Secure Mobile Gambling

RSA Conference '2001 San Francisco, California, April 2001

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Overview

- Introduction
- Constraints
 - device
 - communication
 - adversary
- Our solution
- Conclusion

Introduction

Want! Gambling & gaming using handheld computers and cellular phones

Problems!

- trust between users and casino
- accidental/malicious disconnections
- computational limitations

Requirements:

- use only computationally inexpensive operations
- always allow recovery of state and conflict resolution

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Structure

- 1. Do a setup of many games
- 2. Play an individual game
- The revealed parameters of the game automatically "turn into" an electronic payment to the winner
- 4. Allow restart at same point if disconnected

Definitions

Metagame

game + disconnection strategies

Robustness

the disconnection strategy cannot increase the payoff for a cheater

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Constraints

Typical devices:

- limited memory
- limited computational power

Possible attackers:

lots of storage & computational power

Basic Assumptions

Casino:

May want to cheat but won't systematically deny a player access

Bank:

Will not collude with players or casino Will not steal money


Game:

Focus on open card games

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Game Node



Game:

Defined by game_{i,casino} and game_{i,player} + strategy

Play One Game

- 0. Player & Casino have already exchanged game_{i,player} and game_{i,casino}
- 1. Player sends $r_{i,player}$, casino checks it
- 2. Strategies:

Casino reveals decision preimages, player checks Player reveals decision preimages, casino checks (repeated one or more times)

- 3. Casino sends $r_{i,casino}$, player checks.
- 4. Evaluate game function on all known preimages and obtain result (= an electronic coin)

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
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Example: Roulette

- Player makes a bet by selecting a position and amount
- 2. Bet translated into choice of (decision) preimages ⇒ Player reveals preimages
- 3. Casino reveals a fix preimage (no strategy)
- 4. Determine outcome as a deterministic, but one-way function, of all known preimages

Intuition: why no cheating?

Game Trees



- All randomness can be generated from one seed
- in setup, player and casino sign the pair

(root casino, root player)

preimages + above signature become "payment orders".

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Disconnection

- Because of the signed trees, after a disconnection, they start again at the same point (where the game stopped)
- With a new strategy?
 If the casino/player uses a different strategy,
 the player/casino can choose the worst strategy
 of his adversary by selecting among
 all the revealed preimages
 - ⇒ bad idea to change anything

Conflict Resolution

- If two equal "deposits" of same game, bank pays first one only
- If several inconsistent deposits of same game, bank locates inconsistencies, and lets other party win
- Other cases ... see in the paper

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Conclusion

- Low computation & storage
- can recover state
- disconnection strategies useless
- conflict resolution
- secure gambling for handheld devices