"
```

```
    subsystems
```

```
      | concrete: toggle2, toggle1
```

```
<Success> Property ok is valid by inductive step after 0.164s.
```

```
-----
```

```
Summary of properties:
```

```
-----
```

```
ok: valid (at 1)
```

```
=====
```

```
> kind2 --enable BMC --enable IND --lus_main compare toggles.lus
```

- Consider integers (not machine words)
- and infinite-precision rationals (not floating-point)
- Optimize existing techniques for Lustre programs and features of modern SMT solvers.

- Represent streams as uninterpreted functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \tau$

- Examples:

$$x = y + z \quad \forall n : \mathbb{N}, x(n) = y(n) + z(n)$$

$$x = y \text{ -> } y + \text{pre } z \quad \forall n : \mathbb{N}, x(n) = \text{ite}(n = 0, y(0), y(n) + z(n - 1))$$

- Represent streams as uninterpreted functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \tau$

- Examples:

$$x = y + z \quad \forall n : \mathbb{N}, x(n) = y(n) + z(n)$$

$$x = y \text{ --> } y + \text{pre } z \quad \forall n : \mathbb{N}, x(n) = \text{ite}(n = 0, y(0), y(n) + z(n - 1))$$

- Let N be a node with stream variables $x = \langle x_1, \dots, x_p, y_1, \dots, y_q \rangle$
 (x_1, \dots, x_p are inputs, and y_1, \dots, y_q are outputs)

$$\bullet \Delta(n) = \begin{cases} y_1(n) = t_1[x(n), x(n-1), \dots, x(n-d)] \\ \vdots \\ y_q(n) = t_q[x(n), x(n-1), \dots, x(n-d)] \end{cases}$$

```
node thermostat (actual_temp, target_temp, margin: real)
```

```
returns (cool, heat: bool);
```

```
let
```

```
  cool = (actual_temp - target_temp) > margin;
```

```
  heat = (actual_temp - target_temp) < -margin;
```

```
tel
```

```
node therm_control (actual: real; up, down: bool) returns (heat, cool: bool);
```

```
var target, margin: real;
```

```
let
```

```
  margin = 1.5;
```

```
  target = 70.0 -> if down then (pre target) - 1.0  
                  else if up then (pre target) + 1.0  
                  else pre target;
```

```
  (cool, heat) = thermostat (actual, target, margin);
```

```
tel
```

$$\Delta(n) = \begin{cases} m(n) = 1.5 \\ t(n) = \text{ite}(n = 0, 70.0, \text{ite}(d(n), t(n-1) - 1.0, \dots)) \\ c(n) = (a(n) - t(n)) > m(n) \\ h(n) = ((a(n) - t(n)) < -m(n)) \end{cases}$$

$$\Delta_0 \wedge \Delta_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \Delta_k \models_{\mathcal{IL}} P_0 \wedge P_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge P_k \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \Delta_n \wedge \Delta_{n+1} \wedge \cdots \wedge \Delta_{n+(k+1)} \wedge \\ P_n \wedge P_{n+1} \wedge \cdots \wedge P_{n+k} \end{array} \models_{\mathcal{IL}} P_{n+(k+1)} \quad (2)$$

where $k \geq 0$ and n is an uninterpreted integer constant.

Kind 2 optimizations: path compression

$C_{n,k}$ is a predicate over state variables that is satisfied iff no two configurations in a path have the same state and none of them, except possibly the first is the initial state.

$$\Delta_n \wedge \Delta_{n+1} \wedge \cdots \wedge \Delta_{n+(k+1)} \wedge P_n \wedge P_{n+1} \wedge \cdots \wedge P_{n+k} \wedge C_{n,k} \models_{\mathcal{IL}} P_{n+(k+1)} \quad (2')$$

Allows the addition of a termination condition.

$$\Delta_0 \wedge \cdots \wedge \Delta_k \models_{\mathcal{IL}} \neg C_{0,k+1}$$

Kind 2 optimizations: abstraction

- Drop equations defining variables that are not mentioned in the property P .
Sound: those variables are unconstrained (like inputs).
- Add them back one-by-one if checking fails.
Take one (removed) variable appearing in counter-example and recursively add removed variables from its defining expression (work towards input variables).

Summary

- Express programs, (safety) properties, and assumptions on the environment in a single language.
- Model-checking ideal:
 - » 'push-button' verification gives ok or counter-example;
 - » no need to understand why (i.e., write invariants).
- SAT-based techniques for BMC, complete with k -induction.
- Extend SAT to SMT to handle integers and directly encode Lustre programs.
- Lots of tools for automating induction and interfacing with SMT solvers
 - » Mikino tutorial [Champion, Oliveira, and Didier (2022): Mikino: Induction for Dummies]
 - » F* [Swamy et al. (2016): Dependent Types and Multi-monadic Effects in F*], Why3 [Bobot, Filliâtre, Marché, and Paskevich (2011): Why3: Sheperd your herd of provers], Boogie [Barnett, Chang, DeLine, Jacobs, and Leino (2005): Boogie: A Modular Reusable Verifier for Object-Oriented Programs], ...
- Just the tip of the iceberg (IC3/PDR, interactive theorem provers, ...)

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