

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

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Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several security properties, for voting schemes, without non-standard assumptions. This paper is a work in progress. More specifically, we focus on the universal verifiability of the computation of the tally, on the unconditional privacy/anonymity of the votes, and on the receipt-freeness properties. More precisely, under usual assumptions and efficiency requirements, we show that we cannot achieve:

- universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and unconditional privacy of the votes (UP) simultaneously, unless *all* the registered voters actually vote;
- universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and receipt-freeness (RF), unless the voting process involves interactions between several voters (and possibly the voting authority).

1 Introduction

A huge number of properties for voting schemes have been proposed so far: and namely, the *universal verifiability* (UV), the *unconditional privacy/anonymity* of the votes (UP), the receipt-freeness (RF), the incoercibility, multiple votes. . .

Some properties seem quite important because usual systems and/or paper-based systems achieve them, and some other seem more theoretical because they are not (efficiently) satisfied in existing schemes: people expect much more from electronic voting schemes than from paper-based systems: the best example is the universal verifiability. Furthermore, some properties are easily satisfied by using physical assumptions such as voting booths, while they are difficult if one can vote at home: this is the case of incoercibility. Since cryptography is usually very powerful and makes possible some paradoxical things, one is tempted to build a system that achieves as many properties as possible, with as few assumptions as possible. But what is actually achievable?

In this paper, we address this question: can we build a voting system that simultaneously satisfies several properties, without non-standard assumptions? More precisely, on the one hand we study the universal verifiability (UV) and the unconditional privacy of the votes (UP), which is sometimes replaced by the unconditional anonymity of the voters. On the other hand, we consider the universal verifiability (UV) and the receipt-freeness (RF). In both cases, we show that we cannot simultaneously achieve the two properties without strong extra assumptions, such as secure channels or high interactivity between the voters, which are two unrealistic assumptions for efficient and practical protocols. Furthermore, we assume that the voters only interact with the voting authority and not each other.

The universal verifiability and the unconditional privacy can indeed be simultaneously satisfied if *all* the registered voters actually vote; similarly the universal verifiability and the receipt-freeness can be simultaneously achieved if the voting transcript of a voter *does not* depend on the voter (his vote, his secret, and a random value)

only. It is well-known that using multi-party computation techniques a strongly secure voting scheme can be built, that achieves all the above ideal properties, but using either secure channels or multiple interaction between the parties (the voters). However, the schemes will no longer be efficient in practice since the circuit to compute secure votes will have a large number of gates according to the number of properties we want to achieve. Consequently, cryptographic assumptions are usually made to provide efficient voting schemes: efficient voting schemes that guarantee receipt-freeness or incoercibility [2, 4, 13, 17, 18, 21] use secure channels.

In the standard model we adopt below, we assume algorithmic assumptions only, but no secret channels nor physical assumptions such as tamper-resistant devices [18]. In addition, while studying the security properties of voting schemes, we try to explain why the traditional schemes, based on blind signatures, mix-nets or homomorphic encryption, satisfy these properties or not.

Having a clear view of which sets of properties are achievable has a practical significance: one can easily conceive that the properties required for a national election or for an internal company board vote are different. For instance, the unconditional privacy (UP) of the vote will be important (if not required) for national elections, while the receipt-freeness (RF) will not be as critical as it may be difficult to buy votes on a very large scale without detection. For a board vote, a few number of voters typically have a very large number of shares, while the rest have a small number of shares. The major voters choices are often not private (let alone unconditionally private) because they can be inferred from the result of the vote. However, it may be tempting for a dishonest important voter, which could already have 40% of the shares, to buy the missing 10% to safeguard a majority. The receipt-freeness property is therefore more critical in that case.

Organization. The paper is organized as follows: first, in section 2, we give formal definitions to the above UV, UP and RF security notions. Then, we show the incompatibility results in section 3.

Notations. We use the following notations in the rest of the paper:

- L represents the list of the registered voters,
- V_i is an actual voter,
- \mathbf{V} is the list of the actual voters,
- \mathbf{sk}_i is the secret key of the voter V_i ,
- v_i is the vote of voter V_i ,
- \mathbf{v} the set of votes,
- r_i is the random coins of voter V_i ,
- \mathbf{r} the set of the random coins,
- \mathbf{B} is the set of all the transcripts between the voters and the voting authority, also known as the bulletin-board,
- B_i is the transcript of V_i (that is the interactions between voter V_i and the voting authority, assumed to be public, but not necessarily easy to extract from \mathbf{B}),
- T is the tally of the vote,
- w, w' will denote the witnesses in some \mathcal{NP} — relations R and R' ,
- f, f', f'', g and h will be some functions.

2 Security Notions

In this section, we formally define the most usual security notions: universal verifiability, unconditional privacy, and receipt-freeness.

2.1 Universal Verifiability of the Tally

This security notion tries to prevent voters against dishonest voting authorities that would try to cheat during the computation of the tally.

For example, voting schemes using blind-signature [8, 16, 20] cannot achieve this property since the authority can add some ballots and bias the tally. On the other hand, schemes using mix-nets [1, 9–12, 14, 19, 22] and/or homomorphic encryption [3, 6, 7] can provide it.

First, in order to universally check the validity and the correction of a vote, one has to guarantee that a voter has not voted twice. Consequently, one needs to authenticate the ballot in some way, using a private information. To this end, one needs to be able to verify both the link between the list of the registered voters L , and the list of the transcripts \mathbf{B} (or the bulletin-board) in order to validate the vote, and the link between the bulletin-board and the computation of the tally T .

Definition 1 (Voting Scheme). For a voting scheme to be practical:

- from the partial list of transcripts \mathbf{B} produced by $V_1, \dots, V_n \in L$, the voting authority should be able to determine whether a new transcript B produced by V_{n+1} is valid (well-formed and does not correspond to a double vote):

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists f, \forall n, \forall V_1, \dots, V_n, V_{n+1} \in L, \\ & \forall \mathbf{B} \leftarrow V_1, \dots, V_n, \\ & B \leftarrow V_{n+1}, f(\mathbf{B}, B) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } V_{n+1} \in \{V_1, \dots, V_n\} \\ 1, & \text{if } V_{n+1} \notin \{V_1, \dots, V_n\} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

We thus denote by \mathcal{L} the language of the bulletin-boards \mathbf{B} which are iteratively valid.

- from the transcripts, the voting authority should be able to compute the tally.

$$\exists f', \forall \mathbf{B} \in \mathcal{L}, f'(\mathbf{B}) = \sum_i v_i = T.$$

- from the transcripts, the voting authority should be able to compute the list of the actual voters.

$$\exists f'', \forall \mathbf{B} \in \mathcal{L}, f''(\mathbf{B}) = \mathbf{V}.$$

When one wants the universal verifiability, everybody should be able to check the correctness/validity of the votes and of the computation of the tally and the voters: the bulletin-board \mathbf{B} , the tally T and the list of the actual voters \mathbf{V} should rely in an \mathcal{NP} language \mathcal{L}' , defined by the relation R : there exists a witness w which allows an efficient verification. Furthermore, for any \mathbf{B} , the valid T and \mathbf{V} should be unique:

Definition 2 (Universal Verifiability (UV)). Let R be the above \mathcal{NP} -relation for the language \mathcal{L}' of the valid ballots, tally and voter-list. A voting scheme achieves the universal verification property if

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall \mathbf{B} \in \mathcal{L}, \exists! (T, \mathbf{V}) \text{ s.t. } \exists w \text{ s.t. } R(\mathbf{B}, T, \mathbf{V}, w) = 1 \\ & \forall \mathbf{B} \notin \mathcal{L}, \forall (T, \mathbf{V}, w) \ R(\mathbf{B}, T, \mathbf{V}, w) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, the witness can be computed: $w = g(\mathbf{B})$.

$$\exists g, \forall \mathbf{B} \in \mathcal{L}, R(\mathbf{B}, f'(\mathbf{B}), f''(\mathbf{B}), g(\mathbf{B})) = 1$$

It means that the tally and the list of voters are unique according to the bulletin-board, and that the voting authority can compute a short string (the witness) that allows everybody to check everything.

The functions f , f' , f'' and g may be keyed according to the system parameters: g is clearly private to the voting authority, while f and f'' may be public (which is the case in schemes based on homomorphic encryption). The function f' is likely to be private.

2.2 Unconditional Privacy

First, one should note that this notion can not be achieved in a very strong sense: if all voters vote identically, the tally reveals the vote of each voter. Consequently, privacy means that nobody should learn more information than what is leaked by the tally. By unconditional privacy, we mean that nobody should be able to learn any additional information even several centuries after the voting process.

In voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption [3, 6, 7] privacy relies on computational assumptions, and is thus not unconditional. When mix-nets are used, this is the same, since the latter applies on asymmetric encryptions of the votes. On the other hand, voting schemes based on blind signatures can achieve this strong security notion, but under the assumption of anonymous channels, which are usually obtained with asymmetric encryption: unconditional privacy vanishes!

Definition 3 (Unconditional Privacy (UP)). A voting scheme achieves the unconditional privacy if

$$\mathcal{D}(v | T, \mathbf{B}) \stackrel{p,s}{\equiv} \mathcal{D}(v | T).$$

This equation means that the distribution of the votes, given the bulletin-board and the tally T is the same as without any additional information to the tally. The distance between these two distributions can be perfect or statistical, hence the s and p .

2.3 Receipt-Freeness

The receipt-freeness property means that a voter cannot produce a proof of his vote to a third party. In such a security notion, interactions with the third party are allowed before and after the vote. Furthermore, if the vote is performed outside a booth, we can also assume that the third party tapes the channel between the voter and the voting authority: he has knowledge of the transcript, but also of all the information known to the voter, as well as the public information.

Definition 4 (Receipt-Freeness). A *receipt* is a witness w' which allows a third party to verify, in an unambiguous way, the vote of a voter $V_i \in \mathbf{V}$:

$$\exists! v_i, s.t. \exists w' s.t. R'(\mathbf{B}, V_i, v_i, w') = 1.$$

A voting scheme achieves the receipt-freeness property if there is no such a relation R' , or the witness is hard to compute for all the voters.

3 Incompatible Properties

In this section, we show that a voting scheme cannot provide

- the universal verifiability and the unconditional privacy of the votes, simultaneously, unless all the voters actually vote;
- the universal verifiability and the receipt-freeness, simultaneously, if the transcript of a voter depends on the voter, his vote, and his random only.

3.1 Universal Verifiability and Unconditional Privacy

Theorem 5. *In the standard model, it is impossible to build a voting scheme that simultaneously achieves the universal verifiability and the unconditional privacy unless all the voters actually vote.*

Proof. Assume we have a *universal verifiability* voting scheme. Then, we want to prove that the *unconditional privacy* cannot be achieved.

Because of the universal verifiability, there exists an \mathcal{NP} -relation R such that $R(\mathbf{B}, T, \mathbf{V}, w) = 1$, where w is a witness, for a unique tally T . Because of the existence of f , f' and g , a powerful adversary can guess T , \mathbf{V} and w for any valid \mathbf{B} : excluding parts of transcripts, this adversary can get the excluded voter V' (from the new \mathbf{V}' , and the new tally T' , which leaks the vote $v' = T - T'$ of that voter V'). \square

This proof works because the above relation R applies whatever the size of \mathbf{B} is, which allows us to exclude one transcript. If the transcripts of all the registered voters were required in R , the contradiction would not hold anymore. But such a restriction is not realistic.

In [15], Kiayias and Yung propose a voting scheme in which the privacy is maintained in a distributed way among all the voters. There is no voting authority. They prove that the scheme provides the perfect ballot secrecy which does not correspond to our notion of unconditional privacy: it means that the security of a bulletin is guaranteed as long as the size of a coalition is not too large and of course according to the tally result and coalition votes. However, in their scheme, each ballot is encrypted using a conditionally secure encryption scheme.

In [5], Cramer *et al.* propose a voting scheme that guarantees the unconditional privacy by using unconditionally secure homomorphic commitments. However, the scheme uses private channels.

3.2 Universal Verifiability and Receipt-Freeness

Theorem 6. *If there exists a function h such that $B_i = h(P, V_i, sk_i, v_i, r_i)$, where v_i is the vote of the voter V_i , sk_i his private authentication information, r_i a possibly random value chosen by V_i , and P some public information, then the universal verifiability and the receipt-freeness properties cannot be simultaneously achieved without additional assumptions.*

Proof. Because of the universal verifiability, v_i is uniquely determined by B_i or V_i . Therefore, (r_i, sk_i) is a good witness, and thus a receipt, with the function h : the scheme is not receipt-free. \square

If the transcript is more intricate, and namely includes interactions between the voters, then it may be possible to achieve the two properties simultaneously, but this leads to an inefficient protocol.

In [13], the authors propose a voting scheme that achieves both universal verifiability and receipt-freeness, but they need secret channels between the voters and the voting authority: B_i is no longer available to the third-party, and thus r_i is no longer a witness either. But again, such an assumption is unrealistic.

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