

Introduction to the Lattice Crypto Day

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


May 2010

Summary

- History of Lattice-based Crypto
- Background on Lattices
- Lattice-based Crypto vs. “Classical” PKC
- Program of the Day

Lattice- Based Crypto: A long story



Lattices and Cryptology

- Two years stand out:
 - 1982
 - 1996

Factoring Polynomials with Rational Coefficients

A. K. Lenstra¹, H. W. Lenstra, Jr.², and L. Lovász³

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In this paper we present a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the following problem: given a non-zero polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Q}[X]$ in one variable with rational coefficients, find the decomposition of f into irreducible factors in $\mathbb{Q}[X]$. It is well

Our method of attack uses recent results of Lenstra and Lovacz [2]. We treat the cryptographic problem as a lattice problem, rather than a linear programming problem as in Shamir's result. Like Shamir, we are unable to present a rigorous proof that the algorithm works. However,

ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY

Proceedings of Crypto 82

ON BREAKING THE ITERATED MERKLE-HELLMAN
PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM

Leonard M. Adleman*

Publication
of LLL
1982

First use of
lattices in
cryptanalysis

ECCC
TR96-007

FTP: <ftp.eccc.uni-trier.de/pub/eccc/>
WWW: <http://www.eccc.uni-trier.de/eccc/>
Email: ftpmail@ftp.eccc.uni-trier.de with subject 'help eccc'

Crypto '96 Rump Session

Generating Hard Instances of Lattice Problems

Extended abstract

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ABSTRACT. We give a random class of lattices in \mathbb{Z}^n so that, if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which finds a short vector in a random lattice with a probability of at least $\frac{1}{2}$ then there is also a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which solves the following three lattice problems in *every* lattice in \mathbb{Z}^n with a probability exponentially close to one. (1) Find the length of a shortest nonzero vector in an n -dimensional lattice, approximately, up to a polynomial factor. (2) Find the shortest nonzero vector in an n -dimensional lattice L where the shortest vector v is unique in the sense that any other vector whose length is at most $n^c \|v\|$ is parallel to v , where c is a sufficiently large absolute constant. (3) Find a basis b_1, \dots, b_n in the n -dimensional lattice L whose length, defined as $\max_{i=1}^n \|b_i\|$, is the smallest possible up to a polynomial factor.

New constructions II

9:21 Daniele Micciancio

An oblivious data structure and its applications to cryptography

9:26 Ran Canetti and Rosario Gennaro

Incoercible multi-party computation

9:31 Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph Silverman

A ring-based public-key cryptosystem

Ajtai's worst-case to
average-case reduction

1996

Invention of
NTRU

Lattices and Cryptology

- Two years stand out:
 - **1982**: First use of lattices in cryptanalysis
 - **1996**: First crypto schemes based on hard lattice problems


Lattice-based Crypto

- Somewhat a revival of knapsack crypto (MerkleHellman78,...)
- Two Families:
 - “Theoretical”: [Ajtai96...] focus on security proofs.
 - “Applied”: [NTRU96...] focus on efficiency.
- They “interact” more and more:
[Micc02,GPV08,Gentry09,Peikert10,LPR10,...]

Lattice Problems in Crypto


- In many crypto schemes, one actually deals with problems not defined using lattices:
 - **SIS**. 'minicrypt': OWF, hashing, signatures, identification.
 - **LWE**. 'cryptomania': pk-encryption, (H)IBE, oblivious transfer.
- Both are connected to lattice problems.

Background on Lattices




Lattices

- Consider \mathbf{R}^n with the usual topology of a Euclidean space: let $\langle u, v \rangle$ be the dot product and $\|w\|$ the norm.
- A **lattice** is a discrete subgroup of \mathbf{R}^n .
- Ex: \mathbf{Z}^n and its subgroups.



Equivalent Definition


- Let L be a non-empty set of \mathbb{R}^n . There is equivalence between:
 - L is a lattice.



- There exist **linearly independent** vectors b_1, b_2, \dots, b_d such that
$$L = L(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_d) = \mathbb{Z}b_1 + \mathbb{Z}b_2 + \dots + \mathbb{Z}b_d.$$
- Such vectors form a **basis** of a lattice L .

Volume of a Lattice

- Each basis spans a parallelepiped, whose volume only depends on the lattice. This is the **lattice volume**.




- By scaling, we can always ensure that the volume is 1 like \mathbf{Z}^n .

Lattices in Crypto

- Most of the time, lattice-based crypto restricts to full-rank integer lattices, and sometimes even more (Ajtai's lattices)...
- For a full-rank lattice L in \mathbf{Z}^n , the quotient \mathbf{Z}^n/L is a **finite group** and $\text{vol}(L)=[\mathbf{Z}^n:L]$.


Lattice Problems



Complexity of Lattice Problems


- Since 1996, lattices are **very trendy** in complexity: classical and quantum.
- Depending on the approximation factor with respect to the dimension:

- NP-hardness $O(1)$
- non NP-hardness (NP_{nc} -NP) \sqrt{n}
- worst-case/average-case reduction $O(n \log n)$
- polynomial-time algorithms $2^{O(n \log \log n / \log n)}$



The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)


- Input: a basis of a d -dim lattice L
- Output: nonzero $v \in L$ minimizing $\|v\|$.



2	0	0	0	0
0	2	0	0	0
0	0	2	0	0
0	0	0	2	0
1	1	1	1	1

The Closest Vector Problem (CVP)

- Input: a basis of a lattice L of dim d , and a target vector t .
- Output: $v \in L$ minimizing $\|v - t\|$.



- Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD): CVP where t is close to L .

Lattice-based Crypto vs Classical PKC



Analogy

- Certain lattice crypto schemes somewhat look alike certain schemes from the “classical” PKC world (RSA, DL, Pairings).
- This is especially the case for the emerging lattice IBE family (vs. pairing crypto): [GPV08], [CHKP10], [B10], [ABB10], ...

Differences

- Finitely generated groups
- Noise
- Probability distributions
- Many parameters: selection?

Lattices and Probability



Probability and PKC

- Security proofs require (rigorous) **probability distributions** and **efficient sampling**.
- In classical PKC, a typical distribution is the **uniform distribution** over a finite group.
- Ex: The lack of nice probability distribution was problematic for braid cryptography.

Lattices and Probability


- Distributions on Lattice Points
- Distributions on Lattices

Distribution on Lattice Points

- The Discrete Gaussian
- Mass proportional to


$$\rho_{s,c}(\mathbf{x}) = e^{-\pi \|\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c}\|^2 / s^2}$$

- The distribution is independent of the basis.



Sampling Lattice Points

- This can be done by **randomizing** Babai's nearest plane algo [Bab86].
- [Klein00,GPV08]: given a lattice basis, one can sample lattice points according to the Gaussian discrete distribution in poly-time, as while as the mean norm is somewhat larger than the norms of the basis.



Distributions on Lattices

- Random Lattices
 - In Crypto
 - In Mathematics

Random Lattices in Crypto

- Let n, m, q be integers where $m \geq n \log q$.
- Let A be a $m \times n$ matrix whose coeffs have uniform distribution mod q .
- $L_A = \{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{Z}^m \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{x}A \equiv 0 \pmod{q} \}$. Is a full-rank lattice in \mathbf{Z}^m whose volume divides q^n .
- [Ajtai96]: Finding extremely short vectors in a random $(m\text{-dim})$ L_A is as hard as finding short vectors in every $n\text{-dim}$ lattice.

Note

- In practice, an m -dim Ajtai lattice is typically “easier than usual”, because of the existence of unusual sublattices.
- See Darmstadt’s lattice challenges solved in dim 500–750.

Note: The SIS Problem

- **SIS** (Small Integer Solution) = finding short vectors in a random Ajtai lattice L_A .
- This is why several crypto schemes actually only considers such lattices. But it might be good to keep generality, for the time being.

Random Lattices in Mathematics

- Random (Real) Lattices [Siegel1945]
- Random Integer Lattices [GoMa2003]

Random Integer Lattices

- Let V and n be integers.
- There are only finitely many full-rank lattices in \mathbf{Z}^n of volume V .
- A random full-rank integer lattice of volume V is simply one selected uniformly at random.
- Sampling random integer lattices is trivial when V is prime (see Hermite normal form).

Interest

- This is a natural and simple distribution, used in all recent benchmarks of lattice algorithms.
- [GoldsteinMayer2003]: when $V \rightarrow \infty$ and we scale such lattices, the distribution “converges” to the “classical” distribution on random lattices of volume 1.

Random Real Lattices

- Lebesgue's measure is the "unique" measure over \mathbb{R}^n which is invariant by translation.
- In 1933, Haar generalized Lebesgue's measure to **locally compact topological groups**: it is the "unique" measure which is invariant by the group action (left or right multiplication).



Random Real Lattices

- The set of **lattices modulo scale** can be identified with $G = \mathrm{SL}_n(\mathbf{R}) / \mathrm{SL}_n(\mathbf{Z})$.
- The Haar measure over $\mathrm{SL}_n(\mathbf{R})$ projects to a **finite** measure over G . For $n=2$, it is the hyperbolic measure.
- \Rightarrow natural probability measure over G , giving rise to **random lattices**, first used in [Siegel45].



Random Real Lattices



- [Ajtai06]: one can efficiently sample for the classical distribution on random real lattices.

Schedule

- 10h: Oded Regev on LWE
- 11h: Vadim Lyubashevsky on Ring-LWE
- 14h: Chris Peikert on IBE and beyond
- 15h: Craig Gentry on fully homomorphic encryption